Instituting Collaborative Conservation in Federal Land Management: the BLM\u27s Resource Advisory Councils as an Example by Donatelle, Benjamin D
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
2015 
Instituting Collaborative Conservation in Federal Land 
Management: the BLM's Resource Advisory Councils as an 
Example 
Benjamin D. Donatelle 
University of Montana, Missoula 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
 Part of the Environmental Studies Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Donatelle, Benjamin D., "Instituting Collaborative Conservation in Federal Land Management: the BLM's 
Resource Advisory Councils as an Example" (2015). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers. 4566. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/4566 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
INSTITUTING COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION IN FEDERAL LAND 
MANAGEMENT: THE BLM’S RESOURCE ADVISORY COUNCILS AS AN 
EXAMPLE 
By 
BENJAMIN DAVID DONATELLE 
BA Business Administration, University of Wisconsin, Steven’s Point, WI, 2002 
 
Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
Master of Science 
in  
Environmental Studies 
 
The University of Montana 
Missoula, MT 
 
December 2015 
 
Approved by: 
 
Sandy Ross, Dean of The Graduate School 
Graduate School 
 
Len Broberg, Chair  
Environmental Studies 
 
Matthew McKinney 
Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy 
 
Martin Nie 
College of Forestry and Conservation 
 
 
 
 
  
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© COPYRIGHT 
 
by 
 
Benjamin David Donatelle 
 
2015 
 
All Rights Reserved 
 iii 
Abstract  
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Abstract 
 
Chair: Len Broberg 
 
  Collaborative Conservation is one type of Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) 
that, since the 1970’s, has proliferated throughout public land and natural resource 
management, especially in the Western United States.  As the notion of collaboration has 
risen in the collective consciousness of public land management professionals, various 
efforts to capitalize on its use have been instituted through regulatory reforms and 
legislation.  For example, the Forest Service’s recent adoption of the 2012 planning rule 
emphasizes collaboration and enhanced public involvement in revising forest 
management plans.  Meanwhile, for twenty years the Resource Advisory Councils have 
fulfilled their regulatory responsibilities and exemplify policy mandated collaborative 
consensus-building process, yet little research has been conducted to understand what 
contributes to their effectiveness.  
 
  This study investigates the effect of instituting or requiring collaborative conservation in 
the management of public lands by examining the Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) 
as they are employed within the Bureau of Land Management.   This study seeks to 
understand the key benefits and features of the RAC institution that enable its 
effectiveness by asking: what can be learned from the Rocky Mountain Region RACs as 
an example for how collaborative problem solving can be instituted in public lands 
management? And, how can these lessons inform future attempts to institute 
collaborative governance within the legal and institutional framework of federal public 
lands management?   
 
  An analysis of records from past meetings and interviews with RAC and agency staff 
members resulted in a comprehensive understanding of the issues over which the RACs 
deliberate, their process for formulating recommendations and what benefits are realized 
from the program.  Responses from the interviews indicated a high level of value 
associated with participating in the RAC program such as increased trust between 
participants, appreciation of the complexity of controversial issues, and an ability to help 
the BLM make difficult decisions.  Several recommendations for improvement are also 
highlighted.  
 
  In an age of ceaseless animosity over the management of federal public lands, this study 
contributes to advancing the integration of collaborative problem solving in federal lands 
management and gives voice to the positive effects of community-based conflict 
resolution.  
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1. Introduction 
Collaborative Conservation is one form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) or 
Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) that, since the late 1970’s, has proliferated 
throughout public land and natural resource management, especially in the Western United 
States.  Whether considered a passing fad or the new way of doing business, collaborative 
approaches to natural resource conflict resolution, environmental decision making, and 
land-use planning have undeniably left their mark on the history of natural resource 
management over the past thirty years.  The ability of collaborative conservation to achieve 
on the ground results by bringing together diverse, often adversarial interests to solve 
natural resource problems has caught the attention of policy makers at both the state and 
federal level.  This study investigates the institutionalization, or instituting1 of such 
collaborative processes of ECR within federal agencies by focusing on the example of the 
Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) within the United States Department of Interior’s 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).   
This investigation follows two main threads of inquiry.  First, what can be learned 
from the Rocky Mountain Region RACs, as an example for how collaborative problem 
solving can be instituted in public lands management? Second, how can these lessons 
inform future attempts to institute collaborative governance within the legal and 
institutional framework of federal public lands management?  In approaching this 
investigation, three research questions were developed to probe both the policy and 
                                                 
1 Christine Carlson and John Stephens.  Governance and institutionalization: How may the institutions 
of government make appropriate, sustained use of consensus building processes at the local, state, and 
federal levels? Unpublished manuscript. (October 3, 2002). On file with the Author.  In their article, 
the authors distinguish between institutionalize, which is, “...synonymous with bureaucratize, a 
mindless consistency, active suppression of innovation, and frustration of common-sense problem-
solving...” and institute, which better describes how “...dispute resolution or collaborative practices 
can be employed by government.”  
 2 
practical aspects of the BLM RACs as an institution: 1) What catalyzed the use of 
collaboration in creating the RACs? 2) What has enabled the RACs to achieve their core 
purpose? 3) What sustains the RACs over time as a collaborative arrangement instituted by 
a policy mandate within a federal land management agency? Together the suite of questions 
guides this study through an exploration of the legal arrangement Resource Advisory 
Councils have within the BLM, and the effect instituting the RACs within the BLM has had on  
public participation and collaborative conservation in BLM land and natural resource 
management.  
 This paper begins by highlighting the legal framework for public participation in 
federal public land and natural resource planning and decision making.  This framework 
both created the conditions for collaborative processes of ECR to evolve and poses 
limitations to their use.  Next, the paper introduces community-based collaborative 
conservation initiatives and discusses the evolution, theory and design principles that guide 
successful systems of collaborative dispute resolution. This discussion sets the stage for 
outlining the criteria used to analyze and evaluate the RACs in subsequent chapters.  Finally, 
an introduction of the idea of instituting collaborative processes within federal agency 
planning and decision making justifies this investigation while briefly illustrating examples 
of where else this is occurring in other federal agencies.  
 Chapter three briefly outlines the history of the Bureau of Land Management and its 
relationship with community-based collaborative governance.  This discussion provides a 
rationale for looking more deeply into the Resource Advisory Councils as an example of a 
collaborative process instituted by a policy mandate within a federal land management 
agency.  It traces the evolution of the agency’s statutory and regulatory mandates, the 
reforms that created the RACs in the 1990’s, and provides justification for the selection of 
 3 
the BLM RACs to answer the above research questions.  The end of chapter three addresses 
research sub-question #1: What catalyzed the use of collaboration in creating the RACs?  
 Chapter Four constitutes the original research for this study and explores sub-
questions two and three: What has enabled the RACs to achieve their core purpose as 
outlined in the regulations? And, what sustains the RACs over time as a collaborative 
arrangement instituted by a policy mandate within a federal land management agency?  
Through in-depth personal interviews of RAC members and BLM agency staff, this study 
explores the effectiveness of institutionalizing collaboration (in the form of the RACs) as 
evaluated through the lens of the collaborative process design and evaluation theory 
outlined in chapter two.  
 Chapter five concludes this study by reflecting on the findings from the RAC 
interviews to answer the two primary research questions mentioned above.  This reflection 
compares the RACs to the principles of dispute resolution process design and collaborative 
governance to draw out lessons that could help improve the RAC program or inform 
attempts to further institute and integrate collaborative conservation in other areas of land 
use or natural resource management.    
Purpose, Need, and Justification 
This research examines the use of Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) in the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) as an example of a twenty-year experiment in implementing a 
policy-mandated forum for collaborative conservation in federal public land management.  
The RACs were instituted by Secretary Bruce Babbitt under the regulatory reform known as 
Rangeland Reform ’94.2  For twenty years, the RACs have formally brought together diverse, 
                                                 
2 Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Rangeland Reform ’94 Final Environmental 
Impact Statement. Bureau of Land Management, Washington DC. (1994): 3. [cited hereafter as 
Rangeland Reform ‘94 FEIS]. 
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often adversarial interests to collaborate and provide consensus-based advice on 
management issues to the BLM throughout the Western United States.  This study 
investigates the effects of the regulatory mandate on the collaborative process, public 
participation in BLM land management decision making, and the principles of democratic 
governance.   
This process of collaborative problem solving is not a unique phenomenon.  Other 
forms of ADR are being instituted in other branches of the Federal Government.  The US 
Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the Department of Interior’s National Park 
Service and BLM, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), even the Department of 
Defense are utilizing ADR practices in land use planning and natural resource decision 
making.  Examples include the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program 
(CFLRP), the Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule, and programs for alternative dispute 
resolution outlined in the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act and a myriad of state programs.3  
In 1993, the US Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution was established under the 
Udall Foundation as national support structure for agency professionals facing conflicts 
over environmental issues on the lands and resources they manage.  That these programs 
and policies are being broadly instituted throughout the Department of Agriculture, the 
Department of the Interior and other Federal Agencies is a testament to their perceived 
effectiveness and warrants looking more deeply into the effects of this institutionalization.  
Over time, evaluation of ECR processes has developed into a field of inquiry in itself. 
Scholars and dispute resolution professionals have developed an array of methods to 
evaluate the effectiveness collaborative processes of consensus building, problem solving 
                                                 
3 Sara Bates Van De Wetering. A Legal Framework for Cooperative Conservation. Public Policy 
Research Institute of the University of Montana. (2006).  
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and governance.4  These evaluations have primarily taken a case study approach, evaluating 
individual processes since the late 1990’s.5    Some scholars have investigated mandated 
processes of dispute resolution,6 and others have evaluated the social effects or 
management outcomes of policy mandated collaborative processes such as the CFLRP.7  One 
University of Montana Thesis project from 2003 took strides in evaluating how the RACs 
were meeting their stated goals after ten years of implementation. However, this study 
stopped short of assessing the larger implications of mandating collaborative governance 
on the decision making and public engagement process.  While substantial literature 
outlines criteria for evaluating collaborative processes and methods for doing so, to date, 
little research has been conducted on the effects of instituting a process for collaborative 
governance on planning, decision making and public engagement.8  This study is one 
attempt to do so.  
Definitions 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is defined by the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1993 as any procedure that is used to resolve issues in controversy, 
including, but not limited to, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini trials, 
arbitration, and use of ombuds, or any combination thereof.9 
                                                 
4 Alexander Conley & Margaret A. Moote.  “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management.” 
Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal. Vol. 16, No. 5 (2003): 371-386.  The authors 
give a good overview of existing evaluation methods used by scholars in determining the success of 
approaches to environmental conflict Resolution. 
5Matthew McKinney and Patrick Field. “Evaluating Community-Based Collaboration on Federal Lands 
and Resources.” Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal. Vol. 21 No. 5(2008): 419-429. 
6 Sara B. Van de Wetering and Matthew McKinney. “The Role of Mandatory Dispute Resolution in 
Federal Environmental Law: Lessons from the Clean Air Act.” Journal of Environmental Law and 
Litigation. Vol. 21, No. 1 (2006): 1-45. 
7 Courtney Schultz, Theresa Jedd, and Ryan D. Beam. “The Collaborative Forest Landscape 
Restoration Program: A History and Overview of the First Projects.” Journal of Forestry. Vol. 110, No. 
7 (2012): 381-391. 
8 Dukes, E. Franklin. What we know about environmental conflict resolution: An analysis based on 
research. Conflict Resolution Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1-2 (2004):191-220. 
9 Pub. L. 114-38 codified as amended 5 USC § 571(3) 
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Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) is described by the Office of Management 
and Budget as third-party assisted conflict resolution in the context of environmental, 
public lands, or natural resources issues.10  The Udall Foundation’s U.S. Institute of 
Environmental Conflict Resolution goes on to refine the definition by saying, “The term 
"ECR" encompasses a range of assisted negotiation processes and applications. These 
processes directly engage affected interests and governmental decision makers in conflict 
resolution and collaborative problem solving.”11 
Public Involvement is defined for the BLM in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 as, “...the opportunity for participation by affected 
citizens in rule making, decision making, and planning with respect to the public lands, 
including public meetings or hearings held at locations near the affected lands, or advisory 
mechanisms, or such other procedures as may be necessary to provide public comment in a 
particular instance.”12  
The term public lands has various definitions.  For example, FLPMA defines public 
lands as, “any land and interest in land owned by the United States within the several States 
and administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management, 
without regard to how the United States acquired ownership...”13   The Secure Rural Schools 
Act of 2000 defines Public Lands as, “lands within the National Forest System, as defined in 
section 11(a) of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16 
                                                 
10 Office of Management and Budget and the President’s Council on Environmental Quality. 
Memorandum on Environmental Collaboration and Conflict Resolution. Available at: 
https://www.udall.gov/documents/ Institute/OMB_CEQ_Memorandum_2012.pdf  
11 U.S. Institute of Environmental Conflict Resolution. Frequently Asked Questions: What is 
Environmental Conflict Resolution? Accessed 11/20/15. Available: https://www.udall.gov/ 
OurPrograms/Institute/QuestionsAnswers.aspx  
12 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Office of the Solicitor (editors). 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, as amended. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Land Management Office of Public Affairs. Washington, D.C. (2001): Pg. 2. 
13 Ibid; 2. 
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U.S.C. 1609(a)) exclusive of the National Grasslands...”14  As the term pertains to this study, 
public lands means the portion of the federal public estate managed by the USDA Forest 
Service and the DOI Bureau of Land Management, the two multiple-use land management 
agencies. 
One definition of collaboration that has been widely accepted by scholars 
throughout the academic literature since it was first articulated by Barbara Gray in 1985 is; 
“The pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor, 
etc., by two or more stakeholders to solve a set of problems which neither can solve 
individually.”15  
Collaboration is also defined by the agencies in various ways:   
According to the  USDA Forest Service 2012 Planning Rule, collaboration or 
collaborative process is collectively defined as,  “A structured manner in which a collection 
of people with diverse interests share knowledge, ideas, and resources while working 
together in an inclusive and cooperative manner toward a common purpose.” 16 
Collaboration is defined by the BLM FACA Handbook17 as, “A way of bringing 
communities together to address common problems; work through conflicts; and develop 
forward-thinking strategies for medium- to long-term multiple use management, 
protection, and development.” 
According to the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP), 
collaboration, “Includes multiple interested persons representing diverse interests; and is 
                                                 
14 Pub. L. 106-303 § 3(1)(a) 
15 Gray, Barbara. “Conditions Facilitating Interorganizational Collaboration.” Human Relations Vol. 30, 
No. 10(1985): 911-936, p. 912 
16 36 CFR 219.19 Available at: http://www.ecfr.gov 
17 Bureau of Land Management. National Policy for the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  Bureau of 
Land Management. Washington DC. (2005): 1. 
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transparent and nonexclusive; or meets the requirements for a resource advisory 
committee...” 
Democratic Governance and Collaborative Governance are defined as, “A governing 
arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a 
collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and 
that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.”18; or 
“...the art of governing communities in participatory, deliberative, and collaborative ways”19 
Institutionalization is defined by Stephens and Carlson as, “instituting or integrating 
processes of alternative dispute resolution and collaborative practices in government.” 
They are careful to distinguish between instituting and institutionalizing which, “to some is 
synonymous with bureaucratize, a mindless consistency, active suppression of innovation, 
and frustration of common-sense problem-solving.”20  Throughout this study, the term 
instituted has been adopted in favor of institutionalize to encompass all the activities of 
integrating a collaborative process into planning and decision making.  
Research Methods and Assumptions 
The primary research in this study investigates the effect of instituting a citizen-
based collaborative governance arrangement in federal land management.  The effect of 
instituting this collaborative process is evaluated based on three criteria: 1) how the RACs 
perform compared to their regulatory mandates, 2) the level of satisfaction participants felt 
with the collaborative process as it is structured within the BLM RACs, and 3) how the BLM 
                                                 
18 Matt Leighninger. The Next Form of Democracy: How Expert Rule is Giving Way to Shared 
Governance...And Why Politics Will Never Be the Same. Vanderbilt University Press. (2006). 
19 Chris Ansell and Alison Gash. "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice." Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 18, No. 4 (2008):543-571 
20 Carlson and Stephens.  (2002): 2. 
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RAC process compares with principles for successful dispute resolution design articulated 
in the literature on the evaluation of collaborative processes of ECR.   
Background research began in October of 2014 and consisted of a review of relevant 
literature on alternative dispute resolution, environmental conflict resolution, and 
collaborative conservation theory and practice. Once the RACs were selected as the example 
of policy mandated collaboration to further investigate, the geographic scope of this project 
was limited to the Rocky Mountain States in an attempt to define a region of comparable 
climatic, geographic, and socio-political characteristics and management issues.  A 
document analysis was then conducted of the available meeting minutes from the past two 
years of all sixteen RACs within the Rocky Mountain States of Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, 
Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona.  This analysis resulted in a comprehensive 
understanding of the issues over which the Rocky Mountain RACs are currently 
deliberating; their agenda setting, discussion and decision making procedures; past advice 
provided to the BLM and overlapping topics between districts in the region.  This 
background research informed the selection of case studies.  These case studies facilitated a 
deeper investigation into the perception of the RAC program’s effectiveness and successes 
through personal interviews of RAC members and agency representatives.      
From the document review, a stratified purposive sample of five Rocky Mountain 
RACs was selected.  The RACs were selected based on two factors: 1) to represent the 
geographic diversity from across the seven-state Rocky Mountain region, and 2) to 
represent the diverse structural models outlined in 43 CFR § 1784.6-2 within which the 
RACs can be organized.21  The initially selected sample included five RACs.  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
21 The RACs can be organized based on one of three models described in 43 CFR §1784.6-2.  Most 
RACs investigated in this study were organized under Model C which, among other things, allows the 
liberal use of sub-RACs.  
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one of the RACs was unresponsive to repeated requests for interviews, and so ultimately 
interviews of RAC members and agency staff from the remaining four RACs were conducted.   
A full set of interviews was defined as one BLM Representative who had a direct 
connection to the RAC, and one RAC member from each of the three interest categories.  A 
complete set of interviews was conducted for three of the RACs, while the final RAC was 
also extremely slow to respond to requests for interviews, and due to time constraints 
resulted in only two interviews: one RAC member and a BLM staff member.  A total of 14 in-
depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted between March and May of 2015.  
Although a limited sample population, the interviews provided a comprehensive view of the 
RACs benefits, successes and challenges from a significant cross section of RAC members 
and agency staff who are intimately involved with the program.  The interview questions 
explored four main topics: 1)participants motivation for and benefits from being involved 
with the RAC, 2)definition of and key factors enabling success, 3)the tangible and intangible 
results experienced or observed from working with the RAC, and 4) advice to guide 
instituting future collaborative processes of ECR (see interview guide: Appendix I).  
Interviews were transcribed by the principle investigator and comments were analyzed for 
common themes using a grounded theory approach.22  Themes were based on the 
evaluation criteria discussed in chapter two.  
The evaluation criteria developed for this study were adapted from literature on the 
evaluation of community-based collaborative processes of consensus building and ECR.  The 
works of Leech23, Innes and Booher24, and McKinney and Field25 were largely informative in 
                                                 
22 See generally: Hesse-Biber, S. N. & Leavy, P. The Practice of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. (2006):348.  
23 William D. Leach. “Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western 
Watershed Partnerships.” Public Administration Review; Vol. 66. (2006): 100-110. 
24 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher. “Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems.” Journal 
of the American Planning Association. Vol. 65, No. 4 (1999): 412-423. 
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the development of the evaluation criteria.  A discussion of the history, design theory, and 
methods for evaluation of collaborative processes of decision making and dispute 
resolution in public lands and natural resource management follows in Chapter Two.  This 
discussion serves two purposes.  First, it provides the context for exploring the RACs as an 
appropriate model for analyzing the effects of instituting collaborative processes in federal 
agency planning and decision making.  Second, it establishes the evaluation criteria that will 
be used to understand the effectiveness of instituting this collaborative model in federal 
agency planning and decision making.  
After discussing the interviews in aggregate, the RAC institutional model is 
evaluated based on the principles of democratic governance and dispute resolution process 
design discussed by Leighninger,26 Selin and Chavez,27 Leach,28 Innes and Booher,29 and 
other scholars discussed in chapter two.30  Relying on the work of these scholars, a 
framework for successful collaborative process design is constructed, and the participant 
interviews are used to evaluate the RAC model in the context of this framework. Key 
benefits and a set of recommendations are then distilled from this evaluation in an attempt 
to highlight possible improvements to the RAC model, or to guide future endeavors to 
institute collaborative conservation in public land and resource management.   
This study relies on several critical assumptions.  First, the RACs were established in 
1995 through a series of regulatory reforms.31  Each individual RAC is authorized through a 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Matthew McKinney and Patrick Field. “Evaluating Community-Based Collaboration on Federal 
Lands and Resources.” Society & Natural Resources. Vol. 21, No. 5 (2008): 419-429. 
26 Leighninger (2006) 
27 Steve Selin and Deborah Chavez. “Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning 
and Management.” Environmental Management Vol. 19, No. 2 (1995): 189-195. 
28 Leach (2006) 
29 Innes and Booher (1999) 
30 See infra note 106: Conley and Moote (2001); Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1993); McKinney and Field 
(2008). 
31 See: Rangeland Reforms ’94 infra note 219.  
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charter signed by the Secretary of the Interior which is required to be renewed every two 
years.32  The assumption reasons that since the Secretary has continuously renewed the 
RAC charters for twenty years, they are, at minimum, fulfilling their regulatory 
responsibilities as codified in the regulations.  Second, observing the RACs through the lens 
of collaborative process design and evaluation principles established by scholars and 
professionals in the field of Environmental Conflict Resolution can help to paint a picture of 
the effectiveness of the RACs as they have been instituted within the BLM.  Third, by 
investigating the RACs in this way, lessons can be learned to inform how collaborative 
conservation could be instituted in other areas of public land and natural resource 
management. 
It should also be noted that while the RACs were established to provide advice to the 
BLM on land and natural resource management issues from a local perspective, the BLM 
and the Secretary of the Interior retain all final decision making authority.33 Consequently, 
how the RAC’s advice and recommendations are used is entirely at the discretion of the 
local managers and may or may not be incorporated into policies or on-the-ground action.  
Therefore, this study focuses on successes, challenges and recommendations identified 
through the document review and by the participating RAC members rather than the on-
the-ground outcomes of RAC advice.  Certainly, on-the-ground improvements in 
management or ecological integrity are the ultimate goal of any collaborative conservation 
program.34  However, since the BLM has no obligation to implement the recommendations 
of the RACs, it is difficult to assess how their advice translates to on the ground 
                                                 
32 43 CFR § 1784.1-2(b) states: “Any advisory committee mandated by statute shall terminate not 
later than 2 years after the date of its establishment unless its duration is otherwise provided by law. 
Upon the expiration of each successive two-year period following date of establishment, a new 
charter shall be prepared and, after Secretarial approval, filed with the appropriate committees of 
the Senate and House of Representatives for any statutory advisory committee being continued.” 
33 43 CFR § 1784.5-1 
34 See: Conley and Moote (2003) infra note 135 at pg. 380. 
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management.  Further, participant satisfaction has long been used by scholars and conflict 
resolution professionals as a method to evaluate collaborative process design.35  The degree 
of participant satisfaction for this study was gauged through the in-depth, personal 
interviews of members of fourteen Resource Advisory Committee members and agency 
staff within the Rocky Mountain States and analyzed through the framework of the 
evaluation criteria discussed below. 
A more thorough discussion of the interview methods, analysis, sampling 
techniques, and evaluation criteria precedes the discussion of the results in chapter four. 
2. Public Participation and Collaboration in Public Lands Management  
 As discussed in the preceding chapter, the term “public lands” has several 
definitions. For the purposes of this study, the term was limited to include lands managed 
under federal jurisdiction by the USDA Forest Service and the DOI Bureau of Land 
Management, the two federal land management agencies charged with a multiple-use 
mandate.  Although these two agencies have their own origins, agency cultures, and legal 
and regulatory obligations, the multiple-use mandate distinguishes them from the other 
two Federal Land management agencies: the DOI’s Park Service and Fish and Wildlife 
Service.  While both the Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service manage public lands 
(the National Park System and the National Wildlife Refuges, respectively), their 
management requirements prioritize protection and preservation rather than the diverse 
spectrum of multiple-use management that directs the Forest Service and the Bureau of 
Land management.  Multiple-use management is defined in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield 
act of 1960 as: 
                                                 
35 McKinney and Field (2008): See Generally for an argument on participant satisfaction as a basis for 
evaluation of collaborative models.  
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The management of all the various renewable surface resources...so that they are 
utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people; 
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related 
services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments 
in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; that some land will be used for 
less than all of the resources; and harmonious and coordinated management of the 
various resources, each with the other, without impairment of the productivity of the 
land, with consideration being given to the relative values of the various resources, 
and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or 
the greatest unit output.36  
While the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management are indeed unique 
agencies, operating under their own legal and regulatory frameworks, management plans, 
and under two distinct departments of the Federal government, the fact that they are both 
directed to manage the lands under the multiple-use sustained yield philosophy aligns them 
more as kin.  Comparisons have often been made between the two agencies by both policy 
makers and academics.  In fact, some have called for restructuring of the Forest Service 
within the Department of Interior, arguing such a consolidation would increase efficiencies 
and co-management of adjoining lands, decrease inconsistencies, and better address the 
increasing ecological effects of climate change and wildfire.37  The similarities between the 
two agencies warrant a closer look at the legal mandates that affect public participation and 
collaboration within each of their land use planning directives.  A final assumption of this 
study is that looking more closely into one could help to inform the practices of the other.  
                                                 
36 The definition of “Multiple Use” as quoted from the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 
1960. Pub. L. 86-517 § 4(a).  This act is used as the basis for defining the management 
requirements in the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 and the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976, the two acts that mandate a multiple use 
philosophy of management to the BLM and the Forest Service, respectively. 
37 See generally: GAO report dated February 2009 titled: Observations on a Possible Move of the Forest 
Service into the Department of Interior.  In the report’s third appendix, the GAO discusses five 
historical proposals for restructuring the Forest Service and the BLM.  The five proposals generally 
approach reorganization in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive: reorganizing the agencies 
themselves or reorganizing the agencies’ lands. Available: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-
223 
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The legal framework for public participation  
Federal public land management planning and decision making under the Forest 
Service and the Bureau of Land Management is primarily governed by four major federal 
laws that require public participation: 1) the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 2) the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 3) Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), and the 4) National Forest Management Act (NFMA).  In addition, where citizen-
based groups are operating in an official advisory capacity to an agency, the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) may apply.   
A unique feature of the BLM RACs is the institution’s construction within the 
framework of FACA, which outlines procedures for public notice, interest group 
representation, and open access to meetings and information. This signifies the embrace of 
a law that has created barriers (both psychologically and procedurally) to collaboration 
within other agencies.38  The legal framework for public participation in public lands and 
resource management has been well chronicled by legal scholars elsewhere.39  However, 
several points are worth noting that lay the groundwork for understanding the growth of 
collaborative conservation within federal land management, understanding the instituting 
of collaborative processes of conflict resolution in agency decision making, and framing the 
space within which the BLM RACs operate and make decisions. 
First Principles: The APA and NEPA 
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 40 sets rules for federal agencies to 
inform the public of proposed rulemaking and provided the public with opportunities to 
participate in the rulemaking process.   The National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC § 
                                                 
38 See generally: Beirle and Long (1999) infra note 68. 
39 See generally: Van De Wetering (2006); Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern. Public Participation in 
Environmental Decision Making. National Academies Press, Washington D.C. (2008): 36-52.; and 
Robert B. Kreiter. “Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in 
Perspective.” Utah Law Review. No. 4 (2005): 1127-1226.  
40 Pub. L. 79-404 as codified as amended in 5 USC § 511-599 
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4321-4347) requires federal agencies to analyze the environmental and cultural effects of 
“major actions” affecting the resources they manage.  Together the APA and NEPA create a 
platform, “...for members of the public to make their informed judgments known to agencies 
before decisions were made and thus potentially to have an influence on the decisions...”41 
Sara Bates Van De Wetering calls these the first principles for public participation in federal 
public land and natural resource management. These requirements are, “meant to ensure 
that better decisions are made, with complete information and without hidden influences or 
agendas.”42   
The Planning Acts: NFMA and FLPMA 
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA), as they pertain to the Forest Service and the BLM respectively, 
both have specific requirements for including the public in land use and resource 
management planning.  NFMA, requires the National Forest Service to engage in long-range 
resource planning by directing the Secretary of Agriculture, “...to develop, maintain, and 
revise land and resource management plans with substantial public involvement...”43  
FLPMA is the BLMs organic act, and it outlines the multiple-use mandate, the requirements 
for comprehensive land use planning within the agency, requirements for including the 
public in planning and decision making, and establishing advisory committees.44    
To fulfill the management plan requirements under NFMA, the Secretary of 
Agriculture is directed to, “promulgate regulations...that set out the process for the 
development and revision of the land management plans...”45  These regulations are handed 
                                                 
41 Dietz and Stern (2008): 38. 
42 Van De Wetering (2006): 8. 
43 Ibid; pg. 11  
44 See generally: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Office of the 
Solicitor (editors). The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, as amended. U.S. Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Land Management Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. (2001): 69 pgs.  
45 National Forest Management Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-588 as amended by 16 USC §1600 (note).  
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down through the National Forest Planning Rule and codified in the regulations governing 
Forest Service planning.46  Since 2000, the several attempts to revise the Planning Rule have 
been frustrated by legal challenges, and met considerable difficulty in implementing 
regulations to guide planning procedures across the agency.47  In 2012, after a substantial 
public involvement process to develop new planning regulations, and, in part to focus on, 
“...collaboration, science, and sustainability...”48 the Forest Service finally published the 2012 
Planning Rule.  The new rule states, “The responsible official shall engage the public...early 
and throughout the planning process... using collaborative processes where feasible and 
appropriate.”49    
This emphasis on using collaborative processes is further reinforced in the Forest 
Service Land Management Planning Handbook.  The Handbook provides specific direction 
and procedural guidance to line officers and interdisciplinary team members for 
implementing the 2012 planning rule and carrying out the regulations within 36 CFR § 
219.50  The Handbook first defines collaboration and collaborative process collectively as:  
A structured manner in which a collection of people, with diverse interests share 
knowledge, ideas, and resources, while working together in an inclusive and 
cooperative manner toward a common purpose. Collaboration, in the context of this 
part, falls within the full spectrum of public engagement described in the Council on 
Environmental Quality’s publication of October, 2007: Collaboration in NEPA— A 
Handbook for NEPA Practitioners.51 
The Handbook continues in Chapter 40 by discussing the principles and spectrum of public 
participation to inform the development of the plan components.  The spectrum identified 
                                                 
46 36 CFR § 219 
47 See generally: US Forest Service. The History of Forest Planning.  Accessed on 9/13/15; available at: 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/main/planningrule/history 
48 USDA Forest Service.  New 2012 Planning Rule: Rethinking Forest Regulations. Missoula, MT; slide 
show presentation dated July, 2013: Pg. 9. 
49 36 CFR § 219.4(1) 
50 USDA Forest Service. FSH 1909.12 – Land Management Planning Handbook.  Available at: 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/planningrule/home/?cid=stelprd3828310 
51 Ibid; Zero Code: pg. 5 
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in the handbook ranges at the lowest level from simply informing the public to fully 
collaborating with the public at the highest level.  Collaboration in this context is taken to 
mean directly engaging the public “...to exchange information with each other and work 
together on one or more issues during the planning process. Identify where there is 
agreement and disagreement.”52 According to the handbook, collaboration can utilize a 
range of tools from mediated and facilitated discussions to establishing FACA groups and 
partnerships.53  The handbook focuses on how to develop a public participation strategy but 
leaves discretion to the responsible official to, “determine the scope and scale of 
opportunities for public participation, balancing available resources and schedule 
constraints with public engagement needs.”54  It further states, “There is no prescribed 
format for a public participation strategy, and the strategy can and is likely to change to 
accommodate evolving circumstances.”55 
Indeed, the discretion provided to individual forests in meeting the requirements 
for public participation outlined in the 2012 Planning Rule is intended to allow the 
responsible officials the flexibility to adapt to local needs and interests.  However, the 
failure to articulate clear guidelines and standards for how and when to meet the 
requirements for public participation by the individual forests is already creating some 
confusion and tension between forest managers and interest groups in the planning 
process.  In fact, a federal advisory committee chartered in 2012, and tasked with providing 
national level advice to the Forest Service on implementing the 2012 Planning Rule, made 
several recommendations to the Forest Service to clarify when and how collaboration and 
                                                 
52 Ibid; Ch. 40 § 41 
53 Ibid; Ch. 40 § 43.2 
54 Ibid; Ch. 40 § 42 
55 Ibid 
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public participation should occur in the planning process.56  Consequently, due in part to 
this lack of clarity, some early-adopter forests are frontloading their assessment phases 
with substantial opportunities for collaboration and then having to rush through the 
development of the plan components to meet the established deadlines, while others 
struggle with staff capacity to effectively engage the public when and where it’s most 
needed.57   
In the case of the BLM, FLPMA similarly states, “The Secretary shall, with public 
involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of this Act, develop, maintain, 
and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of 
the public lands.”58  The public’s right to involvement in activities that affect lands managed 
by the BLM is further emphasized later, “The Secretary shall allow an opportunity for public 
involvement and by regulation shall establish procedures, including public hearings where 
appropriate, to give Federal, State, and local governments and the public, adequate notice 
and opportunity to comment upon and participate in the formulation of plans and programs 
relating to the management of the public lands.”59  However, in addition to the general 
public involvement requirements, the BLM is also directed to establish advisory councils to 
provide advice directly to the Secretary of the Interior on land use and management, “The 
Secretary shall establish advisory councils of not less than ten and not more than fifteen 
members appointed by him from among persons who are representative of the various 
                                                 
56 Planning Rule Advisory Committee. Markup of Directives with Committee Recommendations – 
FINAL. Dated: November 15, 2013. Accessed on 10/2/14 from: 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/planningrule/ committee/?cid=stelprdb5394840 
57 Citation: Public Participation: Lessons Learned from Implementing the 2012 Planning Rule. 
Unpublished Study Conducted by University of Montana’s Natural Resource Conflict Resolution Class, 
Fall 2014. On file with the Author.  
58 U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Office of the Solicitor (2001): 4.  
[Emphasis mine.] 
59 Ibid: 6. 
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major citizens’ interests concerning the problems relating to land use planning or the 
management of the public lands...”60  
The BLM had a history of citizen advisory boards prior to FLPMA, but they were 
called Grazing Advisory Boards and comprised almost exclusively of local grazing 
permittees. The Grazing Advisory Boards (GABs) were criticized for having an undue 
influence over the agency decisions and a myopic view of range management.  They were 
accused of elevating their economic interests over the health and ecologic conditions of the 
range.  Under FLPMA, the Grazing Advisory Boards were severely constrained and a more 
evolved version of Citizen Advisory Boards (CABs) were established to “focus on the full 
array of ecosystem and multiple-use issues associated with BLM administered public 
lands...”61 The RACs, implemented under Bruce Babbitt’s rangeland reforms in the mid-
1990’s, combined the CABs and the GABs into the model used today which is  structured to 
coincide with State, BLM District or ecoregion boundaries62 and to consist of balanced and 
diverse membership representing three broad categories: 1) grazing permittees and the 
resource industries; 2) environmental, cultural and historic interests; and 3) elected 
officials, Native American tribes, and academics.63  This period of reform beginning with the 
enactment of FLPMA also marked a shift in the BLM’s management focus to, in part, 
“Accelerate restoration and improvement of public rangelands to proper functioning 
condition.”64  
NFMA also authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to “...establish and consult 
advisory boards as he deems necessary to secure full information and advice on the 
                                                 
60 Ibid; pg. 26 
61 Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental 
Impact Statement. Bureau of Land Management. Washington D.C. (1994): 18. 
62 43 CFR § 1784.6-2   
63 43 CFR § 1784.6-1(c)  
64 Rangeland Reform ’94: 4. 
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execution of his responsibilities.”65  Interestingly, such discretion was not granted the 
Secretary of the Interior and begs the question why?  Regardless of the motivation, 
requiring the BLM to establish the RACs and leaving discretion to the Forest Service 
presents an interesting opportunity to investigate the collaborative processes for planning 
and decision making used within each agency. 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 
In some circumstances collaborative groups either choose to or are required to file a 
formal charter under the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  The Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) of 1970 was enacted to ensure that groups who provide advice 
directly to federal agencies are fairly balanced, and decisions are made publicly and free of 
undue influence of special interests.66  Generally FACA applies when all of three conditions 
are met: “(1) the federal agency establishes the group...or exerts some level of management 
control over the group, (2) the group includes...individuals who are not federal employees 
or elected officials..., and (3) the product of the collaboration is group or collective advice to 
the federal agency.” 67 FACA imposes procedural hurdles on a collaborative group to ensure 
that the public is given notice of meetings and activities, that meetings are held in an open, 
publicly accessible forum, and the goals and expectations of the group are clearly defined.68 
It has long been suggested that FACA’s procedural hurdles create a substantial 
barrier to collaborative conservation.  As William Butler explains, “the lack of clarity of the 
procedural requirements of FACA...may deter collaboration as much as ensure high-quality 
                                                 
65 Pub. L. 94-588 § 14(b) 
66 Van De Wetering (2006): 13. 
67 Council On Environmental Quality (CEQ). Collaboration in NEPA: A handbook for NEPA 
practitioners. Council of Environmental Quality, Washington, DC. (2007): 91.  
68 Ibid: 90. 
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processes.”69  This deterrent has resulted from a variety of factors including the lack of 
clarity around the procedural requirements of the act, when FACA applies to self-organized 
collaborative groups, and agencies feeling discouraged from collaborating or even 
consulting with the public based on the threat of a FACA-based lawsuit.70     
Regardless of whether a collaborative group is chartered as a FACA committee or 
not, Federal agencies walk a fine line between using the advice or recommendations 
provided by the group, and abdicating their authority to make the final decisions.  In a few 
notable cases of “constitutional sub-delegation,” land management agencies have been 
challenged for relinquishing their decision making authority to non-government entities.71 
The importance of this is that in collaborating with groups of stakeholders on land use or 
resource management issues, the federal agency must retain and make the ultimate 
decision or they are vulnerable to legal challenge. 72  In terms of evaluating the success of 
the BLM RACs in this study, the agency’s obligation to retain their decision making authority 
is one of the main reasons for investigating participant satisfaction with the process rather 
than on-the-ground actions that result.   
The rise of place-based Collaboration 
The field of environmental conflict resolution emerged as conservation advocates, 
academics, policy makers, and industry proponents became increasingly frustrated with 
polarization, conflict and stalemate in natural resource management issues.  Stakeholders 
                                                 
69 William Hale Butler. “Collaboration at Arms Length: Navigating Agency Engagement in 
Landscape-Scale Ecological Restoration Collaboratives.” Journal of Forestry. Vol. 111, No. 6 (2013): 
395-413. 
70 Thomas C. Beirle and Rebecca J. Long. “Chilling Collaboration: The Federal Advisory Committee Act 
and Stakeholder Involvement in Environmental Decisionmaking.” Environmental Law Reporter. Vol. 
29 (July, 1999): 3. 
71See generally: NPCA v. Stanton; as mentioned in Van De Wetering (2006): 17.  According to Van De 
Wetering, in NPCA v. Stanton, the National Park Service was challenged for giving the Niobrara Scenic 
River Advisory Council full decision making authority.  The judge ruled the council superseded its 
authority granted by Congress, and today, she says, “the council continues in its advisory role, but the 
NPS retains final decision making authority.”    
72 Ibid: 16. 
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often turned to alternative methods of resolving disputes between entrenched and 
opposing interests such as mediated negotiations and collaboration.  Community or place-
based collaboration has its roots in Van De Wetering’s First Principles, the landmark 
environmental laws of the 1960’s and 70’s.  Community-based collaboration evolved within 
the framework of these laws as one tool in the box of alternative decision making models 
that has gained considerable traction over the past twenty or thirty years because of its 
initial success in resolving conflicts between timber interests and environmentalists in the 
mid-1990s.  Collaboration has been called many things over the years, but one definition 
commonly used in the literature was first articulated by Barbara Gray in 1985, “The pooling 
of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor, etc., by two or 
more stakeholders to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.”73  
As early forms collaborative conservation found success in resolving conflicts and 
producing working agreements to land management problems, they captured the attention 
of agency administrators, policy makers and executives at the local, state and federal level.  
Early case studies such as the Quincy Library Group, the Applegate Partnership, and the 
Niobrara Scenic River Advisory Council (among many others) received considerable 
scholarly attention and further justified the nascent movement.74  Distinct models of 
collaborative conservation evolved, have been refined, and scholars have articulated 
various typologies to help understand and study the various models.  Cestero developed a 
simple typology distinguishing between place-based and policy-based groups.75  It 
                                                 
73 Gray (1985): p. 912 
74 See generally: Cestero (1999); Moote, McClaran, and Chickering (1997); Wondolleck and Yeffe 
(2000); McKinney and Harmon (2004) for case studies on early experimental collaborative processes 
of natural resource management and governance. 
75 Cestero (1999). 
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separates place-based groups that focus on a particular geography from policy-based 
groups that address problems of regional or national significance.76  
Margerum builds upon several typologies, drawing largely on institutional analysis 
literature to argue that collaboratives exist on an Action-Organizational-Policy spectrum.77  
The key functional differences between points on this spectrum are found in membership 
make-up, the management arrangement for implementation, and approaches to 
implementing change.78  Operational or action-oriented groups tend to consist of 
stakeholders who represent themselves and advocate for their own interests from a more 
localized perspective;  focus on on-the-ground activities such as monitoring, education, and 
restoration; and  see the same actors both making and implementing agreements.79  
Organizational and Policy- level collaboratives tend to be made up of individuals 
representing interest groups or organizations such as industry associations or non-
governmental organizations, agency representatives and elected officials.80  At the 
implementation phase, a Policy-level collaborative formulates policies and programs to set 
up others to carry out the on-the-ground actions while an Organizational-level collaborative 
will vary its implementation process depending on which end of the spectrum it most 
closely aligns.81 
Pros and Cons of Collaborative Conservation  
 Advocates of collaborative approaches to natural resource management argue 
several major benefits.  For example, Wondolleck touts four major benefits of collaboration 
that work to: 1) build understanding and shared learning; 2) create a mechanism for 
                                                 
76 Barb Cestero. Beyond the Hundredth Meeting: A Field Guide to Collaborative Conservation. Sonoran 
Institute. (1999): 9. 
77 Richard D. Margerum. “A Typology of Collaboration Efforts in Environmental Management.”  
Environmental Management. Vol. 41 (2008): 493. 
78 Ibid: 493.  
79 Ibid: 488-494 
80 Ibid: 493-494 
81 Ibid: 494 
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effective decision making; 3) get work done; and 4) develop capacity to deal with future 
challenges.82  Scholars like Kenney83, Dietz and Stern84, and McKinney, Field and Bates85 
concur, extolling the benefits of experimenting in collaborative processes to formulate more 
creative, innovative decision making models.  In addition, proponents also advocate that 
place-based collaboration can overcome entrenched opposition, better account for localized 
knowledge and cultural relationships specific to the landscape, and increase buy-in and 
durability of the decisions.86   
On the other side, skeptics argue that place-based collaboration turns over an 
inordinate amount of control over what are inherently national interests and resources to a 
small, localized group of individuals.87  Critics believe the current system of decision making 
works as designed, that litigation is an inherent part of the design, and that collaborative 
groups are merely attempting to work around the existing statutory and regulatory 
frameworks.88  Others insist that the voluntary nature of collaboration has inherent 
problems with representation of interests, and argue that leaving decisions about national 
lands to an ad hoc group of local citizens puts too much power into small, localized groups 
of interests.89  In his book Environmental Communication and the Public Sphere, Robert Cox 
succinctly outlines seven common critiques of place-based collaboration from his review of 
                                                 
82 Julia Wondolleck and Stephen Yeffe. Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from innovation in natural 
resource management.  Washington, D.C. Island Press (2000): 18-19. 
83Douglas J. Kenney. Arguing About Consensus: Examining the Case Against Western Watershed Groups 
and Other Collaborative Groups Active in Natural Resources Management. Natural Resources Law 
Center, 
University of Colorado School of Law. (2000): 7pgs. 
84 Dietz and Stern (2008). 
85 Matthew McKinney, Patrick Field and Sarah Bates. “Responding to Streams of Land Use Disputes: A 
Systems Approach.” Planning & Environmental Law; Vol. 60, No, 4 (2008): 3-10. 
86 Kenney (2000) 
87 Michael McCloskey. “The Skeptic: Collaboration Has its Limits.” High Country News.  May 13, 1996: 
2 
88 Ibid; 2 
89 George C. Coggins. “Of Californicators, Quislings and Crazies: Some Perils of Devolved 
Collaboration.” Across the Great Divide: Explorations of Collaborative Conservation and the American 
West. Island Press (2001): 163-171.  
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the literature: 1) Stakeholders may be unrepresentative of wider public; 2) may encourage 
exceptionalism or a compromise of national standards; 3) power inequalities may lead to 
co-optation; 4) pressure for consensus may lead to the lowest common denominator; 5) 
consensus tends to delegitimize conflict and advocacy; 6) groups may lack authority to 
implement their decisions; and 7) irreconcilable values may hinder agreement.90 
Despite these criticisms, Wondolleck explains, collaborative processes for 
environmental conflict resolution have, “expanded from largely ad hoc application in site- 
or issue-specific situations to now being embedded in agency programs and procedures.” 91   
Land management agencies attempting to incorporate a more adaptive style of 
management and collaboratively plan activities at the watershed or ecosystem scale, may 
require collaboration and increased public involvement across interest groups, agencies, 
and political jurisdictions to accomplish their goals.92 Some scholars argue that planning at 
this scale inherently affects and involves many different agencies (federal, state, and local), 
private land holders, and various interest groups who all have differing goals, objectives and 
methods for achievement.  “For collaboration to occur in such situations,” Wondolleck says, 
“[environmental conflict resolution] needs to be nudged, or even required.  Sometimes 
reluctant or skeptical parties must be compelled to give a process a chance.”93  
Moving Towards Institutionalizing Collaboration 
One of the vital tenets of successful collaboration is that participants come to the 
table voluntarily, with full knowledge and clarity about their options for seeing their 
interests met.  Wondolleck outlines two factors emphasizing the importance of this 
                                                 
90 Robert Cox. “Managing Conflict: Collaboration and Environmental Disputes.” Environmental 
Communication and the Public Sphere. Los Angles: Sage Publications (2013): 111-139 
91 Julia M. Wondolleck. “A Crack in the Foundation? Revisiting ECR’s Voluntary Tenet.” Conflict 
Resolution Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 3, (2010): 323 
92 Ibid.  
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voluntary tenet in her review of the literature: one involving choice, and the other involving 
fairness.  Choice, she says, “implies consideration of alternatives and weighing of 
consequences; it implies an explicit assessment of the potentials and short-comings of 
varying alternatives...A deliberate decision to collaborate suggests that a party understands 
the collaborative process as well as their best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA).”94 Additionally, this choice also implies fairness:  “Voluntary engagement bestows 
a sense of fairness and consequently legitimacy, instilling a level of respect for the potential 
of the process and contributing to a participant’s commitment to the process and good faith 
involvement in it.”95  The voluntary nature of ad hoc collaboration becomes a tension 
around which mandated forms must navigate in order to be recognized as a legitimate and 
valid process for decision making, and worthy of the time commitment required of 
participants relative to other opportunities for seeing interests and values met. 
  Forms of mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) began to emerge in state 
and federal laws, partially in response to the success of grassroots attempts at collaboration 
in which, as Daniel Kemmis puts it, “...old enemies learn to solve hard problems together.”96   
Examples such as the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 97 section 164(e) of the Clean Air 
Act, 98 and Montana’s use of water dispute mediators99 all constitute the beginning of a new 
era of collaborative governance in natural resource management.  Collaborative governance 
is defined by Ansell and Gash as a “...governing arrangement where one or more public 
agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that 
is formal, consensus oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public 
                                                 
94 Ibid: 327 
95 Ibid: 330 
96 Daniel Kemmis. This Sovereign Land: A New Vision for Governing the West. Island Press, Washington 
D.C. (2001): 119 
97 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.  Pub. L. 101-648. 
98 e.g.: Van de Wetering and McKinney (2006).  
99 See: Montana Code Annotated § 85-5-110. 
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policy or manage programs or assets.”100  These laws signify the first attempts by the 
Federal government to establish less adversarial approaches to planning and decision 
making.  However, these early laws have drawn criticism for eliminating the voluntary 
tenet101, and collaboration, whether grassroots or institutional, has been accused of 
impeding or contravening national laws, and circumventing what legal scholar George 
Coggins describes as the, “...legally-ordained processes of decision making.”102 
More recent federal laws and regulations such as the Secure Rural Schools and 
Community Self Determination Act of 2000,103 the Collaborative Forest Landscape 
Restoration Act of 2009,104 and the U.S. Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule105 have created 
requirements or incentives for disparate interests to come together around public lands 
issues to formulate plans or make recommendations on project alternatives prior to formal 
decisions by agency administrators.  This next generation of collaboration laws operates 
within the framework established by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and 
the other environmental and procedural laws that govern natural resource management, 
but also allow for citizens to have “enhanced” involvement in and influence over how lands 
and resources are managed.   
Federal laws, exemplified by those discussed above, authorize policies and 
programs to be implemented by agencies requiring some form of collaboration to produce 
management plans, make decisions, or establish regulations.  These policy-mandates for 
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collaboration have the potential to create a tension with the long standing premise of 
voluntary participation by limiting opportunities for other forms of public involvement, and 
circumventing traditional decision making processes.  As the Forest Service is currently 
promulgating collaboration and enhanced public participation through the 2012 planning 
rule, it may prove helpful to look at how other agencies have already integrated 
collaborative processes into their planning and decision making and how well those 
processes are working.   
Dispute Resolution Process Design Theory and Evaluating Success 
 Collaborative conservation utilizes theories from a variety of disciplines.  Scholars 
Conley and Moote succinctly summarize the theoretical and practical makeup of this diverse 
and growing field in their work Collaborative Conservation in Theory and Practice.106  Chief 
among the disciplines drawn from are Social and Political Science, Public Administration 
and International Development, and Alternative Dispute Resolution.107   Scholars often 
discuss the social and political capital that is created from finding solutions to problems 
collaboratively and at the local level.108  Others discuss the democratic implications of 
collaborative planning and management,109 while still others work to collect, define and 
refine principles and best practices that contribute to developing successful models of 
alternative dispute resolution, consensus building, and collaborative governance.110  This 
diversity of disciplines, theories, scholarship, and approaches to problem solving, coupled 
                                                 
106 Alexander Conley and Ann Moote. Collaborative Conservation in Theory and Practice. Udall Center 
for Studies in Public Policy, the University of Arizona. Tuscon. (2001) 
107: Ibid; 3 
108 See Generally: Kemmis (1990); Eric K. Austin. “The Social Bond and Place: A Study of How the 
Bureau of Land Management Contributes to Civil Society.” Administrative Theory & Praxis. Vol. 24, No. 
2 (2002): 355-362; and Charles F. Wilkinson. “Law and the American West: The Search for an Ethic of 
Place.” University of Colorado Law Review. Vol. 59, No. 3 (1988): 401-425.  
109 See Generally: Ansell and Gash(2007); Leighninger (2006) 
110 See Generally: William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg.  “Designing an Effective 
Dispute Resolution System.” In Getting Disputes Resolved. Cambridge: PON Books. (1993): 41-83.; 
Selin and Chavez (1995); and McKinney, Field and Bates, (2008).  
 30 
with the unique circumstances that constitute each collaborative process both make it 
difficult to apply general theories and entices lively debate among practitioners.  However, 
several theoretical principles for designing successful processes and methods for evaluating 
success have been distilled from the work of those studying practical approaches to 
collaborative conservation that are applicable to this study.  
Conley and Moote point out that participatory democracy in the international 
development arena emphasizes local participation in project development and common 
resource management. They stress four basic tenets borrowed from this discipline that can 
be applied to collaborative conservation: “1) that everyone who might be affected by or 
have an interest in the plan be involved; 2) that all interests be encouraged to discuss their 
needs, concerns, and values; 3) that the public be involved continuously through all stages 
of planning and decision making; and 4) that decision making authority be shared among all 
participants.”111   
Ansell and Gash expand upon this idea of democratic governance and stress six 
defining principles to guide collaborative process development: “1) the forum is initiated by 
public agencies or institutions, 2) participants in the forum include non-state actors, 3) 
participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely ‘consulted’ by public 
agencies, 4) the forum is formally organized and meets collectively, 5) the forum aims to 
make decisions by consensus (even if consensus is not achieved in practice), and 6) the 
focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.”112 
 Including local perspectives in public resource planning and management is a major 
principle underpinning collaborative conservation.   In his work Community and the Politics 
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of Place, Daniel Kemmis discusses the need for re-vitalizing civic culture and the community 
strength that can come from organizing our politics around places of cultural significance;  
...what holds people together long enough to discover their power as citizens is their 
common inhabiting of a place.  No matter how diverse and complex the patterns of 
livelihood may be that arise within the...system, no matter how many perspectives 
from which people view [it], no matter how diversely they value it, it is, finally , one and 
the same...for everyone...if we all want to stay here...then we have to learn, somehow, to 
live together.113 
Other scholars discuss the merits of bioregionalism and the social capital created from 
tackling problems at the local level.  The distinguished law professor Charles Wilkinson 
offers:  
We will always have disputes over land, water, wildlife, minerals, and power.  Such 
raspings are inevitable and ultimately healthy in a colorful, dynamic, and 
individualistic society. Nevertheless, the dissenting parties often leave angry, 
determined to undercut the temporary solution bred of combativeness. Perhaps worse, 
the process tears at our sense of community; it leaves us more a loose collection of 
fractious subgroups than a coherent society with common hopes and dreams. The 
overarching concern, therefore, is not to deny that conflict will occur, but rather to 
acknowledge an ethic that sets standards and, as importantly, provides a method for 
dealing with disputes. Disputants need to recognize that they exist within a community 
and that consensus is the preferred method of resolution.114  
 
Designing a Collaborative Process 
Designing collaborative processes to build consensus and offer a framework for 
successful conflict resolution is an inherently complex endeavor.  Conflict resolution 
processes must anticipate and be able to respond to the myriad unique and interconnected 
social, ecological and institutional factors that simultaneously drive the conflict and frame 
the range of possible solutions. The legal principle of “multiple-use, sustained-yield” defines 
the range of resource considerations and social interests that must be satisfied through land 
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use management within the BLM and Forest Service.  However, the agencies are ultimately 
responsible for weighing and balancing all the factors and interests and making the final 
decisions.  Finally, although the decisions that guide the management of local forests or 
rangelands most directly impact the social, economic and ecologic conditions of local 
communities (broadly defined to include all communities of life), the effect of management 
activities on federal public lands are of national significance, and are of equal concern to all 
citizens whether they live in a small ranching community in Wyoming or in New York City.  
How then, does a dispute resolution system account for and respond to this complexity?     
Best practices of dispute resolution and collaborative conflict resolution systems 
have been discussed through scholarly literature emerging out of the disciplines of natural 
resource management, public administration, and the political and social sciences. 
Regardless of the discipline, much of the scholarship agrees on some general principles to 
help guide the design process.  Perhaps the best recognized are discussed by Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg in Getting Disputes Resolved, one of the seminal works on the topic. They offer six 
principles to guide designing permanent systems of dispute resolution to help parties avoid 
the costs of litigation.  The principles are: 1) Put the focus on the interests, 2) Build in "loop-
backs" to negotiation, 3)Provide low-cost rights and power backups, 4)Build in consultation 
before, feedback after, 5) Arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence, 6)Provide the 
necessary motivation, skills, and resources.115  
According to McKinney, Field and Bates, designing systems using the above 
framework can lead to improved decision making: “[b]y combining opportunities for public 
deliberation, collaborative problem solving and multiparty dispute resolution into the land 
use decision-making process, planners, decision makers, and others can create a more 
                                                 
115 Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1993): 42. 
 33 
responsive system of governance, which in turn will likely improve land use decisions.”116  
Indeed, as agencies seek to improve their strategies for public participation in planning and 
decision making, as exemplified by the Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule and the host of 
other laws and policies aimed at improving the public-agency relationship, utilizing a 
general framework that builds consensus, provides durability over course of time, and is 
responsive to local ecological, social and economic conditions seems to provide a good 
model from which to proceed.  
Selin and Chavez are two scholars who have written on collaborative process design 
from an environmental management perspective.  They insist that collaborative approaches 
to decision making are an increasing trend that views the management agency as but one 
member of a set of stakeholders joined together by a common resource problem.117  They 
suggest collaboration is a process that results from a variety of antecedent conditions and 
proceeds sequentially through several phases: problem-setting, direction-setting, 
structuring, and outcomes.  Antecedent conditions may include things such as an 
environmental crisis, a network of interests sharing a common concern, or a legal 
mandate.118  In the problem-setting phase, the issue is given an identity to enable discussion 
and ultimately action.  They insist that stakeholders will be committed to the process if they 
believe the benefits of participation will outweigh the costs.119  In the direction-setting 
phase, stakeholders begin to develop a common purpose as they engage in shared learning 
to set goals, develop an agenda, and set ground rules.  The Structuring phase, “...involves 
institutionalizing the shared meaning of the group and devising a regulatory framework to 
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guide future collective action...”120 while the outcome phase is where, “...stakeholders 
implement the programmatic thrusts of their collective agreements.”121  Finally, Selin and 
Chavez identify four types of collaborative design: 1) appreciative planning which is 
characterized by exchanging information to develop a shared vision of resource use; 2) 
partnerships whereby stakeholders help to advance the vision through direct action; 3) 
dialogues to resolve conflict by searching for common ground without the pressure of 
developing binding agreements, and 4) negotiated settlements which, “resolve conflicts by 
producing a binding agreement ratified by all participating stakeholders.”122   These four 
designs will be addressed later in chapter five.  
Matthew Leighninger offers a simplified model in his work on democratic 
governance in the United States, The Next Form of Democracy: How Expert Rule Is Giving 
Way to Shared Governance and Why Politics Will Never Be the Same.123  Leighninger defines 
democratic governance as, “the art of governing communities in participatory, deliberative, 
and collaborative ways.”124  Within his model, Leighninger suggests two forms of 
collaborative governance often emerge: temporary organizing efforts, and permanent 
neighborhood structures.125  For the purposes of this study, the RACs closely resemble 
permanent neighborhood structures.  Here, the notion of the neighborhood is expanded 
geographically to encompass a district or region of BLM administered public lands.  
Leighninger suggests that the best examples of each form, whether temporary or 
permanent, employ four basic principles for success: 
First, they recruit people by reaching out through the various groups and 
organizations to which they belong, in order to assemble a large and diverse ‘critical 
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mass’ of citizens. Second, they involve those citizens in a combination of small and 
large- group meetings: structured, facilitated small groups for informed, deliberative 
dialogue, and large forums for amplifying shared conclusions and moving from talk to 
action. Third, they give the participants in these meetings the opportunity to compare 
values and experiences, and to consider a range of views and policy options. Finally 
they effect change in a number of ways: by applying citizen input to policy and 
planning decisions, by encouraging change within organizations and institutions, by 
creating teams to work on particular action ideas, by inspiring and connecting 
individual volunteers or all of the above.126 
Leighninger’s framework incorporates Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s principles of focusing on 
interests, developing processes for consultation and feedback, encouraging negotiation, 
arranging procedures in a low to high cost sequence, and providing motivation, skills and 
resources.  In Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s model, the principle of “providing low-cost rights 
and power back-ups”, refers to processes of professional arbitration that could, “serve as a 
backup should interests-based negotiation fail to resolve the dispute.”127 Such procedures 
do not apply in the case of the RAC and therefore are of less concern for the purposes of this 
study.  The discussion of the RAC model in chapter five will, for the purpose of simplicity, 
focus largely on Leighninger’s four principles for success.  
Evaluating the Collaborative Process 
An important thread in the conversation about instituting collaborative 
conservation more broadly is how to define and evaluate success.  Many scholars have 
constructed frameworks for evaluating the effectiveness and success of collaborative 
processes in the field (notably: Innes and Booher, Leach, and McKinney and Field).128  
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Success cannot be pinpointed to any one particular outcome or criteria because the complex 
nature of collaborative processes can lead to success on a variety of different levels.   
Innes and Booher, for example, argue the consequences of successful collaboration 
emerge in three categorical ways: 1) high-quality agreements that are durable, innovative, 
and account for local knowledge; 2) tangible products such as formal agreements, agreed 
upon data and analysis, and implementable projects; and 3) intangible products such as 
improved social, intellectual and political capital.129  Their work is grounded in the fields of 
complexity science and communicative rationality.  Complexity science, they explain, values 
the intangible effects of shared learning and trust building that accompanies a consensus 
building exercise.  Communicative rationality is a structure for discourse that results in 
emancipatory knowledge, “by engaging all those with differing interests around an issue or 
topic.”130  They argue that this knowledge creation is critical for overcoming the 
institutional and societal barriers that drive conflict and serves as an ideal for developing a 
collaborative model.  Much like scientific rationality, they say, “communicative rationality 
represents an ideal...which is never actually achieved in practice, though it is a goal or ideal 
against which to judge research or communicative practice.”131  
Leach is most concerned with the democratic implications of collaborative resource 
management and focuses on six qualities that are essential for success: inclusiveness, 
representativeness, procedural fairness, lawfulness, deliberativeness, and empowerment. 
His substantial work defines each of these six criteria and applies them to critically 
analyzing watershed groups in California and Washington.  In so doing, he establishes a 
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normative framework of evaluation that he argues can be applied to virtually any instance 
of collaborative public management.132  
Similarly, McKinney and Field (2008) contend collaboration is, “...rapidly becoming 
one of the dominant ideas in natural resources policy and politics.”133  They developed a 
Participant Satisfaction Scorecard based on their review of the commonly accepted criteria 
for measuring success.  The scorecard is used to conduct a survey nearly 50 community-
based groups, including several BLM RACs.  This scorecard contains a series of questions 
that address participants’ motivation for collaborating, as well as the tangible and intangible 
products identified by Innes and Booher.  Finally, the scorecard poses a series of questions 
addressing potential process improvements on a Likert scale in terms of working 
relationships, process criteria and outcomes that was partially based on the democratic 
notions of collaboration framed by Leach.134 
Additionally, Conley and Moote explore a range of evaluation approaches and 
articulate that evaluation methods must be carefully designed to match the effort being 
evaluated.  They offer that comparing multiple efforts can show variations in process and 
context that result in different outcomes, which is especially important to keep in mind 
when using lessons from one process to help inform how to structure future processes.135  
Ultimately, they argue that effective evaluation can, among other things, “assess and refine 
efforts to institutionalize a movement that has developed largely at the grassroots level.”136   
Williams and Ellefson, two scholars who have studied collaborative forestry 
partnerships across public and private lands, define success as, “a group able to attract and 
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keep individuals and organizations engaged in partnership activities.”137  They also 
acknowledge that success requires open communication of values, differences, concerns, 
ideas, and solutions; as well as a certain degree of understanding and flexibility.138  Williams 
and Ellefson’s definition of success implies a measure of longevity, in that groups who are 
able to attract and keep individuals over time can be considered successful.  This success 
sustained over time is what is particularly interesting about the BLM RACs, in that, with the 
exception of one, where they were established, they have been functioning continuously for 
twenty years.   
The BLM RACs are a longstanding (20 year) experiment in local collaborative 
governance that has been instituted by a policy mandate which, at minimum, fulfills 
Williams and Ellefson’s definition of success, “a group able to attract and keep individuals 
and organizations engaged in partnership activities.”  This investigation seeks to 
understand how the BLM RACs measure up to the other principles of dispute resolution 
systems design and evaluation methods outlined here.  However, before proceeding to 
evaluating the RACs, it is important to understand how they were developed and their 
relationship to the BLM in general.  The following chapter is a brief walk through the history 
of the BLM and their approach to public involvement in land use planning and decision 
making.  
3. The BLM, Rangeland Reform, and the advent of the RACs 
This chapter begins with an overview of the BLM and the lands the Agency 
administers to establish the relevant background for explaining the institution of the RACs.  
It traces the evolution of public participation in the BLM’s land and resource management 
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from the days just prior to the implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act through the 
Rangeland Reforms developed by Secretary Babbitt which established the Resource 
Advisory Councils in 1994.  By doing so, it seeks to understand the regulatory requirements 
that set up the expectations and desired outcomes intended to be produced by the RAC, and 
how those requirements have shaped the activities of the RACs.  Finally, this chapter 
addresses the first research sub-question: what catalyzed the use of collaboration in 
establishing the RACs?   
Today the BLM manages 245 million acres of surface land and 700 million acres of 
sub-surface minerals primarily in the Western United States.139  Organizationally, the 
agency is divided into State wide districts and regional field offices within those districts.  
The RACs are organized within the State Districts to provide advice on issues affecting 
either the State as a whole, or to one or more regional field offices.  Of the RACs in the Rocky 
Mountain States investigated by this study, Wyoming, Utah and Arizona each have one RAC 
that provides advice on issues across the entire state.140  New Mexico has four RACs, and 
Montana, Idaho, and Colorado each have three that enables them provide advice on a 
smaller geographic area and from a more localized perspective.   
The RACs are the result of a long history of public management of the lands and 
resources administered by the BLM.   The thread of public involvement that ultimately led 
to the modern system of RACs used today stitches together three distinct eras of rangeland 
management in what was once generically referred to as the public domain.  First, prior to 
1934, a relatively unmanaged common rangeland was equally accessible by all.  An 
unregulated system of unfettered grazing consumed this “sea of grass,” eventually resulting 
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in a classic example of Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons.”   Severe declines of a 
resource that once seemed so limitless during the period of westward expansion marked 
the desperate need for some system of regulation.141   
Second, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934142 enacted such a lease system, divided the 
commons into grazing districts and imposed fees on use of the public domain.  One of the 
BLMs predecessor agencies, the U.S. Grazing Service established an early model of the RACs, 
the Grazing Advisory Boards, to assist in implementing the Taylor Act as early as 1935.  The 
Grazing Advisory Boards were comprised of permittees from the local grazing districts and 
provided advice on all management decisions while the lease system guaranteed a degree of 
certainty to permitted ranchers and established a revenue stream for the nascent Federal 
Grazing Service.143    
The third era began in 1976, when Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act.  FLPMA broadened the scope of BLM management directives under the 
philosophical umbrella of Multiple Use, Sustained Yield. 144  Originating in a time when shifts 
in cultural expectations challenged the bureaucratic expert model of agency decision 
making, under FLPMA, Congress required public involvement and a process for judicial 
review in the management of the public lands.145  In order to guide management actions, 
Congress required the BLM to develop resource management plans, and directed the 
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Secretary to develop regulations for including the public in the development process.  
However, FLPMA failed to articulate clear guidelines as to the nature and scope of that 
involvement, leaving interpretation of a vague statutory mandate to the BLM and the 
courts.146  FLPMA also reconstituted the Grazing Advisory Board model, calling them Citizen 
Advisory Boards, and expanded their purview and membership to include a diverse cross 
section of interests.  The Citizen Advisory Boards were empowered to provide advice and 
recommendations on the implementation of the act and resource management planning 
generally.147   
The regulatory reforms implemented by Secretary Bruce Babbitt in 1994 called 
Rangeland Reform ’94, extend this third era by combining the Grazing Advisory Boards and 
the Citizen Advisory Boards into the modern Resource Advisory Councils.148  These new 
regulations embraced FACA as an organizing framework, while continuing FLPMA’s 
authorization for the advisory committees to provide advice on the “full array of ecosystem 
and multiple use issues associated with BLM administered public lands...”149 Incidentally, 
the Rangeland Reform ‘94 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) points out that the 
Secretary of Agriculture has “...the authority to set up advisory boards consisting of a variety 
of interests and viewpoints...” and, “...could use these boards to gain input for rangeland use 
and management planning.”150  However, to date, the use of RACs within the Forest Service 
has been on a much more limited and temporary basis.151  
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An Unregulated Commons 
Prior to the implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934, the public domain 
was a commons, generally free to use and open to all with little oversight or regulation.  
Under the Unlawful Enclosures Act of 1885, Congress declared that the commons could not 
be fenced in, while the Supreme Court case of Buford v. Houtz guaranteed the public’s right 
to access public lands, but according to Coggins and Lindberg-Johnson, beyond that, “federal 
law applicable to grazing on the public domain was notable mostly for its absence.”152  
During the nineteenth century, homesteading ranchers led the westward expansion,153 and 
maintaining a policy of disposal of the vast estate it so recently acquired, the United States 
sold off or gave away parcels of land typically in tracts of 160 or 320 acres.  Offered up by 
the General Land Office back in Washington D.C., these parcels in the arid West were 
considered relatively small and found to be insufficient to support viable ranching 
operations.  Forced by necessity, ranchers adopted the Spanish style of letting cattle graze 
freely across the vast public domain for months at a time.154  Simultaneously, Congress 
largely ignored range management and the responsibility for regulating grazing and other 
activities on the public domain fell largely to the States and Territories.155  The state laws, 
which focused more on securing private property rights than conservation of the resource 
base, largely ignored the effect overgrazing had on the public domain.156  
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By the turn of the twentieth century, Congress had authorized several means for 
withdrawing reserves of land from the public domain and placing them under systems of 
federal management.  The National Park System and the National Forest Reserves both 
cleaved off the most scenic or the most productive lands.  By 1905, as Coggins and Lindberg-
Johnson explain, “the public domain had been carved up into parks, forests, and all the 
rest.”157  The BLM’s other predecessor, the General Land Office ultimately became 
responsible for managing, “the lands that nobody wanted...”158 but was still primarily in the 
business of disposition.  In 1929, President Hoover offered to give the remaining 
unreserved public lands over to the states. The states refused, fearing that a transfer of 
ownership would result in the loss of significant federal financial benefits and an 
accumulation of even more lands they could, “...neither sell nor lease.”159   
  Largely in response the deterioration of range productivity that resulted from 
uncontrolled grazing, the Taylor Act was Congress’s move to regain control over an 
untenable situation and begin to improve the condition of the public domain.  A hastily 
created Grazing Division under the Department of the Interior was given the responsibility 
for implementing and administering the Act.  In its early days, the Grazing Service faced 
many challenges from the conflicts on the range, the depletion of resources, and a lack of 
administrative direction or guidance from the Department or Congress.160  Nonetheless, the 
significance of the Taylor Act cannot be overstated: “The act is a step in the direction of 
conservation and regulated use on land hitherto without ownership and direction of a 
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branch of Federal Government.”161 Additionally, today the Act, “...remains the conceptual 
foundation of rangeland management and the source of asserted range rights...”162 
Provisions of the Taylor Act 
 The primary goal of the Taylor legislation was, “...to stop injury to the public grazing 
lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, to 
stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes."163  
In fact, bad stewardship practices and overgrazing had depleted vegetation cover and 
subsequently the grazing capacity of the range by fifty percent.164  The Taylor Act 
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to, “...promote the highest use of the public 
lands...”165 through three main provisions: 1) to reserve and organize the unappropriated 
public lands into grazing districts166; 2) to establish provisions for protection, 
administration, regulation, and improvement of the districts,167 and 3) to establish a permit 
system to authorize use of the range upon payment of reasonable fees.168   The 
requirements for public participation in the implementation of the act and subsequent 
management of the range are woven throughout these several provisions.  
For example, a provision in Section 315 provides for a public hearing, and public 
notice of such a hearing prior to the establishment of any grazing district to allow for the 
input of, “...State officials, and the settlers, residents and livestock owners of the vicinity...”169  
Additionally, Section 315(h) made considerations for the Secretary to provide opportunities 
                                                 
161 Vergil Hurlburt. “The Taylor Grazing Act.” The Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics, Vol. 11, 
No. 2 (1935): 205. 
162 Coggins and Lindberg-Johnson (1983): 48. 
163 Ibid: 50. Quoting the Preamble of the Taylor Grazing Act of June 28, 1934, Ch. 865, § 1, 48 Stat. 
1269 
164 Olinger (1998): 651 
165 Pub. L. 73-482 codified as amended in 43 USC § 315 
166 Ibid 
167 43 USC § 315(a) 
168 43 USC § 315(b)  
169 43 USC § 315 
 45 
to cooperate with associations of Stockmen, State Agencies and other entities interested in 
the conservation of wildlife.170 Finally, Section 315(o)-1a, as it was added with the passage 
of the Grazing District Advisory Board Act in1939, officially authorized the Secretary to 
establish the Grazing Advisory Boards, “...so that the Secretary may have the benefit of the 
fullest information and advice concerning physical, economic, and other local conditions in 
the grazing districts...”171   
The unregulated grazing that caused the deteriorated conditions of the range was 
one of the major catalysts to the passage of the Taylor Act.  World War I saw the demand for 
meat production explode which resulted in an increase in grazing on the western public 
lands and consequently increased degradation to the range.  Shortly after the War, the Great 
Drought exacerbated the deterioration of range productivity and nearly ruined the livestock 
industry in the West.172  Under the Taylor Act, improvement of the range was to be 
accomplished by controlling the amount of grazing through the permit system while 
providing for the expenditure of funds, “to perform such work as may be necessary amply to 
protect and rehabilitate the areas subject to [this act]...through such funds that may be 
made available for that purpose.”173  In fact, twenty five percent of grazing fees collected 
were to be used for making improvements to the range, but the conditions were so bad that 
ranchers didn’t want to wait for the accumulation of funds from the grazing fees.174  Some 
advocated for the use of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Works Progress 
Administration to begin making immediate improvements. Consequently, because of the 
provisions providing for range improvements and greater certainty for grazing operations, 
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ranchers were overwhelmingly in favor of the Act, despite the increased regulation and 
federal control imposed upon the once free range.175  
A Unique Species of Range Democracy  
Ferry Carpenter was appointed as the first Director of the Department of Interior’s 
new Grazing Service and charged with the difficult task of implementing the Taylor Act.  
Believing that the ranchers themselves were the ones best capable of developing effective 
range management guidelines, and reluctant to impose a top-down management regime, he 
hastily, and without express authority from the Act, organized local ranchers into grazing 
advisory boards.176   Trying to grasp a thread of management control and start reversing the 
trend of degradation, Carpenter empowered the advisory boards to classify lands, 
recommend licenses, and create rules for grazing operators.177   This “...unique species of 
range democracy...”178 was given free rein to establish the boundaries of the grazing 
districts, implement the grazing fee system, account for the local range conditions and make 
recommendations on the improvements that needed to be made.  This system of local 
advisory boards catalyzed what came to be known as “home rule on the range”179 and gave 
a small collective of local landowners an inordinate degree of power.180  
  During the first few years of implementation of the Taylor Act, the ranchers became 
ever more comfortable with the level of power delegated to them by Carpenter and 
interpreted it as an implied authority over all range management decisions.  
Simultaneously, the grazing boards became dominated by large-scale operators whose 
parochial view of the range seemed to favor of their own economic interests at the expense 
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of the ecological integrity of the landscape.181  As the BLM report, 50 Years of Progress points 
out: 
These boards were expected to address the problem of overgrazing, but the economic 
well-being of individual ranchers and, indirectly, that of the local communities in 
which they lived, was closely tied to the number of animals the rancher was allowed to 
run on the Federal range. This meant that the local advisory board member could have 
placed his friends and neighbors in financial hardship.  Many simply refused to make 
the hard decisions that were necessary to reverse the process of range 
deterioration...182  
By 1938, the both Congress and the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ikes were becoming 
concerned that the grazing boards wielded too much power and came dangerously close to 
violating the principle of constitutional sub-delegation.  They began to pull back on the 
reigns.  Carpenter resigned under pressure from the Secretary and was replaced by Richard 
Rutledge, a former Forest Service employee who favored greater federal control.  In their 
part, Congress enacted The Grazing District Advisory Board Act of 1939.183  
 The Grazing District Advisory Board Act gave statutory authority to the advisory 
boards for the first time, while at the same time it augmented their structure in three 
fundamental ways that are still relevant today.  First, the act implemented a two-step 
process whereby the Advisory Board members were nominated through an election by local 
permittees and then officially appointed to the board by the Secretary.184 This appointment 
process can easily be construed as the mechanism by which Congress returned the final 
authority over the membership of the Boards and decision making power back to the 
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Secretary, ensuring that the Agency is not subjected to the undue influence of a single 
dominant set of interests.  In addition to the appointment process, the Act reserved the right 
of the Secretary to remove members from the board.185  Second, the act attempted to 
balance the represented viewpoints on the board by requiring the inclusion of one wildlife 
advocate to supplement the local stockmen on the twelve to fifteen-member committee.186   
Finally, the Act provided limitations on the advice the boards were to give, and expressly 
prohibited a member from offering advice that would result in a benefit in which that 
member held a direct interest.187  These three provisions resemble those later adopted by 
FACA, FLPMA, and that currently exist within the regulatory framework structuring today’s 
Resource Advisory Councils. 
 While the Taylor Act was able to bring the rangelands under federal control and 
implement some measure of regulatory authority to curb overgrazing, a combination of 
funding and administrative shortfalls prevented the Grazing Service from rehabilitating the 
range to its former productivity.  In fact the condition of the range continued to decline and 
was seen as indicative of two things.  First, it exhibited the inability of the Grazing Boards to 
put the protection of rangeland ecosystems above their economic wellbeing.188  Second, it 
highlighted a fundamental problem with the Grazing Service’s philosophy of decentralized 
administrative authority and reliance on the grazing permittees information and advice to 
direct management.189  Rather than balancing the two competing provisions of the law, the 
Service subordinated its directive to “...stop injury to the public grazing lands...” to, 
“...stabilizing the livestock industry...” and consequently facilitated a continued over-use of 
the range by the industry. 
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The Evolution of Range Management between 1934 and 1976 
In 1970, the congressionally appointed Public Land Law Review Commission 
released its report enumerating a long list of changes to administrative and procedural law 
governing the management of the public lands, some of which were adopted by congress 
when it enacted FLPMA.  Additionally, between 1970 and1976, the BLM frequently sought 
“organic legislation,” similar to that of the Forest Service, to grant it express management 
authority over the Nation’s public lands.190  In 1976, Congress enacted the Federal Lands 
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) in response to these and a number of other public 
concerns roiling just beneath the surface.  Under the Taylor Act, the Federal government 
retained the authority to manage the public lands so long as those lands remained in public 
ownership.  At the time, it was still the official policy of the administration that the lands 
remaining in the public domain would eventually be disposed of through the General Land 
Office either directly to the states or to private entities.  The enactment of FLPMA in 1976 
reversed that policy, declaring the Federal government would largely retain ownership of 
the remaining public estate.191  In the forty years between the implementation of the Taylor 
Act and this new organic legislation, several other important developments took place to 
shape the future of land and resource management within the BLM. 
The first notable development was the merger in 1946 of the Grazing Service and 
General Land Office within the Department of the Interior to create the BLM.  With this 
merger, the BLM inherited both the strengths and some of the weaknesses of its 
predecessor agencies.  A combination of shrinking appropriations from Congress, budgetary 
constraints, staff capacity, and the influence of the, by then, well-established Grazing 
Advisory Boards (GABs) hindered the new agency from making notable progress towards 
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improving the conditions and productivity of the public rangelands.192  Instead, for the first 
two decades of its existence, the BLM spent the majority of its time re-adjudicating grazing 
permits and allotments to bring livestock numbers within carrying capacity.193  
Various attempts to increase grazing fees and reduce the permitted numbers of 
livestock in the 50’s and 60s met with resistance from the powerful GABs.194  In the early 
fifties, the BLM tried to balance grazing use with the carrying capacity of the range by 
adjusting the numbers of permitted animals based on a scientific approach, a measure 
which largely failed to bring about significant change.195 Initially, grazing fees were set by 
the Grazing Service to cover their administrative costs but shortly after, due to pressure 
from the Grazing Advisory Boards and the powerful livestock interests, fees were allowed to 
drop far below what administration of the permit system cost the Agency.196  By 1949, 
grazing fees charged by the BLM were six time less than what the Forest Service charged.197  
In the 1950’s, grazing fees were adjusted slightly to reflect inflation but a joint Department 
of Interior/Department of Agriculture study in 1966 determined fees should be increased 
by both departments to $1.26 per animal, nearly quadruple the thirty-three cents the BLM 
was charging at the time.198 
The growth of the environmental movement in mid-sixties and early seventies 
brought newfound public attention to how the public lands were being managed.  At that 
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time, an increasingly urban population began to increasingly value outdoor recreation and 
advocate for protection of wildlife habitat, watersheds and non-consumptive uses of the 
public lands.199   The conservation organizations that had sprouted up began to decry the 
dominant use management philosophy that had guided the BLM since the beginning.200  
Then, in 1970, the congressionally appointed Public Land Law Review Commission 
submitted their final report recommending over 100 actions agencies or Congress should 
take to improve or augment the management of the public lands.  Among the 
recommendations were that both the Forest Service and the BLM reduce the number of 
permitted animals to improve range health, and the use of the “fair-market value” standard 
for determining grazing fees.201  Shortly after the report was submitted to Congress, the 
BLM sought out legislative action to gain “organic” management authority over the public 
domain.202   
The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 (NEPA) and the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1972 (FACA), as discussed in the previous chapter, 
brought about landmark changes in the public’s ability to interact with public lands 
management.  FACA ensured that groups advising federal agencies consisted of a balanced 
representation of all the interests and provided the framework within which the current 
RACs were developed.  In addition to the public participation provisions in NEPA, the Act’s 
major significance was the requirement that any “major federal actions” proposed by a 
federal agency include a statement of environmental impacts affecting the quality of the 
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human environment, any expected adverse environmental effects of the proposed action, 
and a range of possible alternatives to the proposed action.203 
The passage of NEPA in 1969 gave the budding environmental community a legal 
stick to wield in order to remedy the degradation occurring on the federal public lands over 
the past decades.  In 1974, the Courts landed a resounding blow to the BLM.  The Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior, 
insisting that the BLM’s use of a single, programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) to address the entire grazing management program was insufficient.204  NRDC sought 
sight specific EIS analysis for each grazing unit.  The courts generally agreed.205  The NRDC 
v. Morton ruling prompted Congress to finally address the condition of the public 
rangelands and pass FLPMA two years later. 
FLPMA, PRIA and the Multiple Use Mandate 
By enacting the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in 1976 (FLPMA) and the 
Public Rangeland Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA), Congress acknowledged what ranchers, 
conservationists, and the BLM had been telling them for decades: the federal public 
rangelands were in deplorable condition.206  Recognizing that, Congress reversed the 200 
year old policy of disposal in favor of retaining the public lands under federal ownership. 207 
They mandated the BLM use a Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield management philosophy,208 
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and provided the Agency with the organic legislation it so desperately needed, directing it to 
improve the ecological conditions of the public lands and providing it with the management 
authority to regulate the formerly uncontrolled land uses.209 FLPMA explicitly protected the 
scientific, scenic, historic, ecological, and other values, and, “...where appropriate, protect 
certain lands in their natural condition...for the benefit of fish, wildlife and outdoor 
recreation.”210  Not only was protection of resources declared a management requirement, 
but the rehabilitation of the range is facilitated through a new funding allocation system.  
Fifty percent of all grazing receipts were directed to go towards on-the-ground range 
rehabilitation, protection and improvements.211  FLPMA also adopted the “fair market 
value” standard for setting grazing fees recommended by the Public Land Law Review 
Commission.212   
PRIA supplemented and refined the management requirements laid out in FLPMA, 
provided further funding for rangeland improvements, and declared rangeland 
improvement to be the overall management goal.  Legal scholars, public lands managers, 
policy makers and academics 213 have analyzed and discussed the statutory nuances and on-
the-ground effects of FLPMA and PRIA extensively in the forty years since its enactment far 
more thoroughly than can be constructed here, but what is important for the purposes of 
this study is that PRIA is a recognition of the continuing deterioration of the public 
rangelands while FLPMA substantiates the public involvement strategies the BLM and its 
predecessor the U.S. Grazing Service developed by instituting the Grazing Advisory Boards 
in the 1930’s.   
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Despite the fact that the early Grazing Boards wielded a powerful influence over the 
BLM, oftentimes “hogtying” the agency and compelling it to elevate the needs of the 
livestock industry over ecological improvement, Congress recognized the value in 
preserving the advisory board model.   The Grazing Advisory Boards were retained by 
Congress in FLPMA, but their power was substantially curtailed.214  Instead, Congress 
directed the Secretary to establish a new form of Citizen Advisory Boards under the 
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and granted them with the general 
power to, “...furnish advice on land use planning, classification, retention, management and 
disposal.”215  
Establishing the Citizen Advisory Boards under FACA was an important 
development in the management of the public rangelands and instituting collaborative 
governance over public land and resource management.  In a time of increasing public 
concern over the environment, especially the ecological condition of the public lands, this 
development heralded two things: 1)the changing relationship of the public to federal land 
and resource management, and 2) the increasing employment of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques to resolve conflicts over public policy issues.  
Rangeland Reform ’94 and the Dawn of the RACs 
Shortly after the Clinton Administration was elected to office in the early 1990s, 
Bruce Babbitt was appointed Secretary of the Interior.  As a cattle rancher and the former 
Governor of Arizona, Babbitt was well-known as a consensus builder and someone who 
could straddle the divide between the conservation and livestock interests.  Babbitt felt 
compelled by the public concern over the environment that, in part, brought the Clinton 
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Administration into office, and took on range reform as one of his first orders of business.  
The previous decades had seen marginal improvements in rangeland management and a 
stabilization of the BLMs budgetary and administrative insecurities that had plagued them 
prior to the enactment of FLPMA and PRIA.   So, at the turn of the decade, why the need for 
yet another set of reforms? 
NEPA, FLPMA and PRIA had shed substantial light on the environmental problems 
caused by the overgrazing that had occurred throughout the history of the public 
rangelands.216  The changing demographic and economic realities of “the New West” saw a 
shift in public policy perspectives and concerns over the use (and overuse) of the public 
lands.  A population that, prior to WWII was primarily employed in the ranching, mining, or 
timber industries, was increasingly moving to urban communities and reliant on an 
economic base focused around the manufacturing, technology and service industries. 217  
This increasingly urban population began to value the public lands for non-consumptive 
recreation purposes.  Combined with the increased influence of environmental groups 
across the country clamoring for protection of fish and wildlife habitat, the BLM faced 
mounting pressure to improve range conditions and consider values other than ranching 
and mining in land use planning and management.218  Finally, Babbitt recognized that the 
administration of the grazing permit system was unsustainable, and the agency needed to 
realize a better return from the grazing fees.  
According to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Rangeland Reform ’94, 
the new regulations attempt to better implement the multiple-use mandate, further 
addresses deteriorating ecological conditions on the range by imposing federal Standards 
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and Guidelines for rangeland rehabilitation, outline a new grazing-fee structure, and 
combine the Grazing Advisory Boards with the Citizen Advisory Boards into the more 
comprehensive Resource Advisory Councils known today.219  The ingenuity of the reforms 
was exemplified in the collaborative process that was used in their development, but the 
significance was not fully realized until they began to be implemented.  As the Final EIS for 
Rangeland Reform ’94 explains: 
A major policy element of the reform package consists of national requirements and 
guiding principles for the local development of state or regional standards and 
guidelines for livestock grazing on BLM-administered lands. Fallback standards and 
guidelines in the Preferred Alternative would take effect if regional standards and 
guidelines have not been developed within 18 months.220 
This statement underscores the purpose of the new reforms and also the original intent of 
the Resource Advisory Councils, to develop from a local perspective state and regional 
standards and guidelines for livestock grazing.  The regulations implemented a federal floor 
or “fallback standards and guidelines”, as the baseline for managing the ecological condition 
of the public rangelands, in the event that the RACs were unable to agree.221  Rangeland 
Reform ’94 established the RACs to develop, with consideration of the local conditions and 
cultural heritage, Standards and Guidelines to meet or exceed this federal floor for 
rangeland management.  The regulations also pose limitations on the RACs authority that 
previously were not specifically voiced in other legislation.222 In addition, the reforms 
addressed several other difficult issues the BLM found themselves dealing with: the 
unauthorized sub-leasing of grazing permits, methods for protecting desert ecosystems, 
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how to spend range betterment funds, directing an ecosystem approach to rangeland 
management, and adjusting grazing fees to realize a fair value.223 
The Rangeland Reform regulations define the core purpose of the RACs by 
instituting a process for collaboratively developing the Standards and Guidelines for 
rangeland management. In the process, they recognize FACA as an effective governing 
structure for instituting collaborative decision making in public land use and resource 
management.  Requiring the establishment of a standing FACA committee authorized to 
provide advice on “the full array of ecosystem and multiple use issues associated with BLM-
administered public lands...” is a unique feature of the BLM RACs and brings the institution 
within the legal framework outlined in the previous chapter.  The question then turns to 
why, considering that local control of rangeland management resulted in nearly seventy 
years of degradation to the ecological resources found on the public rangeland, did 
Secretary Babbitt insist on continuing a policy of decentralized management and looking to 
local users for information for decision making?   
Why the RACs? A Continued Experiment in Collaborative Governance 
In establishing the RACs, Rangeland Reform ’94 continued a policy of local 
governance of public rangeland management but with some substantive changes from the 
previous models that simultaneously diversify the interests represented, limit their power, 
and provide them with a sense of direction.  In order to better account for the values of the 
competing and complementary uses of the public lands, the regulations outline distinct 
membership categories that, “...reflect a balance of views.”224  The membership categories 
are as follows: Category 1) Persons who hold Federal grazing permits or leases within the 
area for which the council is organized; represent interests associated with transportation 
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or rights-of-way; represent developed outdoor recreation, off-highway vehicle users, or 
commercial recreation activities; represent the commercial timber industry; or represent 
energy and mineral development.  Category 2) Persons representing nationally or 
regionally recognized environmental organizations; dispersed recreational activities; 
Archeological and historical interests; or nationally or regionally recognized wild horse and 
burro interest groups.  Category 3) Persons who hold State, county or local elected office; 
are employed by a State agency responsible for management of natural resources, land, or 
water; represent Indian tribes within or adjacent to the area for which the council is 
organized; are employed as academicians in natural resource management or the natural 
sciences; or represent the affected public-at-large.225  
The BLM has a nearly eighty-year history of collaboratively managing the public 
domain, from the days of the informal grazing advisory boards set up by Ferry Carpenter to 
today’s modern Resource Advisory Councils.  As Olinger succinctly puts it, “...local control 
was not a new concept in grazing management. In fact, it was a concept that dated to nearly 
the beginning of federal regulatory control of the ranges, and which, as the current 
condition of the range indicates, has been largely unsuccessful in protecting the 
environment of the public range.”226  The reasons for continuing with this experiment in 
local governance reflect the evolving nature of public lands management and an increase in 
the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques throughout the Federal government to 
resolve conflicts and move policies forward.  
This evolution is prevalent in the work of the Colorado Group.  Without the efforts of 
this diverse group of ranchers, wildlife advocates and conservationists, the RACs may have 
                                                 
225 43 CFR § 1784.6-1(c). The establishment and articulation of these interest categories was a 
development implemented by the Ragneland Reform ’94 regulations (see: 60 Fed. Reg. 9900 - 9901)  
226 Olinger (1998): 650. 
 59 
met with much more resistance, especially by the national environmental organizations 
who were already weary of instituting another system of local control.227  Initially, Secretary 
Babbitt held four town-hall style meetings to develop the proposal for new regulations.  
After significant pressure by Congress and Western ranchers, Babbitt promised to work 
more closely with the affected parties to develop the second round of proposed regulations. 
This promise led to the establishment of the Colorado Rangeland Reform Working Group 
(the Colorado Group) in 1993 by Secretary Babbitt and Governor Romer of Colorado.  The 
group’s membership included ranchers, environmentalists, and elected officials who were 
committed to forging solutions through a consensus-based process.  The group met nine 
times between 1993 and 1994, hammering out recommendations to issues around public 
input, range use, range improvement funding, enforcement, grazing fees, water issues, and 
other concerns.  The recommendations of the Colorado Group were almost universally 
adopted in the Rangeland Reform ’94 package.228 
Environmentalists involved in the Colorado Group favored keeping ranchers on the 
land, “as a way to avoid sprawling development and maintain cultural integrity, while the 
group's ranchers were willing to place more emphasis on ecosystem management in their 
operations to satisfy environmental concerns.”229  The Colorado Group’s recommendations 
emphasized both community and ecosystem health equally, acknowledging the importance 
of promoting sustainable communities, producing good stewards of the land, and favoring 
ecosystem function over resource extraction.230   The Group also felt that a centralized, top-
down management structure could never adequately implement ecosystem management, 
which inherently reflects the nuance of the local ecology and local culture.  Here, 
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concessions were made to the environmental concerns over the past problems with local 
control of the range, and the RACs were developed to include members of national 
environmental groups.   As such, the Colorado Group laid the foundation for the current 
model of collaboration and consensus-building adopted by the BLM through Rangeland 
Reform ’94.  In fact, included in their report to Babbitt, the Colorado Group produced a paper on 
their consensus-building process titled Models for Enhanced Community-Based Involvement in 
Rangeland Reform.  The DOI noted in their final published rule that in general the Department, 
“...agrees with the findings of the group and has attempted to incorporate all key elements of the 
model for public involvement in this proposed rule."231  
As it was adopted, Rangeland Reform ’94 amended nearly all of the regulations 
governing advisory committees detailed in 43 CFR § 1780.232  The language used in the 
Federal Register describing the final adopted rule indicates that the BLM intended that the 
RACs fulfill the role of the advisory committees and all their associated functions required 
under FLPMA stating:  
FLPMA directs the Secretary to establish advisory councils of not less than 10 and not 
more than 15 members. Members must be appointed from among representatives of 
the various major citizens’ interests concerned with problems relating to land use 
planning, or with the management of the public lands located within the area for 
which an advisory council is established. At least one member must be a publicly 
elected official. The department envisions that the RACs formed in each State under 
the final rule will fulfill these statutory requirements.”233  
Also according to the final adopted rule, the RACs were established to accomplish two 
primary goals: providing advice on the full array of multiple use issues, and consulting on 
the preparation of standards and guidelines for rangeland health.  As the final rule dictates: 
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The role of the RAC is to provide advice to BLM. Each RAC will focus on the full array of 
multiple use issues associated with public lands within its area of jurisdiction. They 
will consult on the preparation of standards and guidelines for grazing 
administration...They will also provide advice on preparation, amendment, and 
implementation of land use management plans and activity plans and consult in 
planning for range development and improvement programs. 234 
The final regulations also implemented a variety of provisions that helped to 
structure the RACs and provide them some initial direction moving forward.  First, they 
established and organized the categories used to ensure diverse representation of the 
public’s interests.235  Next, it provided authorization for specifically assisting with resource 
management planning in addition to the other duties already authorized by FLPMA in 
section 1784.0-6.236  It also outlined the three models of RAC organization from which the 
district managers could choose to structure the RAC’s initial charters.237  One of the most 
interesting provisions of the RACs is a paragraph in § 1784.6-1 that states, “Where the 
resource advisory council becomes concerned that its advice is being arbitrarily 
disregarded, the council may request that the Secretary respond directly to such concerns 
within 60 days of receipt...”238  This is presumably implemented to provide a measure of 
accountability to the RAC by the State Director and the local managers.  
The last provision of the regulations affecting the RACs amends the grazing 
management requirements, characterizes the federal fundamentals of rangeland health, and 
requires the local standards and guidelines be consistent with the described 
fundamentals.239  The federal fundamental standards are intended to, “...address the 
necessary physical components of functional watersheds, ecological processes required for 
healthy biotic communities, water quality standards and objectives, and habitat for 
                                                 
234 Ibid: Pg. 9896 
235 43 USC § 1784.6-1 
236 Ibid 
237 43 USC § 1784.6-2 
238 43 USC § 1784.6-1(i) 
239 43 CFR § 4180.1 
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threatened or endangered species or other species of special interest.”240   The RACs are 
specifically directed to assist in the development of local standards and guidelines, “...to 
provide specific measures of rangeland health and to identify acceptable or best 
management practices in keeping with the characteristics of a State or region such as 
climate and landform.”241  The regulations require local standards and guidelines to at 
minimum meet the federal standards and address a suite of ecological concerns.242  Section 
4180(C)(3)(f) also dictates that until these local standards and guidelines are approved by 
the Secretary, federal fallback standards and guidelines will apply and be implemented.243  
Unique to federal land management, this provision implements the model of creating a 
federal regulatory floor and encouraging the states or local regions to develop measures to 
meet or exceed the baseline standards.  
Upon release of the initial EIS, the Rangeland Reform package came under fire from 
national environmental groups, ranchers and some federal lawmakers.  For some, the 
reforms didn’t provide strong enough environmental safeguards, others lambasted the 
grazing fee increases, while still others chided the provision allowing direct appeal to the 
Secretary.244  In response to these criticisms and the over 38,000 comments received by the 
DOI on the draft EIS, some changes were made to the final rule delaying the implementation 
of the grazing fee increase and establishing the requirement for RAC members to reside 
within the State in which they have jurisdiction.  Shortly after the rules were adopted, the 
Public Lands Council filed a facial challenge to the regulations claiming the new regulations 
on grazing were incompatible with the Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA and that the, 
“security of their ‘historical adjudicated’ preferences in terms of numbers of AUMs was 
                                                 
240 60 Fed. Reg 9898 (Feb. 22, 1995) (Amending 43 CFR § 4180.1) 
241 60 Fed. Reg. 9899 (Feb. 22, 1995)(Amending 43 CFR § 4180.2) 
242 43 CFR § 4180.2(C)(3)(d – e) 
243 43 CFR § 4180.2(C)(3)(f) 
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lost.”245   The challenges found their way through to the Supreme Court which ultimately 
upheld all of the provisions of Rangeland Reform ’94.246  In the end, Secretary Babbitt’s 
commitment to the Colorado Model and writing “a new chapter in range management...”247 
guided the reforms through these tempests and finally saw twenty-three RACs established 
late in 1995.248   
The language used by the agency in the Federal Register adopting the final 
Rangeland Reform ‘94 regulations provides an illuminating backdrop for considering 
whether the RACs have fulfilled their regulatory requirements.  Their two principle 
requirements developed under Rangeland Reform ‘94 and codified in the regulations are to: 
1) consult with the BLM State Director to develop local standards and guidelines for 
rangeland health249; and 2) provide advice on, “policy formulation, program planning, 
decision making, attainment of program objectives, and achievement of improved program 
coordination and economies in the management of public lands and resources...”250  
Remembering these two critical functions of the RACs when assessing their effectiveness 
will highlight why they have been continuously reauthorized by the Secretary of the Interior 
for twenty years.  
4. Assessing the BLM RAC Model  
Chapter four examines the RAC model from the participant’s point of view and the 
extent the Rocky Mountain RACs are able to fulfill their responsibilities as directed by the 
regulations.  This examination relies on in-depth interviews conducted with representatives 
                                                 
245 Pamela Baldwin.  “Federal Grazing Regulations: Public Lands Council v. Babbitt.” CRS Report for 
Congress. (1 November, 2003): 2-6.  
246 Ibid: 1. 
247 Ibid: 675. 
248 The final rules were officially adopted on August 21, 1995, 180 days after they were published in 
the Federal Register. 
249 43 CFR § 4180.2(a) 
250 43 CFR § 1784.0-6 
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from four Rocky Mountain region RACs to gain their insights into how the RACs function, 
how they define success, and their perceptions of effectiveness.  A summary table of 
recommendations and advice provided to the BLM by all sixteen Rocky Mountain RACs was 
also constructed from the review of the meeting minutes that was conducted as background 
research for this study (see Appendix IV).  This table is used to identify and discuss the 
degree to which the RACs are accomplishing the goals and mandates under which they were 
established.  Section one of this chapter outlines the interview methods in detail, while 
section two discusses the criteria used for evaluating the RAC model.  Finally, section three 
discusses the RAC participant interviews and recommendations in detail through the lens of 
the evaluation criteria discussed in section two.  
According to Hesse-Biber and Leavy, in analyzing in-depth interviews, the 
researcher is, “looking for patterns that emerge in the ‘thick descriptions’ of social life 
recounted by their participants...” with the goal of, “...gaining rich qualitative data, from the 
perspective of selected individuals, on a particular subject.”251  In this study, the subject 
under investigation is the effectiveness of the RACs as an institution, and the patterns that 
emerge are represented by quotes from the interviewees.  The qualitative data gained 
through the interviews is used to develop a picture of the overall effectiveness of the 
institution and extract lessons to inform refinement or the future development of similar 
processes of collaborative governance. 
Using interview quotes to paint a picture of the RAC’s, their effectiveness is 
evaluated based on the criteria laid out in section two.  The evaluation criteria developed 
for this study are based on the literature review conducted for chapter two about evaluating 
processes of ECR.  By relying on quotes of the participants in this study and the patterns 
                                                 
251 Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006): 119, 120. 
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that emerged from an analysis of the interview transcripts, section three addresses the 
remaining two research sub-questions: 1) what has enabled the RACs to achieve their core 
purpose; and 2) what sustains the RACs over time as a collaborative arrangement instituted 
by a policy mandate within a federal land management agency?.  The discussion of these 
findings is divided into two sections, each addressing one of the research sub-questions.  
Interview methods 
Interviews followed procedures detailed in the literature evaluating collaborative 
processes of ECR.  Many scholars have relied on participant perception to evaluate success 
of collaborative processes, as well as a variety of methods to gain those perspectives 
including semi-structured interviews and formal survey instruments. 252   In their 
investigation of over fifty cases of community-based collaboration on federal lands, 
McKinney and Field use a standardized survey instrument and base their evaluation on the 
premise, “...that participants are in one of the best positions to evaluate the relative success 
of their effort.”253  Lu and Schuett, use semi-structured interviews to gain an understanding 
of concerns over forest management issues on the Sam Huston National Forest in Texas.254  
Schuett, Selin and Carr also discuss the use of purposive sampling techniques, open ended 
questioning, and analyzing the content of collected responses to their questioning.  In 
analyzing the responses to their questions, they look for common themes, develop 
categories from those themes, and use quotes to, “...illustrate the richness of these data...” in 
their reporting.255    
                                                 
252 See generally: Cestero (1999); Leach (2006); McKinney and Field (2008); Michael A. Schuett, 
Steve W. Selin, and Deborah S. Carr. “Making It Work: Keys to Successful Collaboration in Natural 
Resource Management.” Environmental Management; Vol. 27, No. 4. (2001): 587–593.;    
253 McKinney and Field (2008): 420.  
254 Jiaying Lu and Michael A. Schuett. “Examining the Role of Voluntary Associations in 
Environmental Management: The Case of the Sam Houston National Forest.” Environmental 
Management; Vol. 49 (2012): 334–346. 
255 Schuett, Selin, and Carr (2001): 588-589. 
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The RACs selected as the sample population for this study were purposely chosen to 
capture a cross section of the geographic and ecological characteristics that exist in Rocky 
Mountain region, as well as the diverse RAC models described in 43 CFR § 1784.6-2.  Each 
interview respondent was purposely-selected to represent one of the three interest 
categories that make up the RAC membership.  Additionally, one BLM staff member directly 
involved with the RACs was also selected to be interviewed.  In three of the four RACs 
studied, a full array of one agency representative and three RAC members (one from each 
interest category) were interviewed.  In one case, only one Agency representative and one 
RAC member were able to be interviewed.  In total, fourteen phone interviews were 
conducted between March and June of 2015.   
Respondents were provided with the interview questions and letter of informed 
consent prior to the call (see: Appendix I).  Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes 
with the average interview lasting just about an hour.  Interviews were digitally recorded 
with the permission of the interviewee and transcribed by hand by the principle 
investigator.  At the time of the interview, each participant acknowledged receiving the 
informed consent form and interview guide, and also verbally expressed their consent to 
both participate in the interview and to have the interview recorded.  To ensure 
confidentiality, recordings were transcribed absent of any information that could identify 
the respondent.  Audio files and transcriptions were also kept in separate folders on a 
password protected computer accessible only to the principle investigator.  
The sample size naturally poses some limitations on the ability to generalize 
theories from the interview responses.  The sample was limited to maintain a manageable 
number of interviews in the time allowed for the study to be completed, and to understand 
from a more regionalized perspective if further investigation into the RAC’s nation-wide 
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effectiveness is warranted.  Since only RAC members and agency representatives were 
interviewed, responses to the questions may be biased in favor of the views of those who 
already believe in the RAC as a valuable process for decision making, and who inherently 
have a stake in ensuring its success.  Consequently, the views of those people who are 
affected by or have an interest in BLM management decisions, but who are outside the RAC 
process are not accounted for in this study.  Although a limited sample population, the in-
depth interviews collected in this study provided detailed insight into the consensus-
building process and overall effectiveness of the Rocky Mountain RACs from the point of 
view of the diverse interests involved.   
Evaluation Methods 
After the interviews were transcribed, the content of the text was analyzed for 
relevant quotes, and quotes were categorized into themes256 based on the evaluation 
criteria presented below.257  The evaluation criteria used for this study was adapted from 
the literature on evaluating ECR and ADR described in chapter two (see also: Table I, 
below).  The following discussion of the findings weaves quotes from the interviews 
through the evaluation framework constructed by the criteria.  Drawing on the views and 
opinions of the RAC members and BLM staff highlights many of the RAC’s successes, 
challenges, and critical enabling features.  Quotes used in the discussion were chosen 
because they were representative of themes discussed by other interviewed RAC members 
and BLM representatives.   
                                                 
256 Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006):343-359 describe the process of analyzing qualitative data and 
coding collected data into themes using a grounded theory approach.  See Also: Carl F Auerbach and 
Louise B. Silverstein. Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis.  New York, NY: New 
York University Press (2003): 31-73.  The coding techniques used in this study to categorize content 
into themes from the responses of the participant interviews was largely adopted from the approach 
described here.   
257 See generally: Lu and Schuett(2012); Schuett, Selin, and Carr (2001) for justification on using 
semi-structured interviews, content analysis and theme development as an  approach to evaluating 
collaborative process design through participant perspectives.  
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This evaluation of the RAC institution is based on the views and opinions of the RAC 
members and the BLM staff most closely involved in the process.  According to Conley and 
Moote, participant perceptions can be used to, “...identify stakeholder attitudes, opinions, 
and relationships; reduced conflicts between parties; increases in social capital; and other 
social changes.”258  Relying on participant perceptions inherently poses some limitations to 
the evaluation.  According to McKinney and Field, “This approach to evaluation creates 
some selection bias because it does not include the views of people who are not part of a 
particular [community-based collaboration], but who may nevertheless be interested in and 
affected by the outcomes.”259  While this study includes only the insights of RAC members 
and the agency staff involved in the program, it is a good platform from which to begin an 
exploration into the RAC institution.  
The evaluation criteria used in this study has been adopted from the substantial 
literature on evaluating community-based collaboration and processes of environmental 
conflict resolution that has accumulated over the past two and a half decades.  The criteria 
used in this study mainly account for tangible and intangible effects of the process of the 
RAC’s deliberations.  Interview questions were developed to elicit responses related to 
representation and inclusion, the ability to build consensus and make consensus-based 
recommendations, the development of social and political capital that often accompanies 
successful collaborative and consensus-building processes of public engagement.  
Many evaluations of collaborative process focus on the on-the-ground or tangible 
outcomes resulting from the deliberation of the group.260  However, as the 
recommendations provided to the BLM are advisory only, it is difficult to evaluate the RACs 
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based on the implementation of their recommendations.  Therefore, despite the RACs 
demonstrated ability to produce collaborative, consensus-based advice, this study focuses 
less on the tangible, on-the-ground outcomes in favor of the process-based evaluation and a 
cursory overview of the RAC’s ability to provide consensus-based recommendations to the 
Agency.  Conley and Moote suggest, “...people’s perceptions are often seen as less 
appropriate for measuring tangible outcomes, due to their subjectivity and reliance on 
respondent’s memories.”261  Therefore, as discussed above, an analysis of the meeting 
minutes of the sixteen Rocky Mountain RACs was used to construct a table of 
recommendations and advice that supplements the interview responses (see Appendix IV).  
This analysis is used to show what topics the RACs have discussed over the past two years 
and where they have found success in providing consensus-based advice to the BLM.  These 
recommendations qualify as one type of successful outcome of a collaborative process and 
are discussed throughout the results.  On the other hand, even when the RACs fail to 
produce a specific recommendation, discussion of a topic around the RAC table often still 
results in a more informed decision being made by the BLM.      
The evaluation approach used here is divided into process criteria and outcome 
criteria.  This approach was adopted from Innes and Booher, who organize their framework 
by separating the tangible and intangible effects of the process from the on-the-ground or 
implementable outcomes of the agreements produced. 262   They also maintain that the 
process of collaboration may or may not lead to implementable outcomes, but the lack of 
implementable outcomes does not necessarily indicate a failure of the process and therefore 
each must be evaluated independently.263  This is especially pertinent in the case of the 
RACs where the agency has no statutory obligation to use the recommendations and advice 
                                                 
261 Ibid: 381. 
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the RACs provide and there is a limited ability to track what is done with the 
recommendations once they are provided to the BLM.   
The categories utilized within the process tract are: representation and 
inclusiveness, shared purpose, self-organization and procedural fairness, engagement and 
empowerment, deliberativeness, and builds consensus.  The categories utilized within the 
outcome tract are: produces agreements, ends stalemates, efficient in costs versus benefits, 
increases creativity, builds social and political capital, and produces information resources. 
Definitions for each of the evaluation categories, and key words or phrases used in 
identifying relevant interview quotes are listed in Table I on the next page.  These criteria, 
definitions and key words have been adopted from a variety of sources including primarily 
Innes and Booher,264 Leach,265 and McKinney and Field.266  These criteria are used in the 
following discussion to frame the evaluation of the effectiveness of the RAC institution.  
  
                                                 
264 Innes and Booher (1999) 
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Table I: Evaluation Criteria, definition of terms, and key words 
Process Criteria 
 
Description Key Words 
Representation and 
Inclusiveness 
Includes representatives of all relevant and significantly 
different interests. Provides substantial opportunity for 
public input and incorporates public input in formulating 
options and decisions. 
other interests, diverse 
interests, perspectives, 
comments 
Shared purpose Process is driven by a purpose and tasks that are real, and 
shared by the group.  Group is able to identify and prioritize 
issues collectively. 
Common ground, shared 
values, compromise, 
Self-Organization/ 
Procedural Fairness 
Allows participants to decide on ground rules, objectives, 
tasks, working groups, and discussion topics; and treats all 
parties equally and respectfully in the establishment of such 
procedures. 
shared development, 
had my say, felt heard,  
Engagement and 
Empowerment 
Engages participants, keeping them at the table, interested 
and learning through in-depth discussion, drama, humor, and 
informal interaction. Enables participants to influence the 
decisions of officials or administrators. 
Influenced management, 
felt empowered,  
encouraged, gained 
access,  
Deliberativeness Fosters creative thinking, shared learning, examination of 
each other’s assumptions, identification of common interests, 
out-of-the-box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo 
common interests, 
understand  other 
perspectives, learned a 
lot,  shared learning 
Builds Consensus  Seeks consensus only after discussions have fully explored 
the issues and interests and significant effort has been made 
to find creative responses to differences 
Consensus, all agreed, 
we all decided, 
Collaborative decision 
Outcome Criteria Description 
 
Key Words 
Produces 
Agreements 
Produces high-quality agreements (formal recommendations 
in the RACs case) that are agreed upon by the participants 
and substantially satisfies their interests. 
Came to agreement, 
provided advice, 
developed 
recommendations  
Ends Stalemate Ends stalemate, increases understanding, and results in the 
implementation of agreed upon projects, activities, or plans. 
Overcome conflict, get 
along, understand each 
other, respect other 
perspectives. 
Efficient in Costs v. 
Benefits 
Compared favorably with other planning methods in terms of 
costs and benefits. 
time commitments, 
Efficient process, less 
costs, beneficial,  
Increases Creativity Produces creative ideas or innovations that would not 
otherwise be achieved. 
Creative results, new 
ideas, see things they 
weren’t thinking about  
Builds Social and 
Political capital 
Builds trust and results in improved working relationships 
between participants, agencies, and the public.  Results in 
improved ability to be responsive to future change and 
conflict. 
build relationships, 
understand other points 
of view, build trust, 
respect,      
Information 
resources 
Produces high-quality information that participants agree 
upon, understand, and accept.  Results in learning and 
change beyond the group. 
Shared knowledge, 
understand the issues,  
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Findings 
The discussion in this section is organized around the two remaining sub-questions: 
1) What enables the RACs to achieve their core purpose? 2) What sustains the RACs over 
time as a collaborative arrangement instituted by a policy mandate in a federal land 
management agency?  The assumption that the RACs are achieving the core purpose is 
based on the fact that, with the exception of when the Governor of Wyoming allowed his 
state’s RAC charter to expire in 1997,267 all sixteen Rocky Mountain RAC charters have been 
continuously renewed every two years since they were established in 1995.   
This discussion proceeds by first addressing the preliminary definition of success, 
have the RACs accomplished their primary goals? Next, the discussion addresses how the 
RAC participants and agency representatives define success for themselves.  Following that, 
the discussion traces themes identified from the participant interviews through the 
evaluation framework discussed above.  A summary of participant responses and the 
themes that were identified through those responses is represented in the tables in 
Appendix III.  This discussion relies on quotes from the interviews to highlight key points 
and contrasting opinions about the ability of the RACs to achieve success, the key benefits 
realized from participating in the RAC program and some of the challenges the RACs face in 
accomplishing the stated goals.  The interviews are discussed in aggregate and focus on 
both the similarities and differences in the participant’s experiences as well as the successes 
and challenges that were discussed.   
Defining Success 
One fundamental way to identify a successful collaborative process is to ask the 
question: did the group accomplish what they set out to do? Did they accomplish their 
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stated goals?268  In the case of the RACs their most basic goals are explicitly stated in the 
regulations.269  As discussed in the previous chapter, the two principle requirements 
developed under Rangeland Reform ‘94 and codified in the regulations are to: 1) consult 
with the BLM State Director to develop local standards and guidelines for rangeland 
health270; and 2) provide advice on, “policy formulation, program planning, decision making, 
attainment of program objectives, and achievement of improved program coordination and 
economies in the management of public lands and resources...”271 
Without exception, the RACs were able to develop and have the Secretary approve 
local standards and guidelines within the appointed deadline.272  Once the standards and 
guidelines were approved, many RACs found success by providing advice to the Agency on a 
variety of issues such as Resource Management Plan alternatives, the siting of energy and 
mineral development projects, administering the wild horse and burro program, and 
habitat, rangeland, or riparian restoration projects.273  The table in Appendix IV highlights 
many of the official recommendations provided to the BLM by all sixteen of the Rocky 
Mountain RACs over the past two years.     
In addition to this analysis, many of the interview respondents discussed specific 
recommendations they had helped to formulate during their tenure on the RAC.  For 
example, wild horse and burro management is one issue that affected several of the RACs 
investigated for this study.  Ten of the sixteen RACs had some discussion or provided advice 
on the management of the wild horse herds such as in Wyoming where, “One of the first 
                                                 
268 Conley and Moote (2003): 377. 
269 43 CFR §§ 1784.0 – 1784.6-2 
270 43 CFR § 4180.2(a) 
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273 Synthesis of Meeting Minutes from past two years of Rocky Mountain RACs; on file with the 
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Mountain RACs in the past two years. 
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things we tried to do was put down on paper what we thought about it...Then every time 
there is a new chapter in the development or litigation over management of wild horses, we 
go back to that letter...”274   
The recent national level discussions around sage grouse recovery and possible 
listing on the Endangered Species List transcended nearly all the RACs investigated for this 
study.  Eleven of the sixteen RACs had a discussion regarding sage grouse management 
detailed in their meeting minutes during the past two years.275  Many of the discussions 
persisted through multiple meetings as the Agency kept the RAC up to date on or included 
them in the discussions of amending resource management plans as a result of the 
proposed listing.  As one respondent discussed:  
The Sage Grouse issues of course is huge in the West and we wrote a letter to the State 
BLM Director as a RAC,...how they and the Forest Service needed to work together and 
work with the State of Utah and find something that would satisfy most of the 
stakeholders...and I thought we got through that in pretty good shape, and came up 
with a pretty good letter that was sent on to the State BLM , a recommendation letter 
explaining the feelings of the RAC.276 
 Resource and travel management planning are also topics that equally affect all the 
RACs.  Fourteen of the sixteen RACs had a discussion around Resource Management 
Planning, Travel Management Planning, or both over the past two years.277  In fact, at the 
time of the document review, ten sub-RACs were involved in assisting with some form of 
resource or travel management planning.278   In addition, RACs help the BLM discuss 
specific issues that arise in the process of resource and travel management planning such as 
where to allow or restrict motorized activity, trail development, recreational shooting, 
forest management activities, and oil and gas leasing.  
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 These issues represent merely the tip of the iceberg of the “full array of multiple-use 
management issues” that exists on BLM managed public lands.  The RACs have the ability to 
engage these issues and topics at a variety of scales from listening to updates from field 
managers, having deliberative discussions within the group, or forming sub-committees to 
facilitate a more in-depth exploration of the issue.  One thing that is apparent from this 
synthesis is that even where the RACs do not advance a formal recommendation to the State 
Director or the Secretary, the discussions help the BLM to understand the effects their 
proposed actions have on the broad cross-section of the public prior to making a final 
decision.   
In addition to analyzing how the RACs measure up to a definition of success 
imposed upon them from the outside, it is equally important to understand how the RAC 
participants define success for themselves.  In many of the interviews, success was 
determined by the ability, after deliberating from all sides of the issue, to build a consensus 
recommendation or position on a topic.  
[Success is] an ability to present options in an open manner and have discussions on 
it...279 
 [The RAC] is a broad cross section [of interests]...So, to bring all of those people 
together and come up with a recommendation letter...I think that’s pretty good success 
for a group that’s that broad and that diverse.  Everybody knows that something needs 
to be done, the question is just how much...I think overall in trying to come up with 
position statements and recommendation letters to our state BLM agency that they 
could put in an EIS, I think that speaks volumes for a group of citizens that have varied 
interests.280  
I feel like when I talk to the managers or the BLM folks that we’re advising, they 
always seem to leave the conversation thinking, “wow, this is really great information, 
I’m really glad we have this opportunity.” So, when we help the managers see 
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something they weren’t really considering and if that was a way to save, to keep a 
process valuable for the public, I think that’s a really good thing.281 
For these individuals, success was broadly defined in terms of both the process and 
outcome criteria. The process involves choosing a topic to address, deliberately discussing 
that topic from the multiple viewpoints, and building a consensus view towards resolving 
the issue.  The outcome consists of producing an agreed upon recommendation and 
providing that recommendation as advice for the BLM to consider.  Whether that advice 
appreciably influences the management decision is a point of contention that will emerge 
later in the discussion.  
 The BLM had a similar definition of success.  For the Agency, success is largely 
determined by the RAC discussing an issue from all sides and deciding upon a consensus 
recommendation: 
Success is being able to present multiple views but be able to discuss them and be 
flexible enough to hear other points of views.282  
I define success when we identify together the things we need advice, and the RAC gets 
to the place where they feel comfortable giving us that advice...they will usually craft a 
letter from the entire body that they will send to the state director, and they will 
provide input on the solution that we have asked them for, or they will provide 
alternatives for us to pursue.283 
How I define success of the RAC is that the RAC is wanting to take up issues or provide 
advice to the BLM, and they actually provide that advice and tackle those issues...They 
may be telling us stuff we don’t want to hear, and to me that is not a bad thing.284 
These last two definitions highlight an interesting point in that, to these individuals, success 
means identifying issues together, and that the RAC wants to take up issues.  These phrases 
imply that the RAC membership must feel empowered to identify the topics they discuss 
and define their mission with some level of independence.  Issues of empowerment with the 
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RAC membership will come up later in the discussion, but for now, it is instructive to 
remember that these Agency staff members view an engaged and empowered RAC, at least 
in part, necessary for success. 
For some members of the RACs, success has not been achieved unless the 
recommendations result in on-the-ground action or the implementation of a policy 
directive.   
Success is getting all the information on an issue, then having a good discussion on 
how do we want to advise the state director, then having them take that advice...We 
can do our due diligence of study and debate and synthesizing concepts and writing a 
good recommendation, then one might say the RACs been successful, we did our job. 
But to ultimately succeed, [the recommendation] needs to be put in place.285 
For individuals with this point of view, success is more narrowly defined and requires on-
the-ground action or policy change.  The RACs success, then, is ultimately determined by the 
BLM who must use the recommendations to augment a policy or affect management in 
some way.  This definition creates a tension with the fact that the RACs are explicitly 
authorized to function in an advisory capacity only and do not hold any binding authority or 
enforcement mechanism over the agency.286  The BLM’s obligation to retain final decision 
making authority over management actions coupled with the fact that the RACs have no 
express assurance that their recommendations will be implemented left some RAC 
members feeling that their advice was not being used by the BLM to the extent that they 
hoped.  As one RAC member lamented, “We developed a position paper and gave it to [the 
State Director], and we might as well have made it into a paper airplane and pitched it out 
the window, because they don’t use it.  Because it’s from this broad based group and not a 
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greedy group of rape the land ranchers, I think it was very powerful, but it’s not being 
used.”287  
 Interestingly, despite the provision allowing a RAC to appeal directly to the 
Secretary if they feel their advice is being arbitrarily ignored by the State Director, not a 
single respondent could identify a time when that had been utilized.  One RAC member 
specifically discussed this:  
...a few of us recognize that [appealing directly to the Secretary is] a possible next step.  
That is also a pretty unpopular.  You know for Wyoming to go to the Feds, the state 
office is enough of the feds, so to go to the Secretary, even among the folks who agree 
that this [recommendation] should be implemented, it would be hard to get them to 
agree that that is the next step. We’re all about fixing it at the local level, we can’t go 
cry to DC.288  
However, even with this provision, most of the RAC members understand the fine line the 
agency walks in not abdicating their authority over final decisions:    
In my experience they listen really well, but they can’t always go there.  You know, a 
rancher wants livestock to be able to go everywhere and water developments, energy 
developers want energy development, wilderness advocates want wilderness – you 
know what I’m getting at – mountain bikers want mountain bike trails.  So even if 
there is a recommendation that is supportive of one of those interests, it doesn’t mean 
that the BLM can implement it.  So I think if the RAC is doing a good job, then 
everyone’s a little happy and everyone’s a little pissed off.289  
The few frustrations expressed around implementing the recommendations don’t detract 
from a general belief that the process is valuable.  Almost every RAC member and BLM 
representative interviewed agreed that the RACs were a successful experiment in 
integrating a collaborative public body into public land and resource management.  Only 
one interviewee explicitly warned against using the RAC as a model for future collaborative 
process design citing limitations on the RAC’s on-the-ground effectiveness, “don’t use the 
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RAC because of the Constraints of the RAC.  Formally the RAC is to give advice.  Now Forest 
Service RACs have the ability to put together natural resource projects, fund them, it’s a 
different set of rules as I understand.  BLM RACS, as this one is, are chartered only for 
advice.”290 
What enables the RACs to achieve their core purpose? 
As discussed in chapter three, the major policy elements of Rangeland Reform ’94 
were intended to create a national requirement to manage the public rangelands to improve 
ecological health and facilitate their recovery, and to maintain opportunities for long-term 
sustainable development. 291  If the RACs had not succeeded in their first task of formulating 
their own standards and guidelines, the federal fallback standards would have been 
implemented and the likelihood of the RAC charters being reauthorized would have been 
minimal.  As it was, the RACs were able work with the BLM State District managers to 
submit and have the Secretary of the Interior approve local standards and guidelines within 
the allotted timeframe.292  Since that time they have moved on to addressing the full array of 
other multiple-use management concerns.  However, absent the clear statutory mandate 
that directed the development of the standards and guidelines for rangeland health, some 
RACs struggled to find a clear sense of direction.  
The RACs were originally created to help the bureau come up with some rangeland 
health standards.  So that was a very definite charge, we were asking for a very specific 
product.  And when you have direction that clear, it’s really a lot easier to come up 
with a good product.  I think since that effort was completed, both the RAC and the 
BLM has sometimes struggled to be very clear as to what their charge was.293  
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I think you need a little bit of a sense of mission when you put these collaborative 
groups together.  Perhaps if the BLM could produce a bit more sense of mission, and 
perhaps that’s really the option of the State Director...but if the State Director was 
motivated to use that RAC ...he or she could find some things that not only meets his or 
her needs but also takes advantage of the various skills and informational levels that 
that appointed RAC brings.294 
On the other hand, not having a prescribed agenda allows the RACs a degree of autonomy 
and flexibility to discuss topics and management problems that are timely, of interest to the 
group, and of most pressing need for the BLM.   
Process Criteria Themes 
Probing a little deeper into what enables the RACs to fulfill their regulatory 
requirements illuminates four main process themes that simultaneously enable success and 
create challenges.  The themes can be categorized into 1)Issues of representation and 
inclusiveness, 2) Issues of self-organization and procedural fairness, 3) issues of 
deliberativeness, and 4) issues of building consensus.  Each theme is discussed in detail 
below.  
Representation and Inclusiveness 
Two critical principles for successful collaboration are interest representation and 
process inclusiveness.  Representation refers to a process that includes representatives of 
all relevant and significantly different interests,295 while inclusiveness refers to a process 
that is publically accessible and places few formal restrictions on participation.296  Public 
engagement processes tend to negotiate these values along a continuum.  A representative 
process is modeled on the concept of representative democracy whereby selected members 
represent an interest group and are empowered to speak on behalf of that interest.  An 
inclusive process much more resembles pure participatory democracy and offers the 
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opportunity for everyone who has an interest to participate freely and equally.  Often, as 
pointed out by Leach, a tension exists between a representative process that balances an 
equal number of opposing interests and an inclusive process that places few restrictions on 
involvement.297  He suggests,  
Restricting access to a select group of stakeholders invariably raises doubts about 
legitimacy.  If an agency with a stake in the issue selected the participants, did the 
agency try to influence the outcomes of the process by excluding the agency’s harshest 
critics? On the other hand, a perfectly inclusive process can jeopardize 
representativeness if it creates an imbalance in the number of individuals representing 
each major faction.298   
One of the challenges the BLM faces with the RAC program, which is an inherently 
representative group, is balancing the limited access by creating opportunities for decisions 
to be informed by the views of the public the RAC purports to represent.  They navigate this 
tension in a variety of ways.  First, each RAC meeting has a designated public comment 
period that provides an opportunity for the public-at-large to make their views known on 
the topics or issues being discussed by the RAC.  Second, the RAC members, who are 
members of the public themselves, are expected to communicate with the interest group 
they have been appointed to represent to get feedback on the issues the RAC discusses.  
Third, the RACs often form sub-RACs (also known as subcommittees or sub-groups) to 
directly include members of the public in gathering information from local residents and 
resource experts, discussing possible solution options, and formulating recommendations 
on complex problems and management issues.      
The public comment periods must be incorporated into the agenda and published as 
part of the Federal Register notice announcing each RAC meeting at least thirty days prior 
to the meeting date.  According to the regulations, “Notices shall set forth meeting locations, 
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topics or issues to be discussed, and times and places for the public to be heard.”299   
Generally, the public comment periods are well-organized and designed to allow the public 
at-large to make their feelings known about the issues being discussed by the RAC.  As one 
BLM representative discussed, “The public is not allowed to speak until the public comment 
period which is set up and defined in our Federal Register notice.  That is their opportunity 
to make a presentation to the RAC and interact with the RAC members.  Other than that 
public comment period, they are absolutely allowed to be there, to observe what’s going on, 
but they cannot participate.”300  
As noted, public comments are restricted to the times designated in the agenda and 
adherence to that policy is typically enforced by the RAC Chairperson.  This allows the RAC 
to efficiently conduct its business and prevents the conversation from devolving into a 
chaotic public hearing.  The public comment period is designed to elicit the public views on 
the topics being discussed to assist the RAC in creating a more informed recommendation to 
the BLM.  While some RACs have managed to engage the public through the public comment 
periods quite effectively, others have been challenged by a “...public comment period [that] 
is inevitably empty...”301  
As a representative body of the public’s interests, the RAC sees itself as a crucial 
conduit for public input on BLM management issues.  In the eyes of some RAC members, the 
conversation is supposed to be, “...between the RAC members, who are representing the 
public and the BLM... [There is]opportunity for public input at every meeting...but it’s not 
really designed to solicit public input because the RAC members themselves are supposed 
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to be the public input...If every one of those was a public meeting, you would just get 
distracted”302  
Occasionally, the BLM will solicit outside groups or members of the public who have 
particular expertise on a topic to give presentations to the RAC.  These types of 
presentations are another way for the RAC to interact with the public on specific issues.  
The presentations also encapsulate a device for gathering shared and agreed upon 
information resources, and help the RAC understand the social, political, ecologic and 
economic implications of the issue.  
We’ve had for example Friends of the Wild Mustangs come and present to the RAC. It 
wasn’t during the public comment periods...and to have those people come in and 
advise the Resource Advisory Council on some of those issues is very helpful...303 
[Before becoming a member] I was actually asked by the BLM to give presentations to 
the RAC on grazing management. That was kind of my first exposure to the BLM RAC 
and how they operate...304 
  The second method for involving the public is by engaging the constituents of the 
interest groups the RAC members are appointed to represent.  The RACs were developed 
based on a model of representative democracy and RAC members are expected to regularly 
communicate with their constituents.   Ideally, the RAC members are approaching their 
communities for feedback and input on the issues the RAC is discussing.  If there are 
particular issues that concern an interest group or member of the public, they can also go 
through their RAC representative to get that issue put on the meeting agenda.    
Ideally what those members should be doing is interacting with the members of the 
interest group they represent...they should be getting feedback...that is the interaction 
that they would have with the public.305  
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I think [the RAC is] very grass-rootsey. Each RAC member represents a public 
constituency, so that RAC member is getting feedback and information and there is a 
two-way communication with those constituents that they represent. [That’s] the 
representative democracy piece.306  
Most of the RAC members suggested that engaging with their constituents is a substantial 
part of their job as a RAC member.  Many insisted that communicating with the people in 
their peer circles helps them gain a more nuanced perception of the issue, the values that 
are critical to represent on that issue, and helps them in how they approach the discussions.  
Ultimately, as one RAC member discussed, the perspective of these engaged constituencies 
influences the advice the RAC develops, “We do have organizations that represent those 
groups that I communicate with about a variety of things, but I also send along to them 
activities of our BLM RAC to ask for their input.”307  
Finally, the RACs often form sub-RACs when more input from the public is needed 
on particularly complex location or issue-specific topics.  Sub-RACs enable the RAC to dive 
deeper into an issue by creating a committee that resembles the RAC’s diverse 
representation of interests, but that is temporary and only deals with one particular issue.  
The most successful sub-RACs usually are made up of members of the public who are 
engaged in or experts on the issue being discussed.  They have the flexibility and autonomy 
to hold public meetings, meet more frequently than the full-RAC, and take adequate time 
and space to thoroughly investigate the issue in question.  Sub-RACs may gather and 
synthesize new information about an issue, discuss solution options, and ultimately make a 
recommendation to the full RAC.  In turn, the full RAC retains the responsibility for 
approving the final recommendation and offering it as advice to the State Director.  
Alternatively, they can modify it themselves or refer it back to the sub-RAC for further 
consideration and refinement.  
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Essentially [with sub-RACs] we have a need to get the actual people from that field 
office who are using the land to advise us on how we should be advising the BLM...So 
the key there, is working with... who might be interested and who might be able to 
contribute to the process valuably and then making sure we, the RAC, are giving the 
sub-RAC the freedom to make recommendations as they see fit, that we have a RAC 
liaison that brings that information back to the RAC and says this is what the Sub-RAC 
said, and then we can decide what to do with that information...308  
Sub-RACs have been used by all the RACs studied in this project.309  In one way or another, 
every participant interviewed suggested that sub-RACs are an innovative tool that the RACs 
can use to engage the public-at-large, and formulate recommendations that are more 
informed by local perspectives, responsive to local conditions, and have broad public 
support. 
The diversity of interests that sit on the RAC and the quality of people representing 
those interests were two of the most consistently cited factors enabling the RACs to have 
high-quality discussions and consistently develop balanced advice for the BLM.  Achieving a 
diversity of interests is facilitated primarily by the regulatory requirements guiding the 
RACs.310   However, the BLM representatives unanimously acknowledged that the RACs 
legitimacy and ultimate success depends on a diverse and inclusive process that encourages 
its members to challenge each other and the agency.  
We are very thoughtful and deliberate when we consider[new RAC members], and it’s 
not that we, we do not want people who think the same way we do...what we are 
looking for are people with a diverse background and people who have a track record 
of being able to work collaboratively.311 
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You absolutely need to get people who aren’t always going to agree with you and just 
don’t think that everything that the agency going to do is going to be correct...we need 
that input from those people who are willing to disagree, and do so respectfully312 
Representation, as noted by the analytical framework definition, means including 
the diverse perspectives of all interests affected by the issue in the discussion.  Clearly that 
is an important factor.  However, both the RAC members and agency representatives 
strongly agreed that not only does the group need the diversity of interests, but they need 
people who embody a willingness to sit at the table, set aside their differences, and work to 
find solutions to management problems.  Nearly all of the interviewees suggested 
representation of interests by those willing to collaborate is an important factor in 
achieving success.  This is not to say that in nominating members the BLM looks for people 
who always agree with what the agency proposes.  Indeed, the ideal RAC members are those 
who are also able to respectfully disagree but who also have a willingness to come to the 
table with a collaborative and solution oriented frame of mind.  
I think in part it’s [successful] because of the people the BLM selects to be on this 
committee... I’ve always said the trick to having committees that work is to pick people 
who are open minded, and who are willing to work with interests that they don’t 
always agree with or understand...the BLM has done an excellent job in selecting the 
RAC members...I know in part the BLM picks these people for open mindedness.  We 
have an amazing ability to work together; that’s why I’ve stayed.  Broad interests, 
people are willing to work together, and I’ve learned a whole lot.313  
When we look at public involvement you have to look at it like a spectrum...you have 
very extreme people who are never going to be involved, never going to be encouraged 
by a resource advisory council, and we’re never going to reach those people. And then 
you got on the other end of the spectrum is the people who are going to be involved in 
everything. And so where we’re targeting is people [in the middle], and I say targeting 
because that is where we can develop those relationships and make good collaborative 
decisions that affect the future of how we manage public land.314  
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One tension that remains around representation is the consideration of the 
stakeholders who focus on other methods such as litigation and appeals to see their 
interests satisfied.  In selecting members who are willing to come to the table with a 
collaborative mindset, the BLM inevitably limits the scope of interest group involvement.  
Those who are critical of community-based, consensus-building processes as a legitimate 
forum for making natural resource management decisions are invariably not going to 
volunteer for participation in a RAC.  This is difficult, as a collaborative process cannot be all 
things to all people, and those who are not willing to collaborate will inherently be left 
behind.  The BLM navigates this tension by adhering to NEPA for any major actions it 
eventually takes.  
 Finally, the structural framework dictated through the regulations and by FACA was 
cited by several interviewees as a distinguishing feature of the RAC that enables success.  
Organizing under FACA requires a charter to be approved and signed by the head of the 
agency to whom the committee reports.315  The charter provides legitimacy for the group 
but also articulates clear guidelines regarding scope of activity, meeting requirements, 
transparency and accessibility that ensures the diversity of interests is represented and the 
public has equal access to participate in the process.316 
I think it’s incredibly helpful to have those constraints [FACA].  It’s helpful to have that 
blueprint that we’re free to operate under so that we know that we’re following the 
policies that American public ultimately wanted to see in action or that has been 
indicated to us by the President or by Congress...By following those rigid guidelines we 
are being good stewards of the public trust that is given to us. It’s also a great resource 
whenever we have questions about how to be deal with certain issues, it helps us look 
back and understand direction specifically on issues where we don’t deal with that 
often.317  
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Unfortunately, the structure sometimes reduces the efficiency of the RAC.  The 
number one challenge discussed by both the RAC members and the Agency representatives 
was the difficulty in getting new members appointed to the RAC.  The problems discussed 
by RAC participants follow two divergent paths.  First, RAC members and Agency 
representatives discussed the difficulties in getting high-quality representatives to apply for 
vacant positions. Second, they discussed the length of time it takes to get applicants through 
the appointment process.   
In soliciting new applicants, both the RAC members and the BLM representatives 
discussed having difficulty finding adequate numbers of candidates to fill the vacancies on 
the committee.  As one Agency representative suggested, “At times it has [been a challenge 
to find new members]...if we don’t have a high enough number of applicants...the 
Department of Interior will dictate that we run it again for applicants.  They want to see 
large enough numbers, they want to be sure they have enough applicants to select from...”318 
Getting new members acclimated to the issues once the appointments are made also 
poses a challenge. Enabling informed discussions at the RAC meetings requires all members 
are acquainted with the issues to satisfactorily contribute to the conversation.  Some RAC 
members feel like by the time they become familiar enough with the issues to contribute 
productively to the discussion, their first term is up, as discussed, “...as a RAC member, 
coming in, and there is so much turn over...That’s a real challenge, when there’s a long 
lasting issue, the learning curve, and getting up to speed to really feel valuable. I’ve heard a 
couple RAC members say, “yeah you spend your first two years figuring out what’s 
happening and then your term is up...”319  
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A second common frustration expressed about membership turnover was related to 
the appointment process.  According to many of the RAC members and the Agency 
representatives, the time it takes to get through the appointment process often inhibits the 
ability of the RAC to conduct its business.  
The lack of timely appointments by the Secretary of Interior [is a challenge]...it causes 
is the inability of the RAC to be effective...there are timely issues that need to be dealt 
with.  And for whatever reason...the appointments weren’t timely a year ago, and now 
we’re facing the same situation.... the BLM has put out a notice for this year’s 
applications, and they still haven’t heard about last years.320  
What’s really sad is now we are announcing for filling our vacancies for those positions 
that are set to expire in September of 2015, and I still haven’t got my 2014’s filled yet.  
So I may not be having a council because I won’t have enough to make a quorum.321 
The unfortunate effect of the inefficiencies of the appointment process, apart from 
preventing the RAC from conducting business, is that it leaves many of the RAC members 
feeling like the program is not a priority for the Agency.   
The appointments could, should [be made faster] if they made it a priority.  I think at 
the local field office level it’s a priority. I think they seem to really value the RAC’s 
advice. But in the DC Office, State Office?  I don’t know what it is; maybe they have 
more pressing issues or something.322 
RAC members discussed several possible solutions to help overcome these barriers 
and improve the efficiency of the RAC.  First, a program of public education to inform what 
the RAC is, what it does, the value it adds to public land management, and the influence RAC 
members can have on management decisions could help to engage a broader base of 
engaged members of the public from which to draw.  Such a program could dramatically 
improve both the visibility and the relevance of the RACs in the eyes of the public.  RAC 
members also suggested two policy changes that could improve the appointment process.  
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First, entrusting the appointments to the Director of the BLM rather than the Secretary of 
the Interior could speed up the process by keeping the decisions in house while still 
ensuring a level of Federal oversight.  Second, allowing RAC members to continue sitting on 
the committee after their terms expire until a replacement is appointed would allow the 
RACs to continue meeting and conducting business while they wait for new members.  
Self-Organization and Procedural Fairness 
According to Innes and Booher, a successful collaborative process is one that is, 
“...self-organized and evolving, good at gathering information from the environment, and 
effective at making connections among participants.”323  Facilitating the ability of 
participants to decide on ground rules and discussion topics, and develop objectives, tasks 
and working groups creates a legitimate process that is accepted by the group.  Treating all 
parties equally, respectfully and impartially in the establishment of discussion and decision 
making procedures is one of the bedrock principles of democratic theory.324  The ground 
rules and operating procedures of the RACs are discussed in each of their charters and 
standard operating procedure (SOP) documents.325  The representation and equality of the 
membership, the requirements for public notice and features of public participation 
discussed above are prescribed by the regulations promulgated under Rangeland Reform 
’94.326  The particular discussion topics, tasks and working groups are typically decided 
upon collaboratively by the agency and the RAC members.   
The discussion topics are driven by the meeting’s agenda, which is required to be 
published in the Federal Register and distributed to local media at least thirty days prior to 
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each meeting.327  The most effective RACs develop their agendas by synthesizing the 
interests of the RAC members with the needs of the agency.  
...it’s kind of a collaborative process for putting agenda items on for the next meeting. 
We get feedback from the BLM on what they’re working on, what they think we might 
be interested in, but we also self-identify topics that we either want to discuss and 
make recommendations on, or that we want to learn more about...There’s themes – 
you know grazing, energy development, wild horses, recreation are all reoccurring 
topics for our RAC. 328 
At the same time, the BLM and the RACs recognize the need to limit the number of 
topics discussed at each meeting to ensure a robust rather than cursory exploration of each 
issue.  Prioritizing the ever-expanding list of discussion topics and deciding on which should 
be discussed at each meeting is a constant task that usually falls to the RAC chairperson and 
the Agency Coordinator.  The challenge is scheduling and addressing the issues that are top 
priorities for the group while allowing space to address unforeseen and unanticipated 
issues.   
We share with [the RAC] the things that we’re struggling with...and the RAC members 
list the things they think are really important, and then we try to marry the two lists 
and then prioritize them.  One of the dangers is that if you take on too many different 
topics, you’ll never get to a result on any of them...we’ve tried in the last year or so, is to 
try to focus each session on one particular set of issues.329  
One challenge the RACs face is ensuring all members are equally engaged on a topic.  
However, this may be a simple byproduct of cogitating on, “...the full array of ecosystem and 
multiple-use issues associated with BLM-administered public lands.”330   
Sometimes the RAC can devolve into one side of an issue against another, and if you 
don’t have a dog in that fight, you’re kind of just sitting on the sidelines to a certain 
degree.  I guess the challenging thing, is when those issues come up and there are two 
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dug-in perspectives or sides to it, it often leaves many of the other RAC members in a 
place where they’re struggling to figure out how to participate.331 
Often, discussions will transcend multiple meetings.332   Typically, no 
recommendations are made until a thorough deliberation of the subject accounts for all the 
views within the group, the thoughts and opinions of the resource experts, public input is 
weighed, and the history of recommendations or advice that have already been given on 
that or similar topics is analyzed.  As one RAC member put it, “It’s usually a multiple 
meeting process, in which we get information, we revisit what past RACs have done on the 
issue if it’s something that’s been reoccurring and if there is a sub-RAC that needs to be put 
in place then there is time that is allowed for that and then the sub-RAC will come back and 
advise the RAC so that we can then advise the BLM.”333 
Who participates in designing the agenda poses another challenge that was 
discussed by some of the RAC members interviewed.  Two of the RAC groups commented 
that the agenda was used as a mechanism for the agency to control or restrict what the RAC 
discusses.  RAC members discussed feeling frustrated that they were not empowered by the 
agency to design their own agenda, “...for a while we didn’t seem to have an agenda that 
anyone was interested in polling us in...our mission was not clear, and we really weren’t 
doing anything in a mission oriented direction.”334  For these two groups, the agenda topics 
dictated to them by the BLM were said to be, “...usually pretty banal.”335  
There’s a sense that the Wyoming BLM didn’t want the RAC...I think they express that 
hesitation by trying to constrain some of what the RAC does.  We’re trying to figure out 
if, or how we can try to write our own agenda.  The chair seems to think that the RAC 
guidelines say that the RAC doesn’t write its own agenda, we just approve what they 
give us.  Most of us agree that if we could design our own agenda that would address 
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what we want to address and gather information together, that that would be 
motivating.  We would create more buy-in in the meetings, and create a feeling like we 
were doing something at the meetings.336 
Selin and Chavez point out that, “The institutional culture within agencies often 
hinders collaboration.”337  Leach expands upon this by explaining, “In relatively traditional 
venues, such as NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) scoping meetings, the public 
becomes involved only after a lead agency has invested large amounts of time and money 
drafting a proposal.  Considering these sunk costs, agencies may be less interested in 
revising or replacing proposals than in trying to win public support or acquiescence.”338   
Probing the notions of institutional culture and resource investments in developing an 
agency agenda is especially poignant in the Wyoming case, where the RAC was disbanded 
shortly after implementation of the Standards and Guidelines for rangeland management 
and has only been reconstituted in the past five years.  The Wyoming RAC seems to struggle 
the most with issues of membership empowerment and engagement.   
Other RACs have navigated issues of empowerment and engagement very well.  
Generally, the more freedom the RAC members have to design their own agenda, develop 
tasks, working groups, and set discussion topics, the more empowered and engaged the 
membership seems to be.  Conversely, if the agenda is used, as the above RAC member says, 
“...to constrain some of what the RAC does...” the members leave feeling disempowered and 
as if, “...we sit through a lot of fun presentations with a lot of information, but we never 
chew on that information, analyze it, come up with something we can do about it....”339  
Consistent with the principles of democratic governance, an effective process is one 
that increases opportunities for self-organization and empowers its membership to design 
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objectives, tasks, work groups, discussion topics and procedures.340  Leach discusses 
empowerment as one of his seven components of democratic governance, noting that an 
empowered process, “would involve the public at the earliest stages, long before a full-
fledged project proposal has been announced, thereby allowing stakeholders to signal their 
concerns when the issues are still being defined.”341  Moote, McClaran, and Chickering agree 
stating, “The participatory democracy approach is said to improve decision implementation 
by resolving conflicts during the planning process, rather than delaying implementation of 
completed plans while decisions are reviewed through appeals and adjudication.”342  In this 
case, involving the RAC membership early in the process of designing agenda items, 
projects, and discussion topics that address their concerns and the problems they are 
hearing from the interests they represent would be a measure of an empowered RAC 
process.  The greater degree a RAC empowers its membership to be involved in all aspects 
of the agenda setting and discussion process, the more successful they might be said to be.  
It is difficult to have an influence on decisions when the group doesn’t feel empowered to by 
the process. 
Deliberativeness 
The extent that a collaborative process fosters creative thinking, shared learning, 
examination of each other’s assumptions, identification of common interests, development 
of out-of-the-box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo is a function of its deliberativeness.  
Leach offers three measurable factors that contribute to a deliberative group process.  The 
first measure is the amount of effort devoted to mutual education of the group’s 
membership.  Second, Leach asks to what extent is joint fact finding used as a tool to 
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collectively define the problem and either synthesize existing information or generate new 
information that helps the group to develop solutions.  The degree to which a group is able 
to collectively define and synthesize information around a problem or topic is a measure of 
deliberativeness.  Leach’s final measure of deliberativeness is the ability of a group to build 
trust and maintain a culture of civility and respect.343  
By engaging the diversity of interests in the process of forming recommendations, 
the RACs soon begin to exhibit the first measure of deliberativeness: the members 
immediately educate each other on their own perspectives of the issues.  Indeed, Leech says, 
one way to increase deliberativeness is to, “engage in a period of mutual education and 
discovery prior to any negotiation over substantive commitments or com-promises.”344  The 
BLM recognizes the importance of this mutual education process and often witnesses a shift 
in RAC member attitudes early on.  
I think what’s most rewarding is to have a group you feel you can share with pretty 
honestly, and they, they began to see that it wasn’t that easy, that their perspective 
was one piece of a very large and much more complex puzzle. They became a very 
valuable member of the RAC because of their background but also because they kind of 
grew and changed a little bit in the process.345 
 Several of the ways in which the RACs educate themselves have previously been 
discussed.  The Sub-RACs often research the issue, and talk with experts or local people 
affected by the issue prior to making a recommendation to the RAC.  The BLM often invites 
resource specialists, members of the public, or outside experts to give presentations to the 
RAC during one of their regular meetings.  The RAC members also educate each other from 
their differing perspectives on the issue.  The RAC is an institutional structure that has been 
constructed by a regulatory mandate for the express purpose of gathering a diverse group 
                                                 
343 Leach (2006): 103. 
344 Ibid  
345 BLM representative comment, on file with the Author. 
 96 
of interests to engage in shared learning about problematic management issues and build 
consensus recommendations on those issues.  The discussions that occur inevitably compel 
the RAC members to learn about each other’s perspectives and views on the issues they 
discuss.  Naturally, if they are open to the process, they begin to understand how those 
other perspectives contribute to the complexity of resource management decisions.  By 
learning about each other’s perspectives together, they begin to examine their own and 
each other’s assumptions. 
I felt like we did a really good job helping the recreation and energy folks understand 
the issues with grazing, and in the same turn, the recreation and energy folks educated 
us old cowboys too.346  
Being able to get out and really understand the cross section and how these different 
land management mandates intersect with each other and how the different uses 
intersect with each other that is really valuable 347 
In turn, the RAC members also begin to understand the challenges facing the BLM in making 
management decisions.  
As a person who is just naturally prone to complain about some of the things that the 
government does sometimes, and then to gain an appreciation for the quality of the 
people who work for the federal government, you get a better appreciation for the 
charge that they have.  They do the best they can with what they have to work with.  I 
have a better appreciation for the difficulty of the job they have and hopefully I can 
give them some advice or we can give them some advice as to how it can go a little 
easier.348  
By having deliberate conversations about topics that account for and respect the diverse 
interests represented by the RAC members, a common understanding begins to be built 
about the issue.  Shared learning takes place when new information is synthesized from the 
working groups, conversations with resource specialists, outside members of the public and 
agreed upon by the RAC members.  Here again, the sub-RACs play an important role.  When 
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collectively agreed upon information is used to form a recommendation, creative solutions 
to complex problems are often found. 
Shared learning, the process of building a common understanding around complex 
issues, builds a social bond that transcends the formation of recommendations and 
contributes to a sense of accomplishment and empowerment within the group.  Witnessed 
by one RAC member, “I also feel like whenever we take on a new subject...we go from not 
knowing really anything about it to understanding a great deal about the project.  I think 
there is a strong sense of accomplishment around learning; us collectively learning”349  The 
notion of the “social bond” is discussed in public policy literature as being a necessary 
component of effective problem solving, resting on the theory that, “fostering more or 
better discourse around any given issue will lead to agreement about key values and in 
doing so, create the social bond necessary for the problem to be resolved.”350  The 
implication is, the more participants in a consensus building process build a social bond by 
learning about each other’s values, the easier it becomes to find agreement:    
The more that we can learn from one another and make well thought out, well 
rounded recommendations to the BLM the better we’re doing.351  
I always said to the group, we’re not always going to agree or disagree but if we’re 
equally informed we’re going to be closer to agreement than anything else.352  
Finally, in providing consensus-based recommendations to the BLM, the RACs often 
compel the agency to look at problematic issues from a different perspective.  As already 
illustrated, in selecting members, the agency looks for people who don’t always agree with 
them, insisting these opposing viewpoints challenge the agency’s beliefs and contribute to 
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creative and balanced recommendations.  Understanding of the impacts of a management 
decision from the perspectives of the people who are affected and who don’t always agree 
with them helps the agency see the on-the-ground implications of their decisions.   
Having local people who are most impacted by our decisions giving us some direct 
guidance is critical because a lot of the things we do, while it sounds good on paper, 
when it actually gets to the implementation phase there are things we can miss that 
people who are most impacted by our decision can pick up on.353  
Having the perspectives of people that live and work in the communities alongside us 
helps us to see the bigger picture.354  
 
Builds Consensus 
Innes and Booher argue that through effective consensus building processes, 
“...agreements can be reached among stakeholders who would otherwise not talk to each 
other, much less participate in a joint proposal.”355  Additionally, they contend that 
agreements between adversarial parties are not the only by products of consensus building 
process and outline a host of “intangible outcomes” that often result, including increased 
social and political capital, increased trust and mutual understanding between members, 
and improved relationships that radiate beyond the consensus building process.356  
Consensus can have different definitions depending on the group, but at minimum, it 
generally means that discussions have fully explored the issues at hand and the concerns of 
the interests at the table before making a decision.357  The process for reaching consensus 
often includes developing creative responses to management problems that consider the 
diverse viewpoints of the group’s individual members.358  This process takes substantial 
time, a sense of open mindedness within the group, and the conversation space to have 
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deliberative discussions and discover shared interests.  Developing multiple options that 
satisfy the shared interests of those at the table often increases creativity and the likelihood 
of an agreement.359  According to mutual gains negotiating theory, developing multiple 
options that satisfy mutual interests allows each member some positive gains, and options 
can be traded back and forth to produce a greater overall agreement.360  Getting the entire 
group to agree on a final recommendation requires compromise, a precise problem 
definition, development of options to address the problem, and a willingness to set aside 
differences in order to focus on where there is common ground:   
We strive for consensus and there are various definitions [of consensus].  On our RAC 
there’s an ongoing discussion on what consensus really means, but the closest I’ve 
come to understanding our version of consensus is that not everyone has to totally 
agree but they have to be able to live with it, the decision. So if someone totally can’t 
live with a decision that everyone is making, and is totally 100% against it, then you 
discuss it until you get to a better place.  That’s sausage making at its finest...361  
Recognizing that building consensus is not an easy task for any collaborative group, 
many of the RAC members and Agency representatives expressed that the process of 
building a consensus recommendation increases group buy-in and demonstrates a balanced 
representation of the public’s interests.  They also cautioned that if the RAC cannot come to 
consensus on an issue, then the future resolution of that issue is questionable at best. 
...sometimes there’s a lot of conversation that goes on to get [to consensus], but they’ve 
always been able to get there...I think consensus is about coming up with something 
that works for everyone. And that’s not an easy thing to do.  But I think the result of 
that is a more balanced approach...I think it just leads to more balanced decisions that 
have a more universal aspect to them.362 
You can pick advocates for any interest, you know from recreation, to grazing, to oil 
and gas, you can put those people together but if they can’t work for a common 
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solution, then you’re not going to accomplish your purpose...you can get more bodies 
who are advocates, but will they be able to look at a problem and see other people’s 
point of view and respect that and work to find win-win solutions, if you can’t do that 
then you have a problem.363 
If we can’t get a group of fifteen people to all agree on an issue that affects the public, 
if we can’t come to consensus knowing all the facts, it’s kind of telling what our future 
is.364  
Allowing adequate time to thoroughly deliberate on a topic is an important factor in 
the ability to build a consensus recommendation.  The RACs often use the sub-RACs or other 
small working groups to gather information, engage the broader public, and formulate the 
pieces of a recommendation behind the scenes and in between full RAC meetings.  The sub-
RACs and working groups are more flexible in their ability to hold meetings, define the 
problem and decision space, build the group in response to the defined problem, gather and 
synthesize new information, develop options as possible solutions, and bring those options 
back to the full RAC for consideration.  The full RAC must then decide if the 
recommendations of the sub-RACs or working groups are ready to be brought to the BLM in 
the form of a recommendation. This process often takes several meetings and months of 
work, but ultimately results in agreements and recommendations that are well thought out 
and representative of the broad interests of the public the RAC represents. 
...everybody gets to look at what the proposals are prior to the meeting.  We’ll have a 
majority of what I’ll call unanimous decisions because of the way that our council 
works, that’s with representation of each category on the sub-groups, and getting 
information out prior to our meetings so you have an opportunity to take a look at 
it...if it’s a point that we can’t reach unanimous decision then we’ll send it back to the 
sub-group until the next meeting.365  
Ensuring everyone in the group has equal access to the information resources is 
another important consideration in the process of building consensus.   The RACs have 
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generally found that providing everyone with all the information, making sure everyone is 
working with the same information, and the group has enough time to consider the 
information and the proposed solutions eases the path to consensus.  Even so, sometimes a 
vote is required to push a recommendation over the finish line, “I always said to the group, 
we’re not always going to agree or disagree but if we’re equally informed we’re going to be 
closer to agreement than anything else so let’s try to get equally informed on the issue and 
then we can weigh our biases after that and eventually come to a vote and democracy 
rules.”366  
 The interesting thing about the RACs is their ability to reach consensus without the 
use of neutral facilitators or outside mediation.  When asked, every RAC member denied 
using outside mediation or facilitation services.  Without exception they cited the quality of 
people, their willingness to set aside differences and look for common ground, and the 
balance of interests at the table as factors that enable the RAC to reach consensus 
recommendations:   
...the RAC is really interesting because we’re asked, at least my perspective of it, is it’s a 
formalized process but it’s not super formalized, it’s more of a culture from what I’ve 
understood.  So the RAC members are supposed to be able to self-facilitate themselves, 
and are supposed to be able to reach consensus, and are supposed to be able to self-
govern themselves, and the BLM is there to hear what’s happening but the BLM isn’t 
going to interject and try to help the RAC get to consensus, and there isn’t a neutral 
facilitator.367  
What sustains the RACs over time? 
 As noted earlier, according to Williams and Ellefson, one factor determining the 
success of any collaborative partnership is the ability to, “...attract and keep individuals and 
organizations engaged in partnership activities.”368  Simultaneously, one goal of instituting 
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an effective dispute resolution processes is to enable the process to continually address the 
management problems that invariably arise over time.  As McKinney, Field and Bates 
suggest, “...the intent of disputes system design is to create systems for dealing with not just 
a single dispute, but the stream of disputes that arise in nearly all relationships, 
communities, and institutions – so called, ‘chronic disputes.’”369  Ideally, an effective 
consensus-based planning and decision making advisory council would encapsulate many 
of the same goals.  By this measure alone, the BLM RACs can be determined a successfully 
instituted collaborative arrangement in federal land management planning.   
 Probing the question of what sustains the RACs over time illuminates three major 
themes.  First, the structure of the RACs ensures longevity and consistency across 
geographies.  However, without producing some outcome or perceived value for the BLM, 
the RAC membership, and the public at large, the structure would remain an empty shell.   
Therefore the second theme, the RACs ability to build social and political good will between 
its members demonstrates one of the intangible by-products of consensus building 
discussed by Innes and Booher370 that supports the structure and cultivates trust between 
the agency and the public.  Finally, as the aphorism suggests, “The ends justify the means.”  
For over twenty years, the RACs have demonstrated an ability to forge agreements around 
complex management problems, and this success has galvanized the BLM to continue its 
twenty-year experiment in collaborative governance. 
The Structure: Embracing FACA 
Much like the organizational structure enables the RACs success, the structure also 
helps to sustain the RACs over time.  The RACs were instituted through Bruce Babbitt’s 
regulatory reforms under the Clinton Administration in the 1990s.  With each subsequent 
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administration, the question invariably comes up within the Agency, will the RAC program 
endure, and how much influence will the RACs continue to have on the agency?  However, 
with each incoming administration, the value of the RACs has been reaffirmed.   
Everyone recognizes the value. There was some thought that when President Bush 
came into office they were going to eliminate the RACs, and that didn’t happen. Then 
when President Obama came in, there was thinking that they were going to eliminate 
the RACs, that didn’t happen again.  They see this as being valuable to the agency... 
Now then so the stature of the RAC changes also with that, how much weight [they are 
given].  We say, ‘well the RAC recommended that we do this.’  Sometimes that carries 
more weight depending on who’s sitting in Washington, who’s in the Whitehouse.371  
Aside from recognizing the value to the agency, the fact that the RACs were constructed into 
the statutory and regulatory structure of the agency (through FLPMA and the Rangeland 
Reform ’94) at a time when the public demanded more access to decision making provides 
some level of certainty around the program’s continuation.  The regulatory structure was 
said to provide the ability for the public to develop a deeper and more meaningful 
relationship with the agency. 
I think the fact that we have, that there is FACA, that the secretary appoints members, 
and there’s strict categories, there’s a process for how the meeting is run, the federal 
register notice, the designated federal officer and a chain of command - all of those 
structural pieces are actually really important, and they provide a common set of 
rules, or set of circumstances that level the playing field for participating.  So 
regardless of geography or what the general population believes, they’ll get a general 
cross section of the population that lives there.  I think all the structure stuff is 
important.372 
Every BLM representative interviewed suggested that having a standing group of 
engaged members of the public to provide them with advice on issues they struggle with is 
incredibly helpful.   The values they highlighted included gaining advice from a diverse 
range of perspectives, helping to find creative solutions to difficult management issues, and 
enhancing public support of the decisions that are made.  Additionally, the RAC can be 
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employed during NEPA scoping, and the recommendations they provide can be used 
directly as an alternative in agency planning documents.  Agency representatives also 
suggested that the RAC helps the BLM understand how their decisions affect the public, and 
in turn, the RAC helps to build trust between the agency and the public. 
We can come to the RAC and say we’re struggling with this and without having to go 
out and form a blue ribbon panel, we already have one set up for us.  We have that 
standing group as a sounding board, to provide us advice if were really heading in the 
wrong direction.373  
Because it’s a federal advisory committee chartered group, we can use that stuff, we 
can take that recommendation and write it right into an alternative that we can write 
an analysis on.  So, in selecting that alternative we know that it’s already had some 
level of diverse group discussion and consensus on it and that should make our project 
and what we’re trying to accomplish better.374 
Several RAC members had a similar view.  Having a standing collaborative group that is 
equipped to provide advice on the constant stream of issues that the BLM struggles with is a 
positive development over building a grassroots or ad hoc collaborative process over single 
issues.  
The benefits [of the RAC], as opposed to the grassroots performance, is that you have 
the funding, the logistics are all set up, you know where you’re meeting, there is a 
meeting space that has been reserved, you set aside three days and go in and do it. At 
the grassroots, you have all the obstacles of logistics, and funding, but the motivation 
and experience at the grassroots level is that you know what you’re going to go and 
do...So we’ve gotten over that first hurdle of grassroots development...sometimes that’s 
where you get stuck, but that’s the one thing that we’re doing well so how do we take 
advantage of that.375 
Two of the key features sustaining the RACs and enabling their success are the legal and 
regulatory structure under which the RAC’s operate coupled with the flexibility to tackle 
diverse issues of concern to the agency and the members when they arise.  Indeed, both the 
BLM and the RAC members view the ability to have a consistent, reliable group to provide 
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advice on complex management issues from a diverse perspective of public peers is seen as 
a major benefit.  Concurrently, the opportunity to have a real influence on BLM 
management decisions is one of the tangible effects of this collaborative process that 
enables the RAC to attract and keep individuals engaged.  
 That said, at one time or another, the question came up with each RAC group 
interviewed as to how much influence they actually had over the Agency’s management 
decisions.  Some interviewees indicated that they felt like at the local level, their 
recommendations were very well valued, but the further the recommendations traveled up 
the administrative hierarchy, or the further they were removed from the field office level, 
the less weight they carried. 
I appreciate the folks in the state office, I appreciate the folks that are trying to 
manage the land out of the district offices, there’s a lot of BLM land ...and they can’t 
make everyone happy, they’re lucky to make half the people happy.  I trusted [the State 
Director] because he was the type of guy to sit down and talk about the issues with all 
the stakeholders, and at least try to get the job done somehow, and get a decision 
made. After it left his office and went to Denver or Washington, I about lost hope.  
Seemed like if the feds, and the people out in DC would just stay out of it, we could get 
the job done...376 
Other members expressed an understanding of an added layer of complexity, or a filter 
between the recommendations the RAC provides and the BLM’s responsibility to ultimately 
make and implement the final management decisions.  
I think they’re [the BLM] very responsive...I think it’s a balance because I think the BLM 
really listens, and understands where we’re coming from, and they do as much as they 
can to have our recommendations translate into management, but I think at the end of 
the day we end up asking for things that the BLM can’t do...there’s a difference 
between them listening to us, taking us seriously, and attempting to implement our 
recommendations is one thing, and what it looks like in the end is another.377 
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The other major challenge the RAC faces with its organizing structure is the 
tendency to be bound by it too rigidly.  Several of the RAC members agreed that while the 
organizing structure, being chartered under FACA, and having the weight of law and 
regulation behind what they do is a critical feature contributing to the RAC’s success, 
sometimes they needed a little more, “...space to move around...” within the structure. 
I think there’s a balance to be found between the cemented structure to get people 
inside, and then a little bit more of give them the boards and nails, say here is what the 
law says, here is what we need to do, can you help us create this together? I think right 
now were the former, were plugged into something we can’t change and we end up 
beating our head against the wall. Again you look at the ground-up, grassroots, 
organic process there is a sense of creating that structure together. So within the 
guidelines, within the law can they give us some more space to move around?378  
I think that having the land management agency or the government step back during 
the meetings, and, you know, they create all this structure, then once folks are into the 
structure and a part of the RAC, they step back and make sure they are not trying to 
unduly influence the conversation, or steer the RAC towards specific outcomes, or 
impede the process in any way once it gets going. I think they should create the 
structure and the boundaries and all that and let it go, so it can self-form and develop 
its own connections, come up with its own conclusions and feel empowered.379 
Finding that balance is no easy task, and takes time for any collaborative group.  All groups, 
whether agency initiated or developed through grassroots efforts go through the classic 
process of forming, storming, and norming before ultimately performing.  Each RAC must go 
through its own group process collectively to identify, understand and implement the best 
way to enhance their performance.  For some, developing the agenda based on the interests 
of the RAC members allows a higher degree of performance.  For others, capitalizing on the 
ability to constitute sub-RACs allows greater flexibility and engages members and the public 
on the issues in which they are most interested.  For the agency, sometimes a higher 
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performing RAC results from finding the courage to let go of the reigns and trust the process 
to proceed under its own impetus.  
Outcome Criteria Themes 
 Innes and Booher discuss two types of products that often result from successful 
consensus building processes: tangible and intangible.380  One of the intangible benefits of a 
successful collaborative process is the building of trust among the members that results in 
improved working relationships between participants, agencies, and the public.381  
Improvements in trust and relationship quality between parties, gaining knowledge and 
understanding about the issues, and increasing the capacity to address future conflict are 
the social qualities that define the criteria building social and political capital that often 
results from a consensus-based dispute resolution process.382   
Conversely, the tangible products often take the shape of formal agreements such as 
plans, policies, legislation, or voter initiatives.383 Additionally, the process outcomes often 
produce favorable results for the ecological function or environmental integrity of the place 
such as improvements to wildlife habitat, forest health or water quality.384  Finally, 
consensus building processes also often result in second- and third-order effects such as 
implementation and monitoring agreements between parties, and spin-off partnerships that 
are better able to address future problems collectively.385 These second and third order 
effects are what Moote describes as keys to “closing the feedback loop.”386  Necessary are an 
individual participants willingness to learn and experiment with new ways of doing things, 
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and an organizational commitment to adaptive management.387 Leighninger discusses 
implementation of agreed upon outcomes as a key strategy for democratic organizing and 
an explicit goal to strive for.388    
Intangible Outcome: Builds Social and Political Capital 
  Building lasting relationships between members of a collaborative group often 
facilitates, “...genuine communication and joint problem solving...”389  which results in an 
improved likelihood to share information, negotiate around potentially conflicting issues, 
and be responsive to future change and conflict.390  Without exception, the RAC members 
interviewed consistently cited the improvement of working relationships and trust between 
interest groups as one of the greatest benefits of working on the RAC. 
We got to know each other as individuals, we got to understand what we had in 
common and what we disagreed on, but I think we became people who respected one 
another and when we were finally given some assignments on long range planning I 
think we functioned [well], certainly.391  
RAC members have taken the time to get to know each other outside of the meetings 
and can understand where each other is coming from, and that’s a really big piece, the 
opportunity we get as RAC members...[to] understand where the other side is coming 
from. So that trust building is a really important component...392 
 
Another benefit of building trusting relationships within the group is that it begins to 
radiate outward and influence the public outside of the RAC setting. As one RAC member 
pointed out, “I think there is some trickle down in the RAC...I think the RAC enables some 
cross communication between the interest groups, and I think the trust that’s built between 
the RAC members serves as a conduit so the BLM doesn’t always have to play traffic cop 
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between the different interests.”393  It was also suggested by the Agency that this trust 
eventually permeates into the communities and generates understanding between the BLM 
and the public at large, noting, “The RAC, being a spectrum of public peers, validates the 
decisions we made and shows that the agency is listening to the concerns of the public 
which ultimately helps to improve trust.”394 
This is not to say that the public always agrees with what the agency’s management 
actions or policies even with the input of the RAC.  Controversy still persists, and a certain 
degree of conflict will always be an inherent part of multiple-use management.  This is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  Disagreement over solutions to a problem often results in stronger, 
more adaptive and politically savvy options to consider.  A problem arises when conflict 
over the issues results in inaction and prevents the agency from effectively fulfilling their 
management requirements or causes degradation to the resources.  The RACs have 
demonstrated an ability to bring together the agency and the public to identify and solve 
problems collaboratively.  
Yes I do [think the RAC provides a good interface between the agency and the public]. 
You have an area that is having some problems, the locals are stirred you can go to 
that area and you listen to the BLM’s position and you can listen to the local’s position. 
And I’ll guarantee you the answer is not always with the agency, and it’s not always 
with the public, its somewhere in between.  And unless, or until you have those 
interfaces with those groups you really don’t start talking, and if you don’t talk you 
can’t resolve the issue...the RACs are a good way to start those conversations.395 
 
The Tangible Outcomes: Produces Information Resources that Increases Creativity, Ends 
Stalemate, and Results in High-Quality Agreements   
Aside from looking at on the ground improvements, one of the most common 
criteria for evaluating a consensus building process is simply whether or not the group was 
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able to reach an agreement.396  A successful collaborative process often results in 
synthesizing shared knowledge and information resources, incorporating that information 
into creative ideas that result in formal agreements.397  Through this process, ideas that 
otherwise would not be considered are often brought to light and developed into 
management plans, legislation, or policy.398  However, these steps in the agreement forming 
process are often so intertwined that it is difficult or inefficient to discuss them individually.  
As Innes and Booher suggest, “Consensus building by its nature is deeply embedded in the 
ongoing stream of political and social action, collective learning and change.  The threads 
can be followed to some degree to show how one action links to another and another, but 
they can never be disentangled or even fully articulated.”399 
The purpose of the RACs, as codified by 43 CFR § 1784, is to provide advice to the 
Secretary and Director of the BLM, “...regarding policy formulation, program planning, 
decision making, attainment of program objectives, and achievement of improved program 
coordination and economies in the management of public lands and resources...”400  
Inherently, the process of formulating that advice compels the participating members to 
discover common ground and areas of agreement though deliberative discussions.  RAC 
members suggested that the most common way to discover shared interests and produce 
recommendations is to focus on where there is agreement rather than where there is 
disagreement. 
There are some things we don’t agree on; we just kind of set those aside.  You don’t 
have to focus on getting total agreement on an issue. The real question might be how 
many [wild] horses belong on an allotment? It’s a lot easier to come to agreement on 
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that than whether you think there ought to be a wild horse program or not.  So you 
just bite off as much as you can chew and work on it.401  
Another frequently used measure of success is to ask whether the agreements were 
implemented.402  Because the RACs function in an advisory capacity only and there is no 
mechanism for enforcing the recommendations, or binding authority over the BLM, 
implementation of agreements is not a good measure of success in the RACs case.  However, 
herein lays the importance of understanding participant satisfaction as a factor in 
evaluating success.  If the recommendations that are offered as advice to the BLM satisfy the 
interests of the RAC members, then the group has largely achieved the purpose under which 
it was organized.  If the recommendations lead to creative or innovative management 
solutions then the BLM benefits all the more.  As Innes and Booher point out, “Even a 
process without an agreement may be a success if the participants have learned about the 
problem, learned about each other’s interests, and about what may be possible.”403 
 Every RAC member interviewed spoke of at least one recommendation their group 
has developed during their tenure on the committee that has helped the BLM with difficult 
management decisions.  In addition, the review of the past meeting minutes as summarized 
in the table in Appendix IV illustrates the diversity of management issues discussed by the 
RACs.  Many of the issues discussed by the RACs overlap, existing consistently across 
landscapes regardless of district boundaries, indicating that management problems, much 
like wildlife, tend not to be bounded by lines on a map.  Wild horse and burro management, 
siting of energy development projects, resource management planning, vegetation and 
riparian restoration projects, grazing management, and recreation fees were among the 
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major issues commonly addressed by the RACs.404  Many of the interviewees discussed the 
RACs demonstrated an ability to develop agreements that improved management plans or 
resulted in creative solutions to management problems across these varied landscapes.  
Over the past 19 years our...RAC has provided the DFO with between 25 and 30 
recommendations. These included the Standards and Guidelines, which was at the very 
beginning of the RAC...issue papers, fee proposals, travel plan guidance, and that just 
names a few things.405  
[The] five year strategy for the NCLS lands...was really interesting.  I mean, the BLM 
RAC almost totally rewrote it.  And the funny thing about it is, I think, even the staff 
people ...were very excited about the outcome of that, and it has since become the five 
year strategy for the Utah BLM office for the NLCS.406 
We spent one entire RAC meting talking about [the Three Creeks Grazing Strategy], 
and then it was pretty clear... that quite a few of the people on the RAC just didn’t get 
it, didn’t understand. So we took a two-day tour, and it was just incredibly productive.  
People when they got on the ground they could see what you were talking about.  So 
then the BLM RAC wrote really quite a sophisticated letter.  It was approved by the 
RAC; we all voted for it, it was a recommendation that the State BLM should support 
the Three Creeks Grazing Strategy.407   
Here again, the sub-RACs aid the RACs in diving deeper into substantive issues and 
developing creative responses to management problems.  Creativity contributes to 
satisfying the interests represented by the RAC as a whole, but can also inspire options that 
otherwise may not have been considered.  The sub-RACs are one such mechanism to gain 
public feedback and induce creativity.  
So we have our discussions, and if it is something that rises to the magnitude of a 
position paper... somebody will say... will you chair a subcommittee and develop 
something.   Then, the subcommittee person will bring back a recommendation and we 
go around the room and say, Yeah what about this, what about that...and then they 
would say we think you need to re-draft, the group would ask, could you take this back 
and fix these things, and so on and so forth...and we got to a point where the chair said, 
everybody agree with what we’ve got?   Somebody makes a motion, and second and we 
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vote on it...we don’t have conflict there, we talk it out, and try and consider, and 
include everybody’s opinion.  If somebody’s exact wording doesn’t get in there, 
generally somebody will pick it up and make sure it’s in the statement.408  
This back and forth conversation between the subcommittee and the full RAC allows 
recommendations to be developed that address the public’s concerns, or proposes creative 
solutions to a local management problems: 
 [The sub-RAC] brought in some outside folks [who were] claiming to have some 
legitimate complaints against the BLM office over the oil and gas leases.  The main 
issue was they had really hot and heavy activity in the area where he lambed in the 
spring, and he had to lamb there because it was the only place where he had adequate 
water.  It was really very simple, we just convinced him by spending 30-40 thousand 
dollars they could provide him water and he could lamb away from the activity and 
everybody could be happy.409 
The RACs have the ability to gather information about a topic by soliciting the 
informed opinions of outside interest groups and the Agency’s resource specialists.  This 
allows outside information to be synthesized prior to or concurrently with the process of 
developing a recommendation.  As one RAC member recalls, “We’ve had two resolutions 
that the advisory council has put together concerning wild horse and burro and they sought 
out Friends of the Mustangs, and also our wild horse and burro specialists to be able to 
bring them information as they were crafting those resolutions to help them understand 
what some of those issues are.”410  In turn, recommendations generated by the RAC often 
empower the agency to tackle issues that they would otherwise be reluctant to take on:  
Some of the things we have heard from our partners at the BLM...is that they would 
have felt that their hands were tied and intimidated to work on tackling an issue like 
invasive plants if they had to do it on their own, but since they had a collaboration of 
people who could bring lots of capacity and lots of resources to the table they feel like 
they actually stand a chance.411 
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Conversely, on issues they know to be controversial, a recommendation from the 
RAC can alleviate the Agency’s anxiety over moving in a particular direction.  A 
recommendation can make the decision easier to implement because the Agency can be 
confident that the recommendation already accounts for the perspectives of the diverse 
cross section of the public interests the RAC represents.  As one BLM staff member 
suggested, “[The BLM] can take that recommendation and write it right into an alternative 
that we can write an analysis on.  So in selecting that alternative we know that it’s already 
had some level of diverse group discussion and consensus on it and that should make our 
project and what we’re trying to accomplish better.”412 
Finally, the consistency of having the RACs and their history of recommendations 
over time creates a significant record of decisions that can be used to inform future 
discussions and recommendations.   According to one RAC member involved in a wild horse 
discussion, “One of the first things we tried to do was put down on paper what we thought 
about it...Then every time there is a new chapter in the development or litigation over 
management of wild horses, we go back to that letter and go, hmm, I guess we don’t need to 
revisit that, we got it right the first time.”413 
The tangible outcomes produced by a particular collaborative process are but one 
measure of success.  Again, as the recommendations of the RACs are purely advisory, and 
the BLM may or may not implement such advice into management action, it is difficult to 
evaluate the success of the RACs based on tangible or on-the-ground management actions.  
However, where the RACs have come to agreement and offered consensus-based advice or 
recommendations to the BLM, they succeed in fulfilling their regulatory requirements.  The 
results of this survey are limited to the perspectives of those participating in the RACs and 
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therefore do not account for the perspectives of parties who may be affected by a 
management decision but not a part of the RAC process.  This is an inherent limitation on 
fully evaluating the RAC process through this investigation.  This highlights one remaining 
question: to what degree have the RAC’s recommendations or advice had an effect on 
objections or appeals to decisions or management actions ultimately implemented by the 
Agency?  This question is beyond the scope of this investigation but could present an 
interesting topic for future research.  What this study does demonstrate is the RACs ability 
to innovate locally crafted solutions to management problems that helps end stalemates 
between represented interests and often result in high-quality, agreed upon information 
resources and advice to the BLM from a diverse representation of the public.    
5. Analysis: What can be learned from the RAC model?  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the RAC’s twenty year tenure of collaborative 
governance with the BLM has demonstrated nearly all of the criteria that describe 
successful collaborative, consensus-building processes of environmental conflict resolution.   
The only criterion that remains questionably fulfilled is that of efficiency.  There are several 
factors, such as the appointment process and the inherent limitations on meeting frequency 
that frustrate efficiency.  At the same time, the use of sub-RACs can be used to improve 
efficiency by meeting outside of the limitations imposed by structure of the full RAC.  In 
evaluating the RACs based on the criteria outlined in chapter four, in various ways, the RACs 
demonstrate representation and inclusiveness, self-organization and procedural fairness, 
deliberativeness, building consensus, producing agreements, increasing creativity, 
producing information resources, ending stalemate, and building social and political capital.  
First, the RACs exhibit an ability to balance representation and inclusiveness 
through several processes that include public input and public participation in the 
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formation of their recommendations.  The use of public comment periods in each meeting, 
presentations on the issues by resource experts and members of the affected public, and the 
use of sub-RACs all demonstrate a commitment to closing the gap between agency decision- 
making and the implications of those decisions on the public’s use of the public lands.    
Second, the RACs navigate a tension around self-organization whereby the most 
successful RACs are those who develop an agenda, working groups and discussion topics 
collectively with the Agency.  Some RACs find this challenging while others have managed to 
smoothly navigate this process.  Where local managers maintain a tight grip over the 
discussion topics and use the agenda as a mechanism to limit the activities of the RAC, 
whether intentionally or not, RAC members feel dis-empowered and that their ability to 
effectively influence management decisions diminishes.   
Third, the BLM has developed a collaborative process that by nature fosters creative 
thinking, shared learning, identification of common interests, development of out-of-the-
box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo.  The RACs engage the diversity of interests in a 
shared learning process about the identified discussion topics and develop consensus-based 
recommendations that often challenge individual participant’s version of the status quo.   
The RACs use several methods, such as sub-RACs and solicited presentations to educate the 
individual members, and use that knowledge to inform their discussions and decisions.  
Fourth, the RACs strive for consensus in when building their recommendations.  If 
consensus is not able to be reached, often the discussion is tabled until more information 
can be gathered, or is sent back to the sub-committee or sub-RAC level for further 
deliberation.  The most successful RACs focus on the areas where agreement can be found 
and work from there to address management problems that are identified by the group and 
the agency together.  
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Finally, successfully moving through these process criteria often result in improving 
social and political capital, and tangible outcomes in the form of consensus-based 
recommendations and advice to the BLM.   RAC members consistently cited improved 
working relationships, improved trust, better appreciation for other interests and the 
challenges the Agency faces as resulting from participating on the RAC.  The Agency 
discussed that where these improvements in relationship quality and trust were most 
profound, they radiating outward into the community.  Where this happens, the agency 
perceived an improvement in their relationships with the public at large.   
The formal recommendations and advice the RAC provides to the BLM constitutes 
the bulk of the tangible outcomes.  The process of forming that consensus-based advice 
weaves together the strands of developing shared information resources, creative problem 
solving, overcoming stalemate, and producing agreements around collectively defined 
problems.  Every RAC studied has examples of producing consensus-based advice through 
this deliberative process.  Their ability to do so is evidenced by the continual renewal of 
their charters for over twenty years.  
The remainder of this chapter addresses the overarching goal and primary research 
questions of this study: What can be learned from the Rocky Mountain Region RACs, as an 
example for how collaborative problem solving can be instituted in public lands management? 
How can these lessons inform future attempts to institute collaborative governance within the 
legal and institutional framework of federal public lands?  The section is divided into two 
parts.  First, an analysis of the above findings highlights the major benefits of the RAC model 
for instituting collaborative governance within federal agency planning and decision-
making.  The second part focuses on key lessons learned from studying the RAC model that 
could either address some of the challenges of the RAC itself or be applied in the 
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development of collaborative processes to be instituted within other agencies.  This analysis 
draws on the interviews to understand how the RAC institution fits within the models of 
collaborative process design discussed in chapter two.   
Reflecting on the model for dispute resolution system design developed by 
Leighninger that was discussed in chapter two can help with a more thorough 
understanding of why the RACs succeed, where they face challenges, and what could be 
done to overcome those challenges.  Recalling the four principles: 1) Recruit diverse 
interests, 2) involve interests in deliberative dialogue, 3)provide opportunities to compare 
options, 4) effect change by applying citizen input to decision making and 
implementation.414  Applying this framework to the RACs highlights a number of benefits 
and key lessons to take away when thinking about the development or refinement of future 
models for instituting collaborative governance in public lands and resource management. 
To achieve this, the four tables in Appendix III were developed from participant responses 
to the interview questions that illustrate the major benefits experienced from participating 
in the RAC process, key features enabling the RAC’s success, common challenges 
experienced by the RACs, and where the RACs exemplify the models of collaborative 
process design.  These tables are shown in Appendix III and were used to inform the 
discussion below. 
What are the major benefits of the RAC model?  
 The major perceived benefits of the RAC model that were discussed by the 
participants and BLM representatives who were interviewed for this study can be 
summarized in four distinct categories. First, as discussed, the purpose of the RACs is to 
empower a diverse cross-section of interests to provide the BLM with consensus-based 
recommendations on the full array of management issues.  By developing recommendations 
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through the multi-faceted lens of diverse interests, the RAC fulfills the first principle of 
engaging diverse interests.   
Second, an empowered RAC facilitates a process of mutual education through 
deliberative dialogue that leads to overcoming differences and results in consensus-based 
recommendations to address complex resource management problems.  A democratic 
governance approach to management that engages participants in shared learning and 
mutual education prior to decision- making is said to result in actions that have more public 
buy-in, and to improve implementation by addressing conflicts during the planning 
process.415  The advice the RAC provides to the BLM constitutes an ongoing conversation 
about particular issues that works to educate the agency, the RAC members, and the public. 
Third, from a RAC participant’s point of view, the institution provides access to the 
BLM decision makers and a way to influence, or effect change on the decisions being made.  
This perception of access to and influence over the BLM management decisions also 
addresses the principles of engagement and empowerment that are critical elements of 
success discussed by Leach and Innes and Booher.  From the BLM’s perspective, they 
appreciate the access the RAC brings them to the mind of the public, which their decisions 
and management activities effect.    
Finally, the RAC builds social and political capital that improves relationships and 
communicative ability between the Agency and the interest groups that embody the RAC.  
Often that communicative ability trickles down to the larger public sphere.  In the RACs 
case, social and political capital manifests itself in the form of increased trust between the 
interests themselves, and between the interests and the BLM.  The process also results in an 
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improved ability to communicate with each other, and more productive working 
relationships outside of the RAC discussions.416  
Representation of interests in decision making 
Every RAC member interviewed expressed that they benefited in some way from 
the diverse representation of interests involved in the group.  These benefits were 
manifested in a variety of ways.  First, the RAC members highly-valued learning about the 
issues from other people’s points of view.  The ability to learn from others on the committee 
created well-rounded discussions and led to finding common ground.  Second, RAC 
members highly-valued the RAC as a vehicle to educate other interest groups about their 
concerns and viewpoints.  Many RAC members discussed one of the major advantages of the 
RAC being the ability to educate others or help others understand their concerns in a civil 
and pro-active arena. Third, it was felt that developing recommendations through such a 
diverse, collaborative body of interests lent some validity and legitimacy to the advice that 
was ultimately given.  According to one RAC member, “The fact that we were a spectrum of 
public interests I think that validated those decisions when we finally made them.”417 
The BLM agreed that the support of a range of interests validated their decisions. 
Additionally, the Agency described four other key benefits from having this collaborative 
body sit in an advisory capacity.  First, the RAC provides a conduit to the public to have pro-
active conversations about management issues prior to making a final decision.  This is 
viewed as an improvement over the decide-announce-defend model of traditional decision-
making.  Each staff member interviewed was emphatic in their appreciation of the RAC 
program for facilitating discussions between such a diverse cross section of community 
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interests.  They unanimously suggested that the balanced, consensus-based advice the RAC 
provides on complex management problems helps them make better decisions.   
Second, the RACs help the BLM understand how their management decisions both 
are perceived by and affect the public.  The conversation that ensues between the Agency 
and the RAC results in decisions that are more informed by and responsive to at least some 
of the interests that are affected by the issue.  Even in situations where people don’t agree 
with the entire decision, it helps to create buy-in.  Generally, if the RAC members feel they 
have been heard and their interests acknowledged, they are more likely to feel better about 
the decision,  “If I know that they’ve heard my opinion, I’m going to feel better about that 
decision they make whether it agrees with my opinion or not.”418  
Third, it was suggested that the RAC provides political cover to the agency when 
making difficult decisions about controversial issues.  There was a perception by some RAC 
members that the agency has a tendency to avoid making hard decisions and allows 
problems to compound on each other.  The RACs, being a diverse cross section of the 
community of interests affected by the both the problems and the responses to those 
problems can act as a shield when the members of the public inevitably complain about the 
decision.  
To be able and look them in the eye and say look we have a RAC that is truly 
representative of the population...they brought me these recommendations and I 
agree.  I think it provides some legitimate political cover for the state director to make 
the right decision rather than be pressured into a decision by a particular group.419 
Finally, according to one BLM Staff member interviewed, because the 
recommendations are coming from a FACA chartered group, the agency can write the RACs 
suggestions directly into a planning document as an alternative to be analyzed by an EA or 
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EIS through the NEPA process, “[The BLM] can take that recommendation and write it right 
into an alternative that we can write an analysis on.  So in selecting that alternative we 
know that it’s already had some level of diverse group discussion and consensus on it and 
that should make our project and what we’re trying to accomplish better.”420.  Grassroots 
collaboratives cannot have this degree of direct access to the agency without risking a 
violation of the major provisions of FACA.   This may be why so many grassroots 
collaboratives pursue legislation as a means of final resolution and ensuring their 
agreements are implemented.  The recommendations made by the RAC are said to be more 
broadly accepted because the RAC can act as that conduit between the represented public 
and the Agency’s decisions.  Their recommendations have already had a degree of 
collaboration and consensus built into them.  Granted, this process inherently excludes the 
parties who would chose not to participate in collaboration, however, groups who attempt 
to get their interests met through other means, such as legislation, litigation, or the appeals 
processes are not excluded from the opportunity to participate through the public comment 
periods, and the regular NEPA process that the RAC recommendations typically navigate in 
order to be implemented.  Analysis of the recommendations through the NEPA process 
allows outside interests the opportunity to inform and shape the ultimate actions taken.  As 
it is, no major federal action, even those recommended by the RAC, can be implemented on 
public lands without paying homage to NEPA. 
By bringing together a, “fair membership balance, both geographic and interest 
specific, in terms of the functions to be performed and points of view to be represented...”421 
the RACs inherently engage the diversity of its membership in a process where, through 
discussion of the issues, they educate each other about their own perspectives, values and 
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concerns.  This discussion results in advice and recommendations that are balanced and 
generally agreeable to all parties involved in the discussion.  Conversely, not every member 
of the group is going to be equally engaged in all issues.  Interests and priorities are 
different, and personal engagement in any one issue is naturally determined by the level to 
which that issue rises on the interest and priority meter of the individual member.  As one 
RAC member stated, “Sometimes the RAC can devolve into one side of an issue against 
another, and if you don’t have a dog in that fight, you’re kind of just sitting on the sidelines 
to a certain degree.”422  However, if a lack of engagement by one or more interests or 
interest categories is a consistent and persistent problem, it may be indicative of power 
imbalances within the group that need to be addressed.423   
Deliberative Dialogue leads to Consensus-based Agreements 
 The RAC fosters deliberative dialogue that commonly results in mutual education, 
finding common ground, and inventing creative solution options to address the 
management problems.  According to Moote, McClaran and Chickering, “In addition to 
improving the information base upon which decisions are made...” improved dialogue is 
said to, “...aid participants in the revision and refinement of their own values and 
interests.”424  Granted, it’s not an easy process.  Often, substantial time and resources are 
invested into researching the issues, developing solution options and cultivating agreement 
upon a final recommendation.   
Coupling this deliberative dialogue with opportunities for feedback from RAC 
member’s constituents and the public at-large develops advice that is ultimately reflective 
of the interests of the greater public.  Ideally, the knowledge RAC members gain through the 
discussions flows back to the constituencies they represent and results in a trickle-down 
                                                 
422 Colorado RAC member comment, on file with the Author. 
423 Ansell and Gash (2007): 552. 
424 Moote, McClaran and Chickering (1997): 879. 
 124 
effect of information sharing and public education beyond the group.  One RAC member 
observed, “I think there is some trickle down in the RAC...I think the RAC enables some cross 
communication between the interest groups, and I think the trust that’s built between the 
RAC members serves as a conduit so the BLM doesn’t always have to play traffic cop 
between the different interests.”425  Facilitating learning and change beyond the group is 
one consequence of successful collaborative consensus building processes.426  As this 
investigation only pertains to the observations of those within the RACs, one area for future 
research could be to investigate the degree to which the knowledge gained through RAC 
discussion actually matriculates outward to the larger community of interests affected by 
BLM land and resource management activities.    
Access and Influence creates buy-in 
By providing access to the BLM decision making process and influence over 
management activities, the RAC institution offers a key advantage over other grassroots 
collaborative processes that are not FACA chartered groups.  The RACs facilitate access to 
BLM administrators and influence over management decisions, which directly relates to the 
principles of engagement and empowerment discussed by Leach.  As already discussed, 
engagement is defined as engaging participants, keeping them at the table, interested and 
learning through in-depth discussion, drama, humor, and informal interaction, while 
empowerment enables participants to influence the decisions of officials or administrators.  
Eight of eleven RAC members interviewed discussed the ability to have access to agency 
administrators or the ability to influence management decisions as a benefit of the RAC 
institution that kept them coming back.     
                                                 
425 Colorado RAC member comment, on file with the Author. 
426 Innes and Booher (1999): 419 
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The fact that the RACs are sustained by the regulations over time facilitates a 
constant stream of informed public input on the issues.  The balance of interests on the RAC 
keeps discussions informed by the diversity of public interests on the landscape, educates 
the members about each other’s perspective, and provides balanced advice to the Agency on 
the array of multiple use management issues.  The term limits and timely influx of new 
members, and the diversity of membership maintained are features of the structure that 
simultaneously contribute to stability of the institution and prevent stagnation, even if they 
frustrate efficiency.   
The provision of the regulations that authorizes the RAC to appeal directly to the 
Secretary of the Interior if the committee feels as though its advice is being arbitrarily 
ignored by the Designated Federal Official is one other feature that enables this access.427  
Again, the interesting thing about this feature is that despite its potential usefulness in 
holding the BLM accountable is that none of the interview respondents could identify a time 
when it has been used.  Recalling the RAC member who discussed this explicitly:  
...a few of us recognize that [appealing directly to the Secretary is] a possible next step. 
That is also pretty unpopular, you know for Wyoming to go to the Feds.  The state 
office is enough of the feds, so to go to the Secretary, even among the folks who agree 
that this [recommendation] should be implemented, it would be hard to get them to 
agree that that is the next step. We’re all about fixing it at the local level, we can’t go 
cry to DC.428  
This statement indicates reluctance, at least in Wyoming, to use the provision even if it gets 
facilitates resolution of the issue because of an apparent cultural aversion to federal 
interference in what are considered local matters.  It also highlights the effect social bonds 
and cultural dynamics have on group process.  In Wyoming, like in much of the West, RAC 
members subscribe to a cultural identity that is fiercely independent and wary of Federal 
                                                 
427 43 CFR 1784.6-2(i) 
428 Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author.  
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interference in local politics.  At the same time, appealing to the Feds could result in 
improvements to the landscape or the decision making process itself.  While from an 
outside perspective this provision may appear to be a valuable tool for ensuring agency 
accountability, if cultural dynamics frustrate its use, then it may be worth less than the 
paper on which it is written. This also illustrates an enduring tension of collaborative 
decision making and one the RACs must navigate when deciding how to approach 
resolution of their concerns or satisfaction of their interests: is it better to preserve fragile 
relationships built during the process or to influence management outcomes by making the 
tough decisions necessary to benefit the landscape?   
Builds Social and Political Capital 
For Innes and Booher, building social and political capital, “can be more important 
than tangible agreements...”429  as it increases trust, leads to mutual understanding of the 
problems, and often results in enabling stakeholders to work with each other outside of the 
consensus building process.430  The RAC members interviewed were unanimous in their 
insistence that the RAC contributes to improved communication between interests, the 
agency, and the public; to building relationships between interests that otherwise would 
not be built; and cultivating trust and good- will between the agency, the members, and the 
public.  As one RAC member put it, “It’s a trust building experience. When you sit across the 
table from somebody who has almost diametrically opposed views of what public land is 
for, if you can sit across the table from them or next to them for two years, and as long as 
you keep it civil, people tend to change their perspective a little...I at least understand why 
they feel the way they do...”  The question of whether RAC members have engaged with each 
other in project work outside of the RAC process was not explored in this study but could be 
another topic for further research.  
                                                 
429 Ibid: 414.  
430 Ibid: 415. 
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What are the key lessons learned for instituting a collaborative governance 
model? 
In the end, the major question driving this study is could the RAC model be applied 
elsewhere, and if so, what are some of the key lessons to be learned?  Five major lessons 
stick out that are imperative to the RAC’s success.  These lessons could provide guidance for 
either improving the RAC model or instituting collaborative conservation in other areas of 
land use and public resource planning and decision making.  The lessons are as follows: 
Embrace the structure 
First, having the agency embrace the FACA structure and the regulatory model is 
considered critical by both the Agency and the RAC members.  As one BLM representative 
stated: 
Because of the FACA they almost have to get it into a regulatory standpoint and make 
it something agencies have to do. Otherwise, it will change with whoever is sitting in 
the White House and the politics will take over. [Without that], it would have been 
easier for [the next] president to do away with the RACs. But because [it’s in the 
regulations] it takes some of the politics out of that decision, and it does 
institutionalize it.431  
This statement summarizes the feelings of many of the RAC members well.  It was suggested 
by many of those interviewed that the regulatory structure of the RAC institution provides 
direction to the agency and helps depoliticize the process.  It also answers some of the 
questions around representation, inclusion, access and funding that ad hoc, grassroots 
collaborative processes often struggle with.  The structure creates a consistent playing field 
across geographic, political and social landscapes, and it provides a system of federal 
oversight that may help to settle the nerves of those who are apprehensive towards 
community-based collaborative governance.  Seeking congressional authorization for 
instituting a collaborative arrangement within an Agency is no easy task.  However, as noted 
in chapter two, the USFS was given the authority to establish Resource Advisory Councils 
                                                 
431 BLM representative comment, on file with the Author. 
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under the National Forest Management Act but, unlike the “thou shalt” requirements under 
FLPMA, implementation of this authority under NFMA was left to the discretion of the 
Secretary.432   
 Indeed, framing the process through a regulatory structure provides the agency 
with an opportunity to create a management floor for a variety of issues, as demonstrated 
by the creation of the federal fallback standards and guidelines for rangeland management 
through Rangeland Reform ’94.  This opportunity does two things for the agency and the 
collaborative group it establishes.  First, it creates a baseline of resource protection, 
allocation, use or conservation that can be used to ensure sustainability at a national level.  
Using a federal regulatory floor for protection, use, or pollution prevention has recently 
been demonstrated in other areas of environmental management such as the use of Clean 
Air Act provisions to curb carbon emissions from energy production at the State level,433 
and recent legislative proposals prescribing specific levels of timber harvest on National 
Forest lands.434 
Second, creating a federal management floor can be used as a motivating factor for 
local groups to develop their own regulations or management prescriptions that better 
account for the perspectives, and conditions of the local areas and at the very least meet the 
federal floor.  From the public perspective, creating legal hooks such as the requirement to 
develop local rangeland standards and guidelines compels the agency to listen to the 
concerns of affected interests.  Witnessing the RAC’s recommendations directly affecting 
land and resource management empowers RAC members to stay involved.  Further, it helps 
                                                 
432 Pub. L. 94-588 § 14(b) 
433 See generally: EPA’s Clean Power Plan announced August 13, 2015, available: 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants#rule-summary 
434 See generally: Martin Nie. “Place-Based Forest Law: Questions and Opportunities Presented by 
Senator Tester's Forest Jobs and Recreation Act.” Public Land and Resources Law Review; Vol. 31. 
(2010): 175-185.  
 129 
to attract and retain new members to the process.  Without the requirement for the RAC to 
produce local standards and guidelines or be subject to the federal fallback standards, 
questions remain as to whether the agency would have been as responsive to public’s input.  
The initial success experienced by the RACs and the Agency in implementing local standards 
and guidelines has resulted in an agency who, in general, largely values the advice and input 
derived from the RAC.  Consequently, this experience reinforces the perception that the 
RACs have access to and influence over management decisions.  
Saddle the horse; let go of the reins 
The second lesson from this exploration into the RAC institution can be summarized 
by the statement, “...build the table but let the process proceed naturally.”435  With the legal 
structure in place, many RAC members felt like it was important for them to be able to 
create the process collaboratively with the BLM.  Where RAC members didn’t have as much 
influence over designing the agenda, or where the managers failed to bring up issues or 
tasks for the RAC to work on, the RAC membership felt increasingly frustrated, uninspired 
and disempowered.  This indicates a need for the BLM to balance the legal structure with 
the principles of self-organization and shared purpose to maintain an engaged and 
empowered membership.  As one RAC member put it, “give [us] the boards and nails, say 
here is what the law says, here is what we need to do, can you help us create this 
together?”436  The degree to which RAC members had the ability to collaboratively develop a 
shared purpose with the agency, to organize their own working groups, and to feel 
empowered developing an agenda on which they were interested in working directly 
correlated with a perception of influencing management and overall effectiveness of the 
RAC.  
                                                 
435 RAC member comment, on file with the author. 
436 RAC member comment, on file with the author.  
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For the agency, as long as the membership represents the diversity of social, 
political and demographic makeup of the surrounding region required by law, and the 
recommendations the RAC provides are lawful, then they should feel compelled to 
implement the recommendations.  Minimizing adversarial confrontations with public 
interest groups on the management decisions under their jurisdiction is in the Agency’s best 
interest.  Engaging and empowering the RACs to assist them in that mission will only 
increase the likelihood that those decisions are made with public participation and public 
support.  As one RAC member succinctly put it, “A RAC is only as good as the state director 
is willing to use them. I think a state director who really pays attention to their RAC, 
dedicates some resources and effort to try to get out of a RAC what they’re really supposed 
to do, can’t help but benefit from what the RAC recommends.”437 
Value added equals value gained 
Both the agency and the participants have to perceive value coming from the 
process in order to be committed and open to it.  As one BLM representative insisted, “You 
have to mean it.  You can’t tell people you want to collaborate with them and then just do 
whatever you want to do. We have to honor the process, because if we don’t we destroy our 
trust with those folks and what’s in it for them to work with us next time.”438  The BLM 
representatives interviewed perceived the value coming from the advice and 
recommendations supporting their ability to make tough management decisions.  They also 
perceived value in improving their ability to communicate with the public and understand 
of how their management decisions affect and are perceived by the public.  
For the RAC members interviewed, several values were perceived as resulting from 
participation, including: shared learning and developing a mutual understanding of the 
                                                 
437 RAC member comment, on file with the author. 
438 BLM Staff comment, on file with the author. 
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issues; building relationships, trust and good will between members; and gaining access to 
and influence over BLM management decisions.  Additionally, one of the most important 
issues for RAC members was feeling that the BLM valued the input and advice the RAC gave 
them.  “The key is that the BLM really values what we’re bringing to the table. I don’t know 
how they got there, if it was their leadership placing a high value on that or just years and 
years of it working that helped the staff get there...It’s not just a policy but it’s also a 
commitment to the process, and taking the time on the staff side to get the value back from 
the public people.”439  
However, as some of the RAC members pointed out, the perception of success is 
often dependent on the outcomes of on-the-ground management.  If the RAC or the public 
isn’t able to perceive the advice and recommendations affecting management actions, a vital 
element of communication about the value added to decision making by the RAC is missing.  
Several RAC members questioned if their time and effort had an effect on the ground.  As 
one RAC member stated:  
Our job is to tell [the] state director ...on this issue, this should be done. Well he can 
take that advice and write an instructional memo (IM), or he can throw it into the 
hopper and revise procedures, or he can totally ignore us, and we’re just blowing in 
the wind.  So the challenge is to see your comments and advice used, and in this 
forum it can be.  I’ll say in most of these things it has had some influence but maybe 
not as much as I would have liked.440 
 
This indicates a need for the agency to be more transparent with the recommendations and 
advice the RAC provides.  Implementing some mechanism to track the advice through the 
rest of the BLM’s decision making process and other processes of public engagement (EIS 
alternative development for example) would allow the public to understand the value the 
RAC brings to the agency decision making process.    
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440 Wyoming RAC member comment, on file with the Author. 
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The RACs are conferred with a degree of access and influence that rises above the 
level of basic public participation: the RACs synthesize the views of the public to help craft 
solution options before the decisions are made.  Additionally, RACs utilize their resources to 
educate each other, gather information and perspectives from a diverse cross section of the 
community.  They are a wealth of knowledge, talent and creativity.  The agency shouldn’t be 
afraid to task them with tackling difficult questions.  Empowering the RAC to provide advice 
on the issues the agency really struggles with not only leads to an empowered and engaged 
membership, but it builds the social and political capital necessary to implement difficult 
decisions.   
I’m saying there’s a history in BLM to let some fairly significant problems compound 
rather than deal with them.  If the RAC could provide some long term advice to the 
state director on issues like that, if the state director could say to them, this is a vexing 
problem that I’ve had, I’m not asking you to solve it for me but could you give me some 
sense of direction on that, I think the RAC could be very useful in that. But it’s kind of 
like taking your clothes off in public in some respect, because you’re not sure what the 
answer you get is going to be.441 
By providing a sense of mission and empowering the RAC to engage in finding creative 
solutions to vexing problems, the perceived value of the RACs can be increased.  Rangeland 
Reform ’94 did this explicitly with the requirement to develop local standards and 
guidelines for rangeland management or become subject to the federal fallback standards.  
Recreating this kind of requirement could help to catalyze an institutional arrangement 
elsewhere.  Over time, listening to the collective voice of the RAC, which represents the 
community of interests who have a stake in the landscape, increases the perceived value to 
both the RAC members and the public at large.  The degree to which the perceived value of 
the institution accumulates over time increases the likelihood of continued success. 
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Invest in the Strongest Asset 
An engaged and empowered public are the RAC and the Agency’s strongest asset.  
Investing in successive crops of collaboratively-minded, solution-oriented leaders who are 
willing to disagree but also find common ground is critical to the success of the institution.  
One RAC member put it nicely, “The thing about it is that a RAC is only as good as the 
representation that’s on it.”442   
One way to accomplish this could be to build loop-backs to the process, much like 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg suggest building loop-backs to negotiation.  By intentionally and 
strategically engaging members of the public, and building pathways to the collaborative 
group through that engagement could sow the seeds for a sustained crop of new 
membership applicants.  Additionally, it could lead to a public that is more informed about 
what the group is and what it does.  In the end, more active public engagement by the group 
could be lead to a cultural shift that embodies respect and civility, collaborative problem 
solving, and collaborative public education about resource problems.  Enhancing loop backs 
to public involvement and engagement with the group could raise awareness of the value it 
brings to public land and resource management.  
The Sub-RACs have been an especially helpful tool for the BLM RACs to engage the 
public at a deeper and more meaningful level.  All the RACs interviewed discussed using 
sub-RACs and the benefits they bring to the discussions, and several RAC members 
discussed first participating on a sub-RAC before applying to sit on the full RAC.  
Encouraging sub-RACs to play a more active role in the communities and with the public-at-
large regarding the issues they are working on could only increase the two-way 
communication that they already facilitate.  Several RAC members spoke of sub-RACs 
holding their own public meetings.  Infusing the RACs and sub-RACs with tools of 
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collaborative process and encouraging them to have a more direct connection with the 
public could also lead to increased trust and improved communication between the public 
and the agency, a more empowered RAC, greater mutual learning and increased 
understanding, and improved management decisions.   
Finally, to improve the efficiency of the BLM RACs or in implementing a similar 
collaborative group elsewhere, the challenges created by the appointment process need to 
be addressed.  The inefficiency resulting from the appointment process was unanimously 
cited by the RAC members and BLM representatives as the number one challenge.  One 
simple solution brought forward suggested letting the RAC member whose term is expiring 
continue sitting on the council until their replacement is officially seated.  Another 
suggestion was that the appointments be made by the Director of the BLM rather than the 
Secretary of the Interior, thus removing a layer of complexity from the process.   
FLPMA directs the Secretary to establish the advisory councils, and further states 
that, “appointments shall be made in accordance with rules prescribed by the Secretary.”443  
The councils are required to comply with FACA,444 but no language in FLPMA requires 
appointments to be made directly by the Secretary.  The regulations governing the RACs 
discuss requirements for establishment,445 membership composition,446 and terms of 
service and interest group representation,447 but none of the regulations require 
appointments to be made by the secretary.  In fact, 42 CFR § 1784.3 (a) states, “Members 
may be appointed to additional terms at the discretion of the authorized appointing 
official...” which seems to indicate that the Secretary has the discretion to delegate the 
authority of making appointments to another official.  The possibility of implementing legal 
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or procedural solutions to the challenges posed by the appointment process should be 
explored further.   
Capitalize on partnership opportunities 
Any program of collaborative governance should capitalize on partnership 
opportunities that emerge to implement agreements and recommendations.  The RACs are a 
bridge between the agency and the public, and this bridge is buttressed by the effective use 
of sub-RACs.   The most successful RACs assume at one time or another three of the four 
collaborative designs discussed by Selin and Chavez: appreciative planning, dialogues, and 
negotiated settlements.448  The ability to connect the recommendations and advice the RAC 
provides to partnership opportunities outside the group is largely a missed opportunity.  As 
one RAC member discussed, “There’s a feeling among myself and other RAC members that 
we sit through a lot of fun presentations with a lot of information, but we never chew on 
that information, analyze it, or come up with something we can do about it...”449   
Leveraging partners for implementation, monitoring and public education may 
require a greater expenditure of effort on the part of both the RAC members and Agency 
staff, but it may also result in greater continuity between the decisions and implementation 
of those decisions, and a greater understanding of on-the-ground activities by the public.  As 
Moote, McClaran and Chickering point out, “Under a participatory democracy approach, 
administrators give up some discretion and agree to share decision making authority with 
other participants.  In return, participants share responsibility for the successful 
implementation of decisions.”450  
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450 Moote, McClaran, and Chickering (1997): 880. 
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The Forest Service has implemented this philosophy under the Collaborative Forest 
Landscape Restoration Program, whereby the collaborative group creates the plan but also 
assists with the implementation by leveraging the strengths and talents of the collaborators.  
CFLRP is a multi-million dollar program that was created around the specific goal of forest 
restoration and provides funding to accomplish that goal.  While the idea of implementation 
goes beyond the scope of the RAC, it is the final piece of Selin and Chavez’s design models 
that is left unresolved by the RAC.  Building a funding component into to the RAC program, 
much like what has been done by the Secure Rural Schools RAC program in the Forest 
Service, could simultaneously help to achieve this implementation goal and provide a 
clearly mandated purpose with which to further empower the RACs. 
By all other measures, the BLM RACs nearly encompass all four strategies of 
collaborative process design described by Leighninger451.  The RAC engages diverse 
interests, involve interests in deliberative dialogue, provides opportunities to compare 
options, and effect change by applying citizen input to decision making.   The RAC also 
utilizes three of the four design models described by Selin and Chavez452: appreciative 
planning, dialogues, and negotiated settlements.  The missing piece of the puzzle in both 
models is engaging the stakeholders and connecting the lager public to implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the decisions and management actions.  Granted this is 
beyond the scope of the RAC institution as it exists today, but when considering future 
design, building in a loop back for participation in implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation closes the circle and completes the life cycle of a collaborative ECR process.  
                                                 
451 Leighninger (2006): 3. 
452 Selin and Chavez (1995): 193. 
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6. Conclusion 
The BLM’s Resource Advisory Councils are a continuation of a nearly eighty year 
experiment in collaborative governance of public land and natural resource management.  
Beginning with the Taylor Grazing Act and the establishment of the Grazing Advisory 
Boards by Ferry Carpenter, local people have been integrally involved in determining the 
conditions under which the range and resources are utilized, conserved, protected and 
improved.  Followed by the Citizen Advisory Boards instituted under FLPMA, the model for 
collaborative governance has evolved to capture an ever more diverse representation of the 
interests and concerns the public holds in the management of the shared estate.        
The RACs program is certainly not without its challenges.  This experiment has 
traveled a bumpy road at times, both in terms of socio-political acceptance and ecological 
effects.  It certainly has not always resulted in the best outcomes for the condition of the 
watersheds, wildlife and landscapes which they were charged with stewarding.  In fact 
much of this history is distinguished by attempts to correct exploitations of the past.  
Efficiency, engagement and empowerment are all dependent on the degree to which the 
agency is open and committed to the institution at all levels, from the federal office, to the 
district managers, to the field staff.  Building this culture within an agency certainly takes 
time, dedication and a commitment of resources.   
The RACs were instituted by a policy mandate over twenty years ago.  Prior to that, 
the Department of the Interior has been working at including local perspectives in 
management decision making for nearly eighty years.  As such, the RACs have demonstrated 
an ability to able to help the BLM make more informed decisions that are more responsive 
to local conditions and concerns, that have more buy-in from the affected public.  Their 
continuity of service is but one measure of success.   In that time, the RACs have also found 
success in improving trust and relationships between the interests at the table, the BLM, 
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and the public.  Producing consensus-based recommendations that translate into 
management action is the ultimate goal, but even where topics are merely discussed, the 
deliberate nature of the discussions helps to better inform the final decisions made by the 
agency.  An interesting topic for future research would be to conduct a survey on the 
condition of the public rangelands after the institution of the RAC program and if they could 
be tied directly to improved ecological conditions.  However, absent that, providing a 
platform for mutual education and public engagement simultaneously informs and supports 
the recommendations and advice provided to the agency, and each of these factors supports 
the premise that the RAC are a successful example of collaborative governance instituted 
within a federal land management agency.    
Finally, none of this is to discount the voices of those who chose means other than 
collaboration to pursue the satisfaction of their interests on public land and resource issues.  
Nor is it meant to undermine the role litigation and appeals can play in ensuring compliance 
with statutory mandates.  Further, the RAC is not able to pursue legislative solutions to 
management problems, yet legislation has proven a significant tool for ad hoc collaborative 
groups to implement policies or designate management priorities.  The RACs clearly cannot 
be all things to all people, and certainly are not a panacea to alleviating all conflict over 
public lands management.   
 To inform instituting future processes of collaborative governance in agencies that 
manage public lands and natural resources, several lessons can be learned from this 
investigation into the BLM RACs.  The RACs support the argument that including local 
people in decision making improves both the quality and durability of the decisions.  They 
also support the argument that collaborative forms of environmental conflict resolution can 
be successfully instituted in a federal agency through a policy mandate.  According to the 
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RAC members and BLM representatives interviewed for this study, the major benefits of the 
institution are: 
 The required diversity of represented interests leads to shared learning and mutual 
education about an issue and legitimizes the decision making process.  
 Engaging in deliberative dialogue about complex issues prior to making decisions 
cultivates a shared understanding of the problem, contributes to developing 
creative solution options, and builds consensus-based solutions. 
 Access to and influence over the agency decision making processes increases buy-in 
and acceptability of the decisions ultimately made.  
 Including the public in formulating solution options to management problems 
builds social and political good will that improves relationships and communicative 
abilities, reduces conflict, and supports proactive solutions.  
RAC members and BLM representatives also identified several critical factors that enable 
the RACs success.  Those factors include: 
 Embracing the regulatory structure provides consistency across jurisdictional 
boundaries, political and social legitimacy, a reliable funding stream, and an 
institutional memory that transcends the individual members terms.  Embracing a 
regulatory structure also provides an opportunity to guarantee federal standards 
are met while encouraging the development of community oriented solutions to 
local management problems.  The structure creates a critical foundation and a 
mechanism for accountability from which a successful process for collaborative 
governance may be built.   
 The agency must construct the framework and provide a sense of mission, but then 
should trust in the process and the people to produce good outcomes.  Any group 
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activity is going to inherently go through the classic steps of group process, the RACs 
are no exception.  The agency should empower the group to address specific issues 
it struggles with but also let go of the reigns and allow the group the freedom and 
ability to build the process, identify issues of interest, and collectively formulate 
advice on those issues without the agency maintaining a tight grip.  After all, the 
agency must retain final decision making authority.  This empowerment to self-
organize increases the engagement of the membership which contributes to the 
social bonds built within the group, and ultimately the strength of the process itself.  
A strong and empowered group inevitably improves the likelihood of producing 
high-quality, tangible outcomes.  
 Both the participants and the Agency overseeing the group need to understand the 
value the process contributes to the landscape.  Trust is built when commitments 
are carried out, interests are satisfied, and mutual value is realized. If the members 
don’t perceive more value gained from participating in the process than they can 
find elsewhere, they will seek satisfaction of their interests through other means.  If 
the agency doesn’t perceive value resulting from its effort, the process becomes just 
another box to check in a long to-do list of procedural requirements.  Value is 
realized not only through a successful process but also from the on-the-ground 
implications of the process.  Implementing a mechanism that transparently tracks 
the recommendations and advice given through the agency’s decision making 
process could simultaneously communicate the value the RAC adds to on-the-
ground management and hold the agency accountable for honoring the outcomes of 
the public engagement process it purports to value so highly.  
 An engaged and empowered public is the strongest asset to any collaborative group.  
Building loop-backs to public engagement strengthens the public’s perception of the 
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group and elicits a perception of direct access to and influence over decisions that 
are unavailable through other means. Investing both time and resources into 
cultivating public engagement is critical to continued success.  
 Capitalize on partnership opportunities.  One final place where the RAC program 
could be improved is in their ability to capitalize on the social and political good will 
that is built through the process.  By utilizing this conduit to engage outside groups, 
build spin-off partnerships, and capitalize on the improved relationships and 
communicative ability produced the ECR circle of life is connected.  Engaging the 
membership and the public in collectively implementing and monitoring 
management actions has been a major element of the next generation of policy 
mandated collaboration (within the CFLRP and SRS programs).  This can lead to 
improved working relationships between the public and the agency by 
collaboratively engaging in comprehensive action on the ground.  
 
The RACs and their predecessors, the Grazing Advisory Boards and Citizen Advisory 
Boards, are a nearly eighty-year experiment in collaborative governance over public land 
and resource management.  They have endured multiple efforts to reform their operation 
and limit their influence, but they have also been consistently regarded as a critical conduit 
for public participation within the Department of the Interior.  The lingering question is 
whether by hearing from the agreeable middle, an agency is better able to deal with the 
fringes on either end.  This is one of the eternal questions regarding the use of collaborative 
decision making and alternative dispute resolution processes.  On the other side, the 
question remains: should the radical fringe hold up progress that the 80% in the middle 
agree upon?  This is an enduring tension in any area of public policy and the RAC certainly 
can’t resolve that debate as of yet.  However, we should learn from the past, and as it exists 
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today, the RAC program is one tool that for twenty years has demonstrated an ability to 
improve relationships between the public and the land managers, produce balanced, 
consensus-based advice over natural resource management, and to manage conflicts over 
natural resource decision making in a healthy and productive way.   
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Appendix I: Letter of Informed Consent and Interview Guide  
 
Letter of Informed Consent to Study Participants 
 
Study Title:  Instituting Collaborative Conservation in Public Lands Management 
 
Principle Investigator:     Faculty Advisor: 
Benjamin Donatelle      Dr. Len Broberg 
MS Candidate, Environmental Studies   Professor, Environmental Studies Department 
University of Montana, JRH 106A    University of Montana, JRH 106A 
Phone: (406)580-1657    Phone: (406)243-5209 
Email: Benjamin.donatelle@umontana.edu   Email: len.broberg@mso.umt.edu 
 
 
Purpose: 
You are being asked to take part in a research study analyzing the effects of institutionalizing, or mandating through law or policy, 
collaboration in public lands management.  This study is exploring the relationship and effectiveness of policy-mandated 
collaboration in resolving conflict and increasing public participation in public lands management, by exploring the Bureau of Land 
Management’s Resource Advisory Councils (BLM RACs) as a model.  You have been invited to participate because of your 
involvement with a BLM RAC working on public lands management issues or project planning and implementation on federal public 
lands in your area.  The results of this research will be used to partially fulfill the requirements for a master’s degree in 
environmental studies at the University of Montana by the principle investigator.  The project findings may also be submitted for 
publication in relevant scientific journals, or for review by the BLM and/or other federal land management agencies, but will be done 
without any information that could identify you as a participant.   
 
Procedures: 
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be interviewed by the principle investigator listed above.  Your records will 
be kept confidential and will not be released without your consent except as required by law.  Your interview can take place in 
person or over the phone, whichever is most convenient for you.  The interview session will last between 45 and 60 minutes.  In 
addition to this statement of informed consent, you have also received a copy of the interview questions/guide.  You may have a 
colleague or person of higher authority review the questions and/or be present during the interview if you think that is necessary.  
Your interview will be recorded with your permission, transcribed by the investigator, and its content analyzed for themes and 
commonalities with other participants in this study.  The audiotape will be transcribed without any information that could identify 
you and the tape will then be erased or otherwise destroyed.   Your name, this form, and any other identifying information will be 
kept separate from the recording, and you will not be identified in the report or any other written documents.  If the results of this 
study are written in a scientific journal, presented at a scientific conference, or submitted to the BLM or other land management 
agency, neither your name nor any other identifying information will be used. 
There is no anticipated discomfort for those contributing to this study, so risk to participants is minimal.  However, answering the 
questions may cause you to think about past conflict situations with other participants in your group and may bring up feelings that 
make you sad or upset.  There is no promise that you will receive any benefit from taking part in this study, but your participation 
may help to increase general understanding of the effects of requiring collaborative processes in public lands planning and 
management.  Your decision to take part in this research study is entirely voluntary, and you may refuse to take part in or withdraw 
from the study at any time.  By giving your verbal consent at the beginning of our call, you are agreeing to an interview that will 
cover general information about and your perception of participating in a Bureau of Land Management Resource Advisory Council 
(BLM RAC).   
 
If you have any questions about the research now or during the study contact: Benjamin Donatelle, by telephone at (406)580-1657, 
or by email at benjamin.donatelle@umontana.edu.  To ensure that your rights as a research participant have been safeguarded, this 
study has been reviewed by the University of Montana Institutional Review Board.   If you have any questions regarding your rights as 
a research subject, you may contact the UM Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (406) 243-6672. 
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Interview Guide: Instituting Collaboration in the BLM’s using Resource Advisory 
Councils  
 
The following questions are meant to guide personal interviews with participants in and observers of Bureau of Land 
Management Resource Advisory Councils (BLM RACs).  The focus of this inquiry is the exploration of an institutionalized 
model of collaboration over public lands and resource management within a federal land management agency.  
 
Prior to Beginning: Can you please confirm that you have received and read the statement of informed consent, that all your 
questions and concerns have been answered or addressed to your satisfaction, and that you agree to take part in this research 
project?  
 
Interview Questions:  
1) Stakeholders and interest group representatives often have very different reasons for joining a collaborative 
group.  Could you talk about why you became involved with the RAC and what keeps you coming back? (BLM 
Representatives: Could you talk about the value you and the BLM gets from being involved with the RAC?) 
a. How long have you been involved, and what was your motivation to become involved? 
i.  Why do you stay?  
ii. What has been challenging about participating in the RAC? Most rewarding? 
b. What has been your experience with other collaborative groups? 
i. How does the RAC compare? 
c. What interest category do you represent in the RAC? 
2) Successful collaborative efforts often have distinct features of their processes in common.  Could you talk about the 
RAC’s operating process, how you define success, to what degree you feel the RAC is meeting its definition of 
success, and what enables it to be successful? 
a. How does the RAC decide on the issues it discusses and make final decisions or recommendations? 
b. How does the RAC manage conflict among members?  
i. Does the RAC use neutral 3rd party facilitation?  
ii. What is the DFO’s role in managing conflict? 
c. How does the RAC engage the public and/or interest group constituents on the issues it discusses?  
3) Collaborative processes often sustain themselves because of their ability to achieve results.  What results have you 
observed from working with the RAC that sustains this process, and why do you feel it has been able to sustain 
itself? 
a. What formal agreements have been reached, projects implemented, or resources improved as a result of 
RAC recommendations? 
b. How has the BLM used recommendations the RAC puts forth? 
c. How has participation in the RAC process affected working relationships with other members of the 
group?  
i. With members of the public? 
ii. With other collaborative groups? 
d. How does the RAC solicit and empower new members? 
4) The RAC program is an example of an institutionalized collaborative process of public lands and resource 
management.  Thinking in terms of setting up future process for success, what advice would you give policy 
makers trying to better institutionalize collaboration in natural resource planning and decision making? 
a. What do you see as the benefits of participating in the RAC? Drawbacks? 
b. How does the RAC provide opportunities for or limit discussion topics? 
i. Are there issues or problems you feel you would like to discuss in the RAC but cannot? Why or 
Why not? 
c. What challenges does the RAC face in achieving its goals or defined criteria for success? 
5) Who else should I be talking to about this particular RAC? What other questions should I ask? 
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Appendix II: Evaluation Criteria 
 
Process Criteria 
 
Description Key Words 
Representation and 
Inclusiveness 
Includes representatives of all relevant and significantly 
different interests. Provides substantial opportunity for public 
input and incorporates public input in formulating options and 
decisions. 
other interests, diverse 
interests, perspectives, 
comments 
Shared purpose Process is driven by a purpose and tasks that are real, and 
shared by the group.  Group is able to identify and prioritize 
issues collectively. 
Common ground, shared 
values, compromise, 
Self-Organization/ 
Procedural Fairness 
Allows participants to decide on ground rules, objectives, tasks, 
working groups, and discussion topics; and treats all parties 
equally and respectfully in the establishment of such 
procedures. 
shared development, had 
my say, felt heard,  
Engagement and 
Empowerment 
Engages participants, keeping them at the table, interested and 
learning through in-depth discussion, drama, humor, and 
informal interaction. Enables participants to influence the 
decisions of officials or administrators. 
Influenced management, 
felt empowered,  
encouraged, gained 
access,  
Deliberativeness Fosters creative thinking, shared learning, examination of each 
other’s assumptions, identification of common interests, out-of-
the-box ideas, and challenges to the status-quo 
common interests, 
understand  other 
perspectives, learned a 
lot,  shared learning 
Builds Consensus  Seeks consensus only after discussions have fully explored the 
issues and interests and significant effort has been made to find 
creative responses to differences 
Consensus, all agreed, we 
all decided, Collaborative 
decision 
Outcome Criteria Description 
 
Key Words 
Produces Agreements Produces high-quality agreements (formal recommendations in 
the RACs case) that are agreed upon by the participants and 
substantially satisfies their interests. 
Came to agreement, 
provided advice, 
developed 
recommendations  
Ends Stalemate Ends stalemate, increases understanding, and results in the 
implementation of agreed upon projects, activities, or plans. 
Overcome conflict, get 
along, understand each 
other, respect other 
perspectives. 
Efficient in Costs v. 
Benefits 
Compared favorably with other planning methods in terms of 
costs and benefits. 
time commitments, 
Efficient process, less 
costs, beneficial,  
Increases Creativity Produces creative ideas or innovations that would not 
otherwise be achieved. 
Creative results, new 
ideas, see things they 
weren’t thinking about  
Builds Social and 
Political capital 
Builds trust and results in improved working relationships 
between participants, agencies, and the public.  Results in 
improved ability to be responsive to future change and conflict. 
build relationships, 
understand other points 
of view, build trust, 
respect,      
Information 
resources 
Produces high-quality information that participants agree upon, 
understand, and accept.  Results in learning and change beyond 
the group. 
Shared knowledge, 
understand the issues,  
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Appendix III: RAC Themes Tables 
 
Table III – I: Key Benefits of participating in the RAC 
 
Key Benefits Representative Quote Corroborating 
Theory 
Access to decisions and 
decision makers 
We worked really closely with permittees and our goal was to improve grazing 
management...So it was really important for us to have a connection with the 
public land agencies and of course the BLM RAC was a great opportunity to do 
that. 
 
The RAC for me was of interest to one, build relationships with the land 
managers but also just to find out if there was more of a role for us to be 
playing in terms of how BLM works on river management issues in general, and 
to be able to have access to more of a cross cut of the public and 
environmental field in general and how they interact with the BLM. 
Engagement and 
empowerment 
Opportunity to influence 
decisions and land or 
resource management 
When we help the managers see something they weren’t really considering 
and if that was a way to save, to keep a process valuable for the public, I think 
that’s a really good thing;  
 
There’s a ton of influence and diversity on BLM RACs and they have an 
incredibly sway on public land management policy, and hardly anyone knows 
what the heck they are. 
Engagement and 
empowerment 
Stay informed on the 
issues affecting public 
lands and resources 
The reason I applied for the RAC was I knew it... was a forum that I could stay 
informed on BLM issues across the state. 
 
Deliberativeness 
Mutual education and 
shared learning between 
the diverse interests leads 
to discovering common 
ground 
It’s interesting sometimes to sit back and listen to their philosophies and how 
they got them, then you sit down over lunch or something and tell them yours 
and, “...oh, I never really thought of that...”  Or you realize that you hadn’t 
thought about their position. I often have felt that two people, equally 
informed seldom disagree.  That’s where I come from. 
 
Being able to...understand the cross section and how these different land 
management mandates intersect with each other and how the different uses 
intersect with each other, that is really valuable. 
Deliberativeness 
Learn about diverse 
perspectives of the issues 
I think what’s most rewarding is to have a group you feel you can share with 
pretty honestly, and they...they began to see that it wasn’t that easy. That 
their perspective was one piece of a very large and much more complex puzzle. 
And they became a very valuable member of the RAC because of their 
background but also because they kind of grew and changed a little bit in the 
process. 
Representation and 
Inclusiveness, 
Deliberativeness 
Builds trust and 
communicative ability 
which  improves 
relationships between 
interests 
 It’s a trust building experience. When you sit across the table from somebody 
who has almost diametrically opposed views of what public land is for, if you 
can sit across the table from them or next to them for two years, and as long as 
you keep it civil, people tend to change their perspective a little...I at least 
understand why they feel the way they do... 
 
It improved my ability to communicate with people outside of the box that I 
normally travel in. 
Social and political 
capital 
Builds political good will 
around controversial 
issues 
The RAC, being a spectrum of public peers, validates the decisions we made 
and shows that the agency is listening to the concerns of the public which 
ultimately helps to improve trust. 
Social and political 
capital 
Provides political cover to 
make difficult decisions 
To be able and look them in the eye and say look we have a RAC that is truly 
representative of the population...they brought me these recommendations 
and I agree.  I think it provides some legitimate political cover for the state 
director to make the right decision rather than be pressured into a decision by 
a particular group. 
Social and Political 
Capital 
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Process of discussions 
results in consensus based 
agreements that enhances 
management decisions 
...the formal recommendations we make to the BLM. Whenever we do a 
resolution or make a formal recommendation on an issue to the BLM that feels 
like there’s some accomplishment.  I also feel like whenever we take on a new 
subject...we go from not knowing really anything about it to understanding a 
great deal about the project. I think there is a strong sense of accomplishment 
around learning; us collectively learning 
Produces 
Agreements 
 
 
 
Table III – II: Features enabling RAC success 
 
Enabling Features Representative Quote Corroborating 
Theory 
The structure  ...there is a strong structure on the front end. I think the fact that we have, that 
there is FACA...all of those structural pieces are actually really important, and 
they provide a common set of rules, or set of circumstances that level the 
playing field for participating. 
 
...we can come to the RAC and say we’re struggling with this and without 
having to go out and form a blue ribbon panel, we already have one set up for 
us...and because it’s a federal advisory committee chartered group, we can use 
that stuff, we can take that recommendation and write it right into an 
alternative that we can write an analysis on. 
 
The benefits [of the RAC], as opposed to the grassroots performance, is that 
you have the funding, the logistics are all set up, you know where you’re 
meeting, there is a meeting space that has been reserved, you set aside three 
days and go in and do it...So we’ve gotten over that first hurdle of grassroots 
development...sometimes that’s where you get stuck, but that’s the one thing 
that we’re doing well so how do we take advantage of that.  
Representation and 
Inclusiveness, 
Engagement and 
Empowerment 
Finding the right people 
who want to work 
towards solutions  
You can pick advocates for any interest, you know from recreation, to grazing, 
to oil and gas, you can put those people together but if they can’t work for a 
common solution, then you’re not going to accomplish your purpose...you can 
get more bodies who are advocates, but will they be able to look at a problem 
and see other people’s point of view and respect that and work to find win-win 
solutions, if you can’t do that then you have a problem. 
 
...a RAC is only as good as the representation that’s on it. 
Representation 
Engaging the public I think [the RAC is] very grass-rootsey. Each RAC member represents a public 
constituency, so that RAC member is getting feedback and information and 
there is a two-way communication with those constituents that they 
represent...[it’s] the representative democracy piece. 
Inclusiveness 
Sub-RACs ...essentially [with sub-RACs] we have a  need to get the actual people from 
that field office who are using the land to advise us on how we should be 
advising the BLM...So the key there, is working with... who might be interested 
and who might be able to contribute to the process valuably and then making 
sure we, the RAC, are giving the sub-RAC the freedom to make 
recommendations as they see fit, that we have a RAC liaison that brings that 
information back to the RAC and says this is what the Sub-RAC said, and then 
we can decide what to do with that information... 
Inclusiveness 
Support from the Agency 
to organize the 
discussions and develop 
the agenda 
It’s kind of a collaborative process for putting agenda items on for the next 
meeting. We get feedback from the BLM on what they’re working on, what 
they think we might be interested in, but we also self-identify topics that we 
either want to discuss and make recommendations on, or that we want to 
learn more about...There’s themes – you know grazing, energy development, 
wild horses, recreation are all reoccurring topics for our RAC 
Self-organization 
and Shared 
purpose, 
empowerment and 
engagement 
Relationships built 
contribute to shared 
understanding 
RAC members have taken the time to get to know each other outside of the 
meetings and can understand where each other is coming from. 
Deliberativeness 
 
Establishes procedures for 
shared learning 
On more complex issues we form work groups to study the issues and make 
recommendations to the full RAC. 
Deliberativeness 
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communication about 
difficult issues facilitates 
educating each other from 
diverse interests  
We did a really good job helping the recreation and energy folks understand 
the issues with grazing, and in the same turn, the recreation and energy folks 
educated us old cowboys. 
 
 
Builds Consensus 
Balanced representation 
and deliberate 
conversations improves 
ability to reach decisions 
...if someone totally can’t live with a decision that everyone is making, and is 
totally 100% against it, then you discuss it until you get to a better place 
 
We’ll have a majority of what I’ll call unanimous decisions because of the way 
that our council works, that’s with representation of each category on the sub-
groups, and getting information out prior to our meetings so you have an 
opportunity to take a look at it...if it’s a point that we can’t reach unanimous 
decision then we’ll send it back to the sub-group until the next meeting 
Builds Consensus 
Produces agreements on 
complex management 
issues 
The more that we can learn from one another and make well thought out, well 
rounded recommendations to the BLM the better we’re doing. 
Produces 
Agreements 
 
 
 
Table III – III: Common Challenges 
 
Theme Representative Quote Corroborating 
Theory 
The BLM has to be 
open to the process 
[The] challenges sort of stem from that history and the reluctance of the agency to 
even have a RAC and I think they express that hesitation by trying to constrain some 
of what the RAC does;  
 
I know before I got on the RAC the State Director didn’t use the RAC at all. They had 
meetings that weren’t particularly productive at all, and sometimes that State 
Director just didn’t convene the RAC because I think there was some question as to 
whether that RAC would go in the direction that director wanted it to go in. 
Empowerment and 
Engagement 
 
The design structure There is a balance to be found between creating the guidelines, providing the 
cemented structure to get people inside, and letting go of the reigns a little, finding 
the space within those guidelines to move around. 
 
I think you need a little bit of a sense of mission when you put these collaborative 
groups together. Perhaps if the BLM could produce a bit more sense of mission, and 
perhaps that’s really the option of the State Director, the Secretary isn’t going to get 
involved in that, but if the State Director was motivated to use that RAC and has any 
administrative skills at all, he or she could find some things that not only meets his 
or her needs but also takes advantage of the various skills and informational levels 
that that appointed RAC brings 
Empowerment and 
engagement, Self-
organization 
Time Commitment That’s a real challenge, the learning curve, and getting up to speed to really feel 
valuable. 
Empowerment,  
Efficiency 
The agenda  We don’t design our own agenda and the agenda is usually pretty banal. 
 
We didn’t seem to have an agenda that anyone was interested in polling us in. 
Self-organization 
The appointment 
process 
You’re constantly taking on new members, and...because the old members are no 
longer official, and the new members haven’t been approved, you run the risk of not 
having a quorum. 
Efficiency and 
efficacy 
Public engagement ...it’s supposed to be a conversation between the RAC members, who are 
representing the public and the BLM...opportunity for public input at every 
meeting...but it’s not really designed to solicit public input because the RAC 
members themselves are supposed to be the public input...If every one of those was 
a public meeting, you would just get distracted 
Inclusiveness 
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Table III – IV: Process Design Theory 
 
Model Theory Representative Quote(s) Correlation with 
evaluation criteria 
Recruit diverse interests.  
 
Put the focus on the 
interests.  
BLM does an excellent job in selecting the RAC members; people 
who are willing to work together. 
 
A RAC is only as good as the representation that’s on it... 
 
To me the biggest value is that we have a broad range of interests 
and opinions and backgrounds, [and] when you bring all those 
people together you get a diverse set of viewpoints on what the 
BLM is doing... 
Representation and 
Inclusiveness; Procedural 
Fairness 
Involve interests in 
deliberative dialogue.  
 
Build loop-backs to 
negotiation 
[The RAC is] such a cross section of people. You don’t agree with 
everybody’s philosophies...but you just have to work together and 
try to find some common ground. 
 
 
Deliberativeness, Shared 
Purpose, Self-organization, 
Builds Social and Political 
Capital. 
Provide opportunities to 
compare options.   
 
Arrange in a low-to-high cost 
sequence  
 
Consultation before... 
To come up with position statements and recommendation letters 
to our state BLM agency that they could put in an EIS, I think that 
speaks volumes for a group of citizens that have varied interests 
 
...everybody gets to look at what the proposals are prior to the 
meeting.  We’ll have...representation of each category on the sub-
groups, and getting information out prior to our meetings so you 
have an opportunity to take a look at it...if it’s a point that we can’t 
reach unanimous decision then we’ll send it back to the sub-group 
until the next meeting  
Deliberativeness; Ends 
Stalemate; Builds 
Consensus;  
 
Effect change by applying 
citizen input to decision 
making and implementation.  
 
Provide necessary 
motivation, skills, and 
resources. 
 
...feedback after 
People know each other, work together, respect each other, they’re 
willing to make compromises. 
 
You come to respect the other side... 
 
It’s a trust building experience... 
 
Overall, I think they’ve been pretty successful at talking through 
issues and reaching consensus. 
Engagement and 
Empowerment;  
Produces Agreements, 
Shared Information 
Resources, Increases 
Creativity, and Ends 
Stalemate  
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Appendix IV: RAC Recommendations and Advice Table 
 
RAC Arizona Utah Wyoming Colorado FR 
Recommendations 
or Advice 
Secretary’s  Themes 
and Priorities – BLM 
asking for advice. (Jan 
2014) 
FEB '14 RAC MEETING 
- DEVOTED to 
developing advice to 
BLM on Sage Grouse 
DEIS - RAC advice: Not 
picking an alternative 
but saying, BLM 
should continue to 
work for ways to bring 
the two (State and 
FWS plans) 
alternatives closer 
together... 
(Feb 2014) 
Analyzed WH&B 
subcommittee 
position paper - no 
recommended 
changes (Nov'13) 
Suggested WH&B 
position paper may 
need to be reissued to 
reinforce 
recommendations  
 
Letter of Support for 
Pikes Peak National 
Historic Trail 
Sonoran Landscape 
Pilot Project – 
recreation, education 
and outreach strategy 
– BLM asked RAC for 
advise – no 
recommendations yet 
(Jan 2014) 
NLCS strategy - 
rewrite document w/ 
general public as 
intended audience. 
MOTION - RAC 
recommends the BLM 
review summary and 
comments from the 
RAC as guide to 
rewrite of the 
document to bring 
back to the RAC by 
June 21st 
Recommendation: 
Assemble a bentonite 
and uranium working 
group  to consider: 
streamlining approval 
process, (3809 
working group)- 
(Mar'14) 
 
Advice on EA for AMP 
– suite of 
recommendations re: 
fence removal, weed 
control, watering 
sites, adjusted grazing 
limits. (May 2014) 
Recreation and Fees – 
all three approved 
(Feb 2013) 
BLM should 
implement regulatory 
mechanisms (9-plan); 
control cheatgrass; 
control juniper; 
reclamation and 
restoration of 
disturbances; engage 
SGIT and local working 
groups (June'14) 
 
Suggesting re-writing 
a protocol to adjust 
how the RAC and 
RecRAC work together 
- motion passed (May 
2014) 
Grand Staircase-
Escalante NM Fee 
proposal - Approved 
unanimously (Jan'14) 
Transparency Position 
paper provided 
recommendations on 
enhancing roles in the 
planning process; BLM 
WY will incorporate 
recommendations 
into next revision of 
Instruction 
Memorandum (IM) 
that guides staff 
(Sept'14) 
 
Climate Change and 
Healthy Landscapes 
(Sept. 2014) 
Moab FO Rec Fee 
proposal - Approved 
unanimously (Jan'14) 
 
Recommendation - 
BLM should 
collaborate w/ local 
certified governments 
during cultural 
consultation process 
on Cultural issues 
 
 Forest Service - three 
fee proposals - 
approved 
unanimously (Jan'14) 
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 Special Recreation 
Permit Fee proposal 
and roles/ 
responsibilities of the 
RAC/FS/BLM under 
REA (Aug'14)  
MOTION - RAC to 
write a letter to 
Secretary expressing 
frustration and 
discontent change  
affecting BLM Utah's 
ability to provide 
quality recreation 
experiences - CC'd to 
congressional 
delegation. 
  
Sub-RACs Arizona 
Sub-RACs 
Utah 
Sub-RACs 
Wyoming Sub-RACs Colorado FR Sub-
RACs 
 Grazing  - see 
recommendation #1 
above 
 3809 work group - id 
6 areas for potential 
streamlining: pre-
scoping; improve 
communication 
between BLM+DEQ; 
improve Fed Register 
notice process; clarify 
section 106; Refine 
NEPA documents; 
Training on 3809 
procedures (June'14) 
Royal Gorge RMP – 
formed Aug 2014 
Section 106  Transparency and 
openness in NEPA  
RAC subgroup 
 
 
Wild Horse and Burro    
Friends Groups and 
Partnerships  (Sept. 
2014) 
   
 
RAC Colorado 
NW   
Colorado 
SW 
Idaho –  
Boise 
Idaho –  
CDA 
Recommendations 
and Advice 
Wild horse roundtable 
with public to discuss 
management options 
– keep it on the 
agenda (May 2014) 
BLM asked RAC to 
help with concepts to 
keep wild and 
domestic sheep 
separated 
(Aug 2013) 
Member asks for BLM 
to focus on presenting 
to the RAC challenges 
and opportunities 
rather than status 
updates (Nov 2012) 
Increase in 
Recreation Fees at 
four sites (Feb 2012)  
Wild Horse Resolution 
- Supporting sand 
wash pilot area 
project - motion 
seconded, vote will be 
via email. (May 2014)  
Seeking RAC input on 
land acquisition in Tres 
Rios - Contiguous 
parcels; Riparian 
habitat areas (May 
2014)  
 
DRAFT letter to O.C. 
Commissioners 
presented - RAC 
decided to talk to 
other ID RACs before 
sending the letter. 
(April 2013) 
Discussion on: 
Natural Resource 
Damage Assessment 
& Restoration 
Program – Role of the 
RAC? Involved in 
work on BLM lands; 
letters of support for 
projects. (Feb 2012) 
RAC proposes: Writing 
a letter to National 
Wild Horse Advisory 
Board with 
suggestions of ideas, 
writing to other RACs. 
(May 2014)  
 Motion: RAC provide a 
resolution in favor of 
the Paradigm Project - 
motion passed 
(Jan 2014) 
Sheep Fire Salvage 
Timber Sale RAC to 
support timber sale – 
unanimous; RAC to 
draft letter of 
support 
(March 2013) 
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Sutey Ranch Land 
Exchange – Acquisition 
presents opportunity 
for RAC to be involved 
in management 
(Aug 2014) 
  RAC to draft letter to 
send to State 
Director requesting 
more Emergency 
Stabilization and 
Rehabilitation (ES&R) 
funds (March 2013) 
NW RAC passed 
resolution supporting 
chemical vasectomy in 
Sand Wash (Aug 2014) 
 
   
BLM looking for 
support from RAC to 
move forward with 
proposal for North 
Sand Hills – vote 
forthcoming (Aug 
2014) 
   
HORSE RESOLUTION - 
draft a letter to other 
RACs to collectively 
solve problems, 
encourage better 
volunteer 
participation. (Dec 
2014) 
 
   
Sub-RAC Colorado NW Sub-
RACs 
Colorado SW Sub-
RACs 
Idaho Boise  
Sub-RACs 
Idaho CDA Sub-
RACs 
 Fencing – 
recommended BLM do 
more fencing for 
permittees – 
committee dissolved 
(March 2014) 
Uncompahgre FO RMP 
– RAC approved using 
sub-group for 
RMP/public outreach 
 
BLM Requested that 
RAC form a sub-
committee to work on 
the project: to review 
resources and make 
recommendations 
(Nov 2013)  
 
 
 Colorado River Valley 
FO RMP -  
Oil and Gas – intent of 
the group was public 
education (Aug 2013) 
Important for group to 
hear concerns outside 
of public comment 
periods (Nov 2014). 
Will designate a sub-
committee to work w/ 
local WH&B program 
(Jan 2014). 
 
 White River FO TMP – 
BLM asked RAC to 
form sub-group – Sub-
group formed w/ vote 
(December 2014) 
   
 
 
RAC Idaho –  
ID Falls 
Idaho – 
Twin Falls 
Montana 
East 
Montana  
Central 
Recommendations 
or Advice 
RAC members 
encouraged to 
network/solicit for 
new RAC members 
(Jan 2013) 
Motion: Draft a 
response, not going to 
take on the issue (ID 
Standards and 
Guideline Review) at 
this time  - passed  
(June 2013) 
Pumpkin Creek Area 
recreation 
development and 
Restoration - What 
RAC involvement? - 
hope for help in 
seeking public 
comments for use; 
increase public 
awareness 
(March 2013) 
Campground Fees – 
support fee increases 
– passed 
unanimously  
(May 2013)  
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Caribou-Targhee NF 
proposed cabin rental 
fee - Motion to 
approve fee passed 
unanimously 
(April 2013)  
Sage Grouse DEIS 
discussion/recommen
dation -  RAC to 
support ALT E w/ 
adjusted mapping to 
include more leks (use 
maps from ALT D). 
Motion Passes: 12:1; 3 
abstain 
(Jan 2014) 
BLM asked RAC to be 
ready to approve or 
propose Pompey's 
Pillar plan at next 
meeting 
(March 2013) 
Lewistown RMP - 
BLM Asked RAC to be 
involved in the 
process - taken 
under consideration 
no commitment for a 
sub-group but 
commitment from 
entire RAC to look at 
RMP (Sept 2013)  
Salmon/Challis NF Rec 
Fee proposal – 
Unanimous approval 
of new and increased 
fees (Jan 2014)  
Planning 2.0 - RAC 
expressed concerned 
about this weakening 
the voice of the RAC 
(June 2014)  
Pompey's Pillar 
motion to approve the 
new fee schedule – 
approved  
(Sept 2013)  
RAC was asked to 
change the way 
public comment 
period was run. 
Public comment is 
not to carry on 
dialogue...  We don't 
interact with the 
public so we can 
have a productive 
meeting and not 
debates. (May 2014)  
  NLCS Letter: overall 
supportive of NLCS 
strategy – approved 
unanimously 
(sept 2013) 
Request: add land 
swap/monument to 
agenda 
(May 2014) 
   Motion made and 
passed - letter of 
support for WMT RAC 
proposal to extend 
RAC members terms 
beyond 3 years until 
Secretary appoints 
new member 
(May 2014)   
Missouri Breaks 
Interpretive Center 
Fee increase – 
passage unclear 
(May 2014) 
 
    The Central Montana 
RAC endorses 
Director Kornze’s 
proposal to revamp 
the BLM’s Planning 
Process.  (May 2014) 
   The term of a RAC 
member will end 
after 3 years; 
however if upon 
expiration of the 
member’s term, a 
replacement has not 
been appointed, the 
outgoing term will be 
extended until the 
Secretary has 
appointed a person 
to fill that position 
(May 2014) 
    
Sub-RACs Idaho Falls Sub-
RACs 
Idaho Twin Falls 
Sub-RACs 
MT East 
Sub-RACs 
MT Central 
Sub-RACs 
 Sub-committee 
formed for 
Curlew/Deep Creek 
TMP (Aug 2013)  
Sage Grouse Sub-
committee will meet 
in Nov. (Sep 2013) 
 
Pumpkin Creek 
Committee -  
Suggestion that RAC 
form a citizens 
committee to solicit 
public input 
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(Sept 2013)  
RAC formed sub-
committee to work on 
Pocatello TMP  
(Jan 2014)  
Jarbidge RMP 
(Jan 2014) 
Pumpkin Creek 
Committee officially 
formed - develop a 
proposal/ 
recommendation to 
BLM to finalize a 
multiple use plan for 
area  
(May 2014)  
 
Considering sub-
committee to review 
Thompson Creek Mine 
Draft EIS  
(Jan 2014)  
Wild Horse and Burro 
(Jan 2014) 
  
 Gateway West 
(Jan 2014) 
  
 Cedar Fields and 
Castle Rocks Closures 
(Jan 2014) 
  
 Sage Grouse  
(Jan 2014) 
  
 
RAC Montana 
Western 
NM –  
Albuquerque 
NM – 
Farmington  
NM – 
Las Cruces  
Recommendations 
and Advice 
Approve 
recommendations on 
Rec Fees (March 2012) 
Rio Puerco RMP –  
recommendations 
highlighted preferred 
options 
(July 2014) 
Glade Run Recreation 
Area - Draft 
management plan – 
Deliverables for the 
RAC = Letter of 
support. 
(Feb 2013) 
RAC MOTION- support 
alt. A - passed 
unanimously (Feb'14) 
BLM asked for 
assistance from the 
RAC with recreation 
access issues (April 
2013) 
Forest Service - 
Earthquake Lake 
Visitor Center fee 
elimination  - 
approved  
(March 2012)  
 
Tent Rocks Monument 
is underfunded - 
Proposing to increase 
fees.  Proposal will be 
brought to RAC at a 
later date.  
(July 2014) 
 
Public Comment 
Periods - MOTION - 
follow sign-in 
protocol, limit 
speakers to five 
minutes, and disallow 
questions and answers 
- passed unanimously 
(Feb 2014)  
TriCounty RMP – 
BLM wants the use of 
firearms to be safe 
and in a proper area 
– Requests RAC 
assistance  
(Aug 2013)  
 
MOTION - reiterate 
and support 2007 
shooting restriction 
recommendations - 
passed unanimously 
(March 2012) 
Discussion: What 
should RAC be?  
Concerned that 
meetings are mostly 
informational; limited 
time to develop 
recommendations. 
BLM to provide 
information. Agenda 
and priorities need to 
be set by RAC. RAC 
should help with 
issues people are 
interested in before 
they get angry. (July 
2014)   
Tri-State Corridor - 
RAC to help on 
Management Plan 
(NOV 2013) 
BLM Asked RAC to 
keep own route 
inventory; attend 
training for travel 
management. 
(April 2014) 
Missouri River 
Recreation Fees – 
unanimously approved 
(June 2012) 
 Cebolla O&G EA - BLM 
asking for help to id 
information on a 
variety of issues for 
NEPA. (NOV 2013) 
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Discussion re: 
prioritizing timber 
salvage -beetle killed 
trees. RAC would like 
feedback from BLM on 
how areas are 
prioritized 
(June 2012)  
 Mancos/Gallup Shale 
RMP amendment - 
BLM request RAC 
assistance in 
addressing all issues 
that need to be 
addressed (NOV 2013) 
 
USFS Fee proposal - 
Passed unanimously  
(Aug 2013)  
 Chaco Canyon - BLM 
request RAC 
assistance in 
developing plan for 
leasing around 
National Historic Park; 
BLM feels EIS and 
NEPA proper place for 
public involvement 
 (NOV 2013) 
 
Motion for BLM to add 
Henneberry House to 
the cabin rental 
program. Unanimous. 
(Aug 2013)  
 Monument designated 
in March '13; BLM 
developing 
management plan - 
focus on public 
involvement - RAC to 
help developing 
alternatives 
(Nov 2013) 
 
  Planning 2.0 - BLM 
wants input from RAC 
on how to improve the 
process (May 2014) 
 
Sub-RAC MT West 
Sub-RACs 
NM Albuquerque Sub-
RACs 
NM Farmington 
Sub-RACs 
NM  
Las Cruces  
Sub-RACs 
 Subgroup - REC fees 
 
RMPs 
(Dec 2013) 
  
Subgroup developed 
to review EIS for Mid 
States Transmission 
Intertie (MSTI).  
El Malpais NCA  
(Dec 2013) 
  
Timber Subgroup - 
Asking BLM to 
prioritize resources to 
address dying timber 
 
Forestry Work 
(Dec 2013) 
  
 
